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This study investigates the extent to which post-conflict livelihoods change may contribute to 
conflict recurrence and a threat to human security. Post-conflict livelihoods studies (e.g. 
Jacobson 2002, 2005; Karf 2003; Werker 2007; Porter et al. 2008; Amirthalingam and 
Lakshman 2009, 2010) have for too long focused on refugee and internally displaced person 
camp settings. Justino (2009; 2011a; 2012) however, argues that these are inadequate in 
providing sustainable post-conflict peace not only because of the restricted focus on refugees 
but failure to address the fundamental livelihoods changes and the specific implications. This 
study examines the nature of livelihoods changes in a post-conflict transition non-camp context. 
It draws on Justino to adapt then use the sustainable livelihoods framework for the analysis of 
post-conflict livelihoods changes as a possible precursor for conflict recurrence in a non-camp 
setting.      
The study utilises a case study design, Buni Yadi, North-east Nigeria for an empirical 
investigation of a post-conflict scenario. It employs a mixed methods approach combining 
quantitative surveys, observations and in-depth discussions with men and women whose 
livelihoods have been disrupted following the Boko Haram insurgency to analyse post-conflict 
predicaments.  
The outcomes of the empirical investigation suggest heterogeneity in the livelihoods changes. 
Although they are mainly negative, evidence of positive resilience for the youths and women 
groups is observed. The study also found that post-conflict vulnerabilities are similar for camp 
and non-camp contexts in that the livelihoods experiences in the non-camp are mostly the 
extension of the camp conditions. However, while the livelihoods vulnerabilities in the camp 
contexts relate to legal, administrative, movement and economic restrictions, the existence of 
these challenges for the non-camp setting are insignificant. Instead, it is chronic post-conflict 
livelihoods deficiencies that are critical. 
The research concludes that the conflict-induced livelihoods changes may be instrumental in 
conflict recurrence given the deteriorating resilience and weak post-conflict living conditions 
which expose individuals, groups and the community to the vulnerability that may be exploited 
to instigate another round of conflict. This research confirms the consideration that while 
interaction of unresolved pre-conflict challenges and the post-conflict living conditions (Walter 
2004; Kreutz 2010; Hegre et al. 2011; Kantiok 2014) are essential, post-conflict livelihoods 
change whose vulnerability may be exploited by insurgents is a critical condition for conflict 
recurrence. The theoretical contribution of this research improves the analytical depth and 
application of the livelihoods framework to evaluate post-conflict context, while the empirical 
and methodological advancement is valuable for post-conflict recovery and development 
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Introduction to the Research: Insecurity Challenge 
1.1 Research Background: Persistent Insecurity  
Insecurity remains an intractable global human problem (Justino 2011a; Bennett et al. 
2017) which manifests in many forms such as the outright protests against regimes, 
insurgency, terrorism, religious extremism, kidnapping, ethnoreligious conflicts, human 
trafficking, militancy, armed robbery etc. These phenomena of violence and conflicts 
have varying devastating socio-economic consequences depending on the scale and 
nature of the disputes (Justino 2011; Call 2012). The challenge of insecurity is 
particularly dire in the contexts where Collier and Sambanis (2002) refer to as ‘conflict 
trap’ due to higher susceptibility to conflict recurrence. Conflict and its attendant 
consequences truncate both human and physical development, and exposure to the 
ensuing vulnerabilities often lead to conditions that manifest into conflict resurgence  
(Hegre et al. 2011). This thesis seeks to make theoretical and empirical contributions to 
the ongoing debate regarding conflict and its recurrence (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; 
Hartzell et al. 2001; Walter 2004; Ross 2006; Lujala 2010; Hegre et al. 2011; Keen 
2012; Aubrey et al. 2016; Barkindo 2016; Lamloum 2016). The study primarily examines 
the significance of post-conflict livelihoods change as a potential trigger for conflict 
recurrence (Justino 2012).  
While the causes of conflict remain contested (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Ross 
2006 and Lujala 2010), weak economic conditions and access to resources are essential 
motivations to taking up arms. Similarly, it is often argued that a previous armed 
conflict is a likely ‘stager’ for subsequent ones (Licklider 1995; Doyle and Sambanis 
2000 and Hartzell et al. 2001). This view draws from the consideration that unresolved 
grievances foster further rounds of conflict: previous conflicts re-enforce conditions that 
favour conflicts (resurgence) including the degeneration of social cohesion and mistrust 
and economic hardship (Hegre et al. 2011). In contrast, however, Walter (2004) affirms 
that conflict resurgence has often less to do with a previous one; but the existing post-
conflict vulnerabilities that could necessitate taking up arms or joining rebel groups as a 
means to survival. This study takes the Hirshleifer (1995; 2001) and Keen (2012) ‘all-
inclusive’ viewpoint in the debate to suggest that conflict recurrence is a function of a 
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complex interaction of unresolved undesirable conditions before a conflict, as well as 
post-conflict vulnerabilities from livelihood distortion. This position draws on the 
manifestations of the complex interactions of existing and evolving problems in many 
post-conflict contexts such as Syria, Tunisia and Nigeria (Aubrey et al. 2016; Barkindo 
2016; Lamloum 2016).  
Walter’s (2004) post-conflict view has been a subtle source of inspiration in many post-
conflict studies (e.g. Jacobsen 2002, 2005; Korf 2004; Werker 2007; Porter et al. 2008; 
Amirthalingam and Lakshman 2009, 2010). These have sought to understand the direct 
impact of conflict on various aspects of victims’ livelihoods in which the focus has been 
toward assessing the coping strategies of post-conflict communities as a means for 
identifying suitable post-conflict livelihood interventions. While these studies provide 
useful insight into post-conflict livelihoods strategies, Justino (2012) argues that the 
studies are insufficient to resolving post-conflict livelihoods challenges adequately. In 
other words, limiting the theorising of the post-conflict livelihoods to the coping 
strategy and the direct impact of conflict is inadequate for developing a sustainable 
intervention to prevent conflict recurrence. According to Justino (2009; 2011; 2012), the 
post-conflict analysis must adequately address both direct and indirect impacts of 
conflict to achieve long-term post-conflict security – livelihoods. The immediate 
(direct) impact in this sense refers to the physical destruction of infrastructure and 
livelihoods, while the indirect effect connotes the livelihoods changes that come with 
the conflict destructions. Addressing these two aspects helps to accomplish a holistic 
analysis of the post-conflict predicament, thereby prevent possible conflict relapse.  
However, research which investigates specific post-conflict livelihoods changes as a 
relevant precursor for conflict recurrence is limited (Justino 2009; 2011; 2012). Justino 
(2012a) reviews existing literature in an attempt to establish ‘channels of transmission’ 
between conflict and poverty leading to a repeated cycle of unrest. While focusing on 
the conflict-induced impact of social and political changes on livelihoods, the analysis is 
limited to war-time context whose conditions may be different from post-conflict 
livelihoods dynamics. This thesis, however, addresses this post-conflict time-dynamics 
limitation. While acknowledging the significance of investigating post-conflict 
livelihoods change, it may be challenging to achieve this without examining the direct 
impact of conflict. Exploring the physical destructions may, therefore, help to analyse 
better and understand specific livelihoods changes and implications that emanate from 
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the effects after the conflict. Furthermore, post-conflict investigations (based on 
livelihoods framework) focus more on the refugee and internally displaced person (IDP) 
camp context (e.g. Jacobsen 2002, 2005; Korf 2004; Werker 2007; Porter et al. 2008; 
Amirthalingam and Lakshman 2009, 2010). Also, these studies investigate individual 
aspects of post-conflict livelihoods at the expense of comprehensiveness that is 
emphasised in the framework to understand the linkages of the components better 
holistically (DFID 2000). Consequent to these, the comparative analysis on whether or 
not the post-conflict livelihoods predicaments in the camps are the same as the non-
camp contexts may be crucial for understanding conflict recurrence. In line with Justino 
(2012; 2012a), therefore, this study seeks to respond to the research question 
(objective):  
To what extent is post-conflict livelihood change a potential contributor to 
conflict recurrence and a threat to human security? 
Providing an answer to this question would undoubtedly add a perspective to the 
theorising of post-conflict discourse, specifically for the non-camp setting. While 
investigating this research question, the study draws on Justino (2009; 2011a; 2012) to 
broaden the theoretical analysis of post-conflict challenges in ways that pay critical 
attention to livelihoods changes. Review of livelihood changes may be useful for 
understanding the effects of those changes on human security and their potential for 
fostering conflict recurrence. The aim of the research, therefore, is to: 
To adapt then use the sustainable livelihoods framework for improved 
understanding and theorising of the nature of livelihoods changes and their 
implication on post-conflict human security and conflict recurrence in a non-
camp context. 
The sustainable livelihood approach – developed by the department for international 
development (DFID) is a broad people-centred development concept which prioritises 
relevant efforts for reducing poverty. The framework is designed for effective analysis 
and understanding the precarious living conditions of the poor as a complex interaction 
of various aspect of human needs. The primary objective of the concept is to promote 
efforts towards achieving sustainable development through its components such as 
improved quality education and healthcare, access to necessary infrastructure, access to 
affordable financial and natural resources (DFID 2000). However, while the concept 
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was developed initially for poverty alleviation in the rural non-conflict contexts, its 
flexibility allows the expansion to other settings which are stable (e.g. urban), non-
stable (conflict) or fragile and transition (e.g. post-conflict) (Jacobsen 2002). This 
framework is discussed in further depth in chapter four, which covers the utility and 
justification for its application for this study.   
The following methodological processes are employed for the thesis in an attempt to 
achieve the aim of this research:  
1) to establish a theoretical basis for understanding the dimensions of human 
security to identify the relevant factors that affect it. The consideration is to have 
a broadened view of the constituents of security and to determine how they 
interrelate. A review of the human security concept is particularly important for 
this research given the precarious living conditions and the lopsided conflict and 
post-conflict military intervention in the proposed case study (presented in 
chapter four). The dominance of the military intervention at the expense of 
livelihood efforts suffices to necessitate the review of the concept of human 
security for the study;  
2) to draw upon the theoretical concept in (1) to articulate conditions for conflict 
motivations and livelihoods changes in the post-conflict context. This objective 
explores the discourse on factors that instigate conflict as a way of situating the 
construct into the case study of this research. The review of the literature on the 
post-conflict livelihoods changes provide existing knowledge and inspiration for 
identifying areas that need to be broadened and justifies the utility of the 
livelihoods framework for this study explicitly;  
3) to develop a suitable methodological framework to contextualise the 
investigation based on the proposed case study for achieving the research 
question. With this, data is collected and analysed while inferences are drawn 
about the research findings; 
4) to present research contribution(s) – theoretical and empirical, following the 
discussion of the results. The contribution to the theorising of conflict 
resurgence adds to the existing discourse while the empirical contribution 
provides new perspectives to post-conflict livelihoods dynamics, which are 
useful for intervention practices. 
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This research contribution is particularly valuable for developing economies, given the 
depressing global security trend. As noted in the World Development Report (2011), the 
post-Cold War era, for instance, ushered in a change in the pattern of a global conflict 
from the dominance of interstate to intrastate conflicts with an apparent increase in 
conflict recurrence. The report underlines three discernible patterns namely (a) increase 
in disputes that are the continuation of previous ones; (b) decrease in the inter-state 
conflict starting from the end of Cold War giving way for increased internal conflicts in 
many states and (c) increasing concentration of violent recurring disputes in developing 
countries including sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 1.1).  
Figure 1.1: Global Trend on Conflicts 
Source: Adapted from World Development Report (2011)
Furthermore, the report shows a rather disturbing trend particularly for African conflicts 
which account for about 35% of all civil disputes in the 2000s (Figure 1.1) and the 
seeming non-abating trend in the continent's conflicts and their resurgence (World 
Development Report 2011:1). This concern for growing internal conflicts in Africa 
features prominently in the Habitat III Regional Report for Africa (UN 2017). The 
report underlines the surging new forms of security threats, particularly regarding 
precarious living conditions that have devastating consequences. Annan (2014), for 
instance, expresses worry that the wave of internal conflicts has had devastating costs 
on many African countries, and the adverse effects are enormous to the extent that some 
of its economies almost collapse while others rely on humanitarian aid to survive. These 
devastations are noticeable in the decades-long cycles of conflicts and atrocities in 
countries such as Somalia, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Burundi, Nigeria, 
Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Ivory Coast to 
mention few (Stewart 2008; Sturges 2008; Call 2012; Branch 2013; UN 2017; Corbin 
and Hall 2019).  
6 
This concern inspires the current research and assessment of the persisting insecurity, 
with a particular focus on the context of Nigeria. Nigeria has had its fair share of the 
internal conflicts which result from a variety of regional security dynamics such as 
those relating to resource utilisation (oil and gas) and competition (e.g. farmer-herder), 
secessionism and precarious living condition. The six geopolitical divisions in the 
country have predominantly weak and low-level human capital development in the 
northern regions and relatively prosperous south. Buni Yadi, Northeast Nigeria, is a 
post-conflict and transition non-camp settlement that is selected in a case study design 
for the empirical investigation. The adoption of Buni Yadi follows the identification of 
features that makes it suitable for investigating the research question. However, 
Nigeria’s regional insecurity diversity, the selection criteria and justification for using 
only one case study are discussed in greater depth in chapter four. This is to rationalise 
the current challenge of the case study to the theoretical underpinning for this research.    
1.2 Chapter Summary 
Chapter one is an introductory section of the study, which presents the broad subject – 
insecurity and the research question – livelihood change, for the investigation. The 
chapter points out that instability and conflict have continued to rack devastating 
consequences on communities all over the world. While a variety of theoretical 
arguments about the causes of conflict onset and recurrence exist, this research 
underlines the significance of precarious living conditions as a vulnerability factor 
which is exploited to instigate conflict and possibly its repetition. With a particular 
focus on the conflict recurrence, the chapter has presented an argument that post-
conflict studies have focused more on the direct impact of conflict thereby 
understudying other pertinent indirect aspects such as the post-conflict livelihoods 
change. A case is, therefore, made for exploring the potential implication of the 
livelihoods changes on conflict resurgence. Similarly, the chapter contends that post-
conflict studies had paid more attention to the refugee and IDP context hence the 
consideration for the post-conflict self-settled setting.  
The global security trend, which suggests a growing concentration of conflict recurrence 
in developing economies informed the choice of selecting Nigeria for this study. Four 
specific objectives are also presented in the chapter to guide the empirical investigation. 
These objectives include the reviews of the human security concept, conflict 
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motivations to justify the application of livelihoods and the contextualization of the 
inquiry for suitable methodology. However, the arguments, theories and methodological 
considerations that are introduced in this chapter are discussed in greater depth in the 
subsequent sections. Accordingly, the next chapter presents the first objective of this 
investigation, which focuses the discussion on the review of the human security concept 
regarding its evolution, ramification, threats and the relevance to this study.  
1.3 Structural Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into ten chapters and five sections including introduction, part 1-3 
and conclusion. Chapter one is the introduction, which has introduced the broader 
concern – insecurity, as well as the theoretical argument of the research – livelihood 
change and its implication on conflict recurrence. The chapter also highlights the 
potential theoretical approach for the study based on the contextual peculiarity of the 
case study for the investigation. The literature review follows the introduction. The 
literature review forms part one of the research and is divided into chapters two and 
three. Chapter two discusses the concept of human security. The analysis focuses on the 
historical development and the evolution of security concept from the state-centric to 
human-centric. It also examines the ramifications of human security, its inter-related 
components, as well as the need to have a holistic understanding of their threats. The 
theoretical concepts for the subject of this investigation are discussed explicitly in 
chapter three. The chapter reviews the theoretical debates on the conflict motivations 
leading to conflict onset and recurrence. Concepts such as the resource curse and greed 
and grievance are articulated in the chapter. These concepts provide insight into the 
justification for exploring the utility and suitability of the livelihood concept upon 
which this research is based.  
Part two covers the case study selection and the methodology in chapter four and five 
respectively. Chapter four examines the diverse security contexts in Nigeria and justifies 
the adoption of Buni Yadi as the case study. Chapter five - research methodology, 
begins by presenting the research question(s) and hypothesis. These, together with the 
theoretical underpinning of the research, informed the choice of the research design and 
strategy which guided the fieldwork. The chapter presents a detailed description of the 
utility of the case study design and mixed methods strategy for the fieldwork. The 
results of the empirical investigation follows as part three. This part covers chapters six, 
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seven eight and nine to show results of the empirical study and the discussions. Results 
of the quantitative survey are presented in chapter six. The section covers the 
quantitative analysis of the livelihoods change in the case study. Chapter seven shows 
the results of the physical surveys. The physical survey chapter presents the pictorial 
corroborative evidence of the pattern of infrastructural destruction in the case study. 
Chapter eight is for the qualitative results. The section shows the results of the 
individual interviews and focus groups discussions. Chapter nine is the analysis chapter 
in which the syntheses of the research findings and discussions are presented. The 
discussions centred on the synthesised themes of livelihoods change, including lack of 
access to farmland, declined resilience, mismatch needs and support as well as inter-
relations of the challenges with infrastructure. Chapter ten is the conclusion section. 
Bibliography of references cited in this study is presented at the end of the thesis. 
Similarly, appendices of materials which provide additional information about specific 








Multi-dimensionality of Security as a Concept: A Paradigm Shift from State-
centric to Human-centric Security 
2.1 Introduction: Towards Human Security 
The preceding section has introduced the subject of the research – security and conflict, 
and focus – post-conflict livelihoods change. The chapter presents the global insecurity 
challenges and articulates a theoretical argument for the study. The potential theoretical 
lens – livelihoods, for the analysis has also been proposed based on the context of the 
case study. However, the tendency to over-rely on the military response to resolving 
insecurity in the developing economies such as Nigeria necessitates the review of the 
concept of human security – a human-centric approach, in the methodology of this 
investigation. The relevance of human security to this study derives from the 
recognition of the significance of according equal attention to the socio-economic 
wellbeing (livelihoods) of people as a conflict prevention strategy. This research also 
considers that while military effort is relevant, failure to attain a balanced (military and 
socio-economic) response to insecurity increases the vulnerability and exposure to 
conflict recurrence in the case study. Accordingly, the current chapter critically reviews 
the concept of human security to understand its components, features and ramifications.  
Contemporary views on security suggest that military intervention on its own is 
insufficient for the attainment of peace and development in the world. However, taking 
a step back to the history of the evolution and transition of military security to human 
security helps to appreciate the inherent limitations of the military approach. The review 
shed light on the need for a paradigm shift for a concept that is human-friendly without 
undermining the significance of the military. Security has been an evolving concept, as 
its connotation and drivers have continued to change. The development of human 
security as a concept evolves as a sharp response to the changing security dynamics, 
mainly starting from the post-Cold War period. This section establishes broadened 
horizons of contemporary security issues which are hitherto not captured in the 
traditional security discourse, especially regarding socio-economics conditions. The 
chapter provides a comprehensive view of understanding security, and that threat to 
human security exists even in the absence of physical violence or conflict as a 
consequence of precarious livelihoods.   
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2.2 Prelude to Human Security: A Military State-centric Perspective  
Vigorous pursuit of military dominance was the American realists’ strategy for security 
and foreign relations (Snyder 2008; Lawal and Mbiba 2020). This military security 
notion survived mainly during the Cold War period, owing to the general perception of 
strategic scholars (e.g. Liddell-Hart 1932; 1967; Bull 1977) that military power was to 
be applied to gain political and economic dominance in international relations. The 
military strategy sustained its prominence on the premise that the state commanded 
military might and was the primary interface in the global system. Hence, the 
application of military force to suppress any form of threat - state or non-state, was 
considered the best option (Buzan 1987) for maintenance of state sovereignty (Lawal 
and Mbiba 2020). The power struggle influenced the rationale and justification for the 
application of force at the time (Burchill 2001) particularly in the face of the bipolar 
power balance between the US and the former USSR (Mearsheimer 1990) during the 
Cold War. This way, security was based on the aggressive encounter for gains by one 
State (or group) to incapacitate or repress another which the state regarded as a threat 
for various ends (Jolly and Ray 2006; Lawal and Mbiba 2020).   
However, the destructive and unsustainable trend of the aggressive approach led to the 
thought for an alternative strategy for achieving lasting peace and security. This thought 
became necessary and inevitable, given the changing global security dynamics after the 
collapse of the former USSR in 1991. The United Nations, for instance, was established 
(in 1945) to mobilise for the initiation of peace and justice within the realm of 
international law. One of the primary purposes was to enshrine dialogue and negotiation 
to discourage the application of irrational military aggression (Jolly and Ray 2006). The 
call for the review of the security conceptualisation is traceable to the realist theorists 
themselves. For example, John Mearsheimer and Brzezinski envisaged the possible 
world disorder after the alteration of Cold War order.  Mearsheimer (1990) believes that 
relative order (peace) was maintained (during Cold War) primarily due to the state-
centric nature of security and bipolar military division at the time (by superpowers). It 
was those conditions that previously deter possible conflicts other than military 
aggression within and among nations. This consideration brought to the fore the need 
for the expansion of the scope of security to cover post-Cold War political, social and 
economic realities (Lawal and Mbiba 2020). 
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Perhaps the apparent effort to discourage military aggression (as security strategy) 
started with the establishment of the United Nations standards on the application of 
nuclear capabilities. Examples of these are the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty 
(Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1968) and the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic-Missiles Treaty (Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems 
1972). Other standards for the reduction of military aggression are the 1972 Biological 
Weapons Convention (Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production 
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological [Biological] and Toxin Weapons and their 
Destruction 1972) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons 
and on their Destruction 1993). The position on these treaties it was argued, aimed to 
protect communities and humans who suffer the devastating effect of those weapons 
although the action was carried out by state authority in an attempt to achieve its goals 
(Krause and Williams 1997; Lawal and Mbiba 2020). 
Similarly, advocacy was led by France (in 1955) to encourage the reduction in the 
military budget of permanent Member States of the UN. And that the budget cuts are 
contributed to an international fund, part of which would be used for development 
purposes in underdeveloped states. Although differing perceptions emerged from other 
countries, the analysis indicated that inducement of income growth (from 3.5% to 5%) 
for backward states would require no more than one-tenth of half of the advocated 
contribution from the reduced military spending (Jolly 2005). This move was associated 
with bringing an end to the Cold War and disintegration of the former Soviet Union. 
The eventual collapse of the former Soviet Union changes the security focus from 
conflict containment to conflict prevention (Boutros-Ghali 1992). This change was 
informed by the anticipated peaceful world which the standards could not achieve after 
the nuclear treaties and the agreement among the UN Member States to reduce military 
spending. The Commission for Human Security- CHS, (2003) reports that United 
Nations had dealt with the highest number of peacekeeping missions after the Cold War 
(especially in the 1990s) than any other time since its establishment. Buzan et al. 
(1998), notes that non-state factors caused the conflicts including socio-political, 
economic deficiencies; environmental threats etc. and are hardly addressable by state 
military actions. The limitations of the traditional military approach to security became 
more visible and therefore needed to be expanded to accommodate new strategies for 
dealing with contemporary security threats.   
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Further to the need to discourage over-militarisation of security, more treaties were 
enacted and signed by United Nations Member States to ensure continued protection of 
individuals and groups from all forms of threats - especially the non-military. Among 
such pacts are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966), the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979) 
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). Challenged by the problem, a 
host of scholars have also strived to make useful input in the debate for widening the 
scope of the security concept. For instance, Enloe (1989), considers security and 
conflict issues with particular regard to women, Roberts (1990), conceptualises security 
from the viewpoint of human right protection; while Weiner (1992), focused on 
international migration issues. Although universal definition does not exist, however, 
there is a general agreement on the insufficiency of reliance on military powers as the 
lone means of securing individuals and groups within states (Snyder 2008). But the 
extent to which the effort and advocacy for the reduction in the reliance on military 
intervention have been adhered to after the Cold War remained intangible. The next 
section attempts to highlight the deficiency of the excessive dependence on a military 
response to internal instability.    
2.3 Internal Crisis and Military Intervention: A Lopsided Use of Military for 
Internal Conflict    
The end of Cold War ushered marked decline in inter-state conflict but saw increased 
internal insecurity, especially in the developing economies (World Development Report 
2011). However, the Cold War legacy of excessive reliance on the military for civil 
unrest, persist in many states. In Africa, for instance, Yoon (2005) notes that those 
countries continued to rely heavily on military solutions for their internal crises upon 
attainment of independence and beyond. This practice is attributable partly to the 
involvement of the African countries - which were used as proxies, in conflicts by the 
world powers during the Cold War (Aduloju and Pratt 2014). The military interventions 
in internal conflicts and the particular high handedness and brutality often leave behind 
the horror of their atrocities on individuals and households. In Zimbabwe, for example, 
the military operations of the ‘fifth Brigade’ unit (1983-1987) following the 
Matabeleland uprising – selective murder and destruction of property, was estimated to 
have caused the deaths ranging from 10,000 and 20,000 of unarmed civilians (Burke 
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2017; Simmons 2017). The massacres which are collectively tagged ‘Gukurahundi 
Atrocities’ was characterised with rampant human right abuses such as rape, torture, 
arbitrary detention and forced disappearance (Killander and Nyathi 2015; Burke 2017; 
Simmons 2017).  
Similarly, the brutal murders of hundreds of unarmed civilians in Odi village, Bayelsa 
State – ‘Odi Massacre’ 1999, and several communities in Benue State – ‘Zaki-Biam 
Massacre’ 2001, are examples of the sequence of the repressive involvement of military 
in internal conflicts in Nigeria (Nwajah 1999; Human Rights Watch 2001; Sanusi 
2005). Call (2012) recalls that punitive military actions in internal unrests featured 
prominently as one of the significant factors that triggered the escalation and recurrence 
of civil wars in many countries. Recurrent civil wars in Liberia - 1985 - 1996 and 1999 - 
2003, Burundi - 1972, 1988 and 1993 – 2002, and Rwanda - 1962 – 1965 and 1990, are 
typical examples (Call 2012). The tendency of military intervention to cause the 
escalation of internal conflict is probably more apparent in the Nigerian context. The 
series of military operations in the Niger Delta unrests, for instance, has led to the 
repeated full-blown internal crisis in the region (Johnson et al. 2010; Newsom 2011; 
Ajodo-Adebanjoko 2017). Insecurity continued in the area up until recently (late 2016) 
when specific non-military palliative measures were employed to secure a cease-fire 
(Kazeem 2016; Toromade 2018). The secessionist movement in the South-east is 
instead thriving in the minds of its propagators despite the repeated military 
interventions which have continued to heat the unrest (Ibrahim 2017; Adonu 2018; 
Agbodo 2018).  
Furthermore, the extrajudicial killing of the pioneer leader of the Boko Haram sect is 
widely held to have gotten the members radicalised into a full-blown terrorist group 
(Meagher 2013). The subsequent high-handedness, atrocities and Human Rights abuses 
that are committed against the civilians by the military has continued to make it 
challenging to win the war against the insurgency (Matfess 2017; Amnesty International 
2018). The growing distrust for the military by aggrieved residents of the region 
benefits the insurgents who capitalised on the military actions to gain local support and 
recruitments (Matfess 2017). Military intervention alone can hardly address internal 
conflicts. Moreover, the abusive and excessive military intervention increases the 
existing despairs of precarious living conditions which have not had adequate attention. 
As noted by Bamgboye (2014) and Peterside (2014), military interventions have failed 
to provide a sustainable solution to the internal conflicts in Nigeria. They rationalised 
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this conclusion to the government’s failure to address the socio-economic challenges, 
which are often the root cause of many disputes. Salkida (2016) explicitly attributes the 
inability of the Nigerian government to sustainably win the war against the North-east 
insurgency to this same challenge. A more encompassing perspective of resolving 
security challenges is therefore necessary. The following section discusses this 
consideration as human security concept. 
2.4 Human Security Concept: A Human-centric Approach 
United Nations Human Development Report (HDR 1994) could be asserted to be the 
first global report that projected security in a more encompassing fashion (Lawal and 
Mbiba 2020). It incorporates individuals’ and communities’ socio-economic needs as a 
significant component of security with policy and guidelines for implementation (Jolly 
and Ray 2006; Aduloju and Pratt 2014). The report was a follow up to the 1990 Round 
Table deliberation of the North-South titled ‘Economics of Peace’ at Costa Rica. It was 
unanimously clear and accepted in the Round Table that the post-Cold War era requires 
a more dynamic and internationally acceptable security concept. Emphasis was on the 
need to reduce military spending to engage in a more human-related development such 
as economic and environmental improvement as a means of achieving global peace in 
the context of post-Cold War order (North-South Roundtable 1990). The HDR put 
forward the argument that the notion of security had:  
 For too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, 
 or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from a nuclear 
 holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states than to people (HDR 1994:22).  
Human security conception was a conscious effort to include measures to prevent 
non-military threats to human lives, which were hitherto not captured in traditional 
security (HDR 1994). The HDR built human security on the notion of universality, 
interdependence of components, less costly to achieve and human survival and 
safety. 
The universality of the human security concept in this sense refers to the commonness 
of the security threats people experience throughout the world. Although the level of 
impact and devastation that threaten nations’ security differ, their consequences such as 
economic deprivations, oppression and human rights violation, climate change, illicit 
drugs trafficking, gender discrimination, environmental pollution exist almost 
everywhere. In other words, social security concern cut across international boundaries 
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and therefore requires genuine commitment from across the world to be successful. The 
interdependence of human security components brings to the fore the concern that 
substantial incidence of insecurity in any part of the world has an impact on others 
directly or indirectly. The Syrian crisis and the consequential humanitarian (e.g. 
refugee, migration) crisis in Europe is a recent and ongoing example. Insurgents’ 
activities in the North-east region of Nigeria and their evident impacts on the 
neighbouring countries (Niger, Chad and Cameroon) are another case on point. The 
increasing pace of globalisation could also be said to be worsening this tendency where 
major conflicts are difficult to be restricted to a given country in which they originate 
(Gissinger and Gleditsch 1999; Derri and Popoola 2017).  
The less costly feature of human security portrays the concept as preventive rather than 
the interventionist approach to solving security threats. The human security concept 
advocates adequate and peaceful precautionary handling of all forms of real or 
perceived threats to individuals in a nation by ensuring that they do not escalate to 
devastation. This feature derives from the universal notion that preventing conflict is 
cheaper than containing it. For instance, the report of Northeast Nigeria Recovery and 
Peace Building Assessment (RPBA) says the reconstruction of the war-torn region will 
require $9 billion – about a third of the 2016 budget ($30.6 billion) of Nigeria (NAN 
2016; Gaffey 2016). Investing much less of this amount in agricultural, education, 
health care and other empowerment schemes could have averted the crisis. The lives 
lost are irreplaceable, and the wellbeing of those individuals and households whose 
livelihoods have been disrupted by the conflict may never be the same again. Human-
centeredness is one of the major pillars of human security. Its concern is primarily on 
the livelihoods, survival and dignity of individuals and communities. The focus is about 
people’s access to basic needs of living and the need for adequate and sustainable 
protection from any form of physical and non-physical danger.   
The conception of human security had attracted the support and attention of academics, 
policy decision-makers and governments. This acceptance followed the recognition of 
the inherent benefits of its holistic approach as a useful strategy for domestic and 
foreign security policy. For instance, the former Costa Rican President and a 1987 
Nobel Peace Prize winner - Oscar Arias, identify the connection between human 
security and the proposed ‘Global Demilitarisation Fund’. The fund aimed at helping to 
discourage the application of force to achieving peace and integrate people into the 
society while taking steps to ensure adequate arms regulations and enlightenment for a 
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democratic government (Jolly and Ray 2006). The concern here is the need to have 
policies that are developed primarily to overcome threats to individuals’s and means of 
survival with dignity.  
 
2.5 People and Rights in Human Security 
Putting people – individual, at the centre of human security is a crucial feature of post 
‘HDR 1994’ consideration. Many definitions have emerged – from academics, 
environmentalists, policymakers, multinational non-governmental organisations in an 
attempt to conceptualise and capture the essence of human security (Lawal and Mbiba 
2020). Kanti (2000), for instance, sees human security as synonymous with all efforts to 
ensure personal safety for people and to prevent them from such threats, whether real or 
perceived. In this sense, preventive measures and protection for individuals and 
communities against threats are the major focus to ensure human safety and wellbeing. 
Kanti argues that human development, prudent and collective resource management 
through good governance are the basic ingredients for achieving human security. David 
and Nana (2000), however, argue from the human rights viewpoint. They agree with 
Krause and Williams’ (1997) view on the need to shift the attention for security concern 
from the state as an institution to people as the primary beneficiaries of security. They 
contend that human security can only be ethical and morally justifiable when it 
guarantees the freedom of individuals’ human rights. They believe this rights and liberty 
relates mainly to the recognition of those of migrants (such as refugees) hence become 
an international responsibility of states to ensure their access to basic needs and 
protection (David and Nana 2000).  
Lincoln (1995)’s conception of human security also put people as the referent subject, 
whose protection is to be the ends of security concerns. With this view, military security 
should be one of the means to achieving human security and not only for the need to 
secure territorial integrity. Leaning and Arie (2000) would rather have human security 
as a precondition for the attainment of overall human development. Talking from a 
development viewpoint, they underline that this is achievable through a sustained effort 
to ensure social, psychological and political freedom that guarantee the capability of 
individuals to achieve an acceptable standard of living. They argue that security success 
is measurable in terms of the absence (rather than the presence) of indicators of 
livelihoods component to achieve individual’s and societal goals (Leaning and Arie 
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2000). Environmental concern drives the perception of Steven et al. (2000) concerning 
human security. Their position is that human security revolves around the recognition of 
the indivisibility of individual’s success with his/her environment - physical, social or 
political. Human security is achievable when individuals are strengthened with the 
capacity to deal and adapt to the threats posed by their environment. It also entails the 
freedom to exercise those capacities and participate fully in decision making to attain 
those capabilities (Steven et al. 2000).   
Human security concept was strongly advocated for by Kofi Annan - former Secretary-
General of the United Nations. Annan, during the 2000 United Nations Millennium 
Summit stressed the need to evolve a more human-concerned approach to security. 
According to him:  
  . . . security should be thought of less in terms of defending territory and more in terms of
 protecting people. . . . Security is a precondition for lasting peace . . .  (Annan 2000).         
The growing acceptance for the human security concept is not only the reflection of its 
adaptability for policy decisions but the recognition of the deficiency of the traditional 
state-centric security strategy (Annan 2005). In an attempt to institutionalise human 
security into Japanese domestic and foreign security policy, the former Japanese Prime 
Minister – Keizo Obuchi, considers security as:  
 . . . comprehensively seizing all of the menaces that threaten the survival, daily life, and 
 dignity of human beings and to strengthening the efforts to confront these threats      
 (Obuchi 1998).  
Similarly, the Canadian Foreign Affairs says:  
 . . . human security means safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats. It 
 is a condition or state of being characterized by freedom from pervasive threats to 
 people’s rights, their safety, or even their lives’ (Axworthy 1999).  
The importance of people as referent subject reflects in the final report of the United 
Nations Commission on Human Security - Human Security Now (CHS 2003). 
Synthesised from a broad range of considerations human security encapsulates the 
totality of human survival. Commission for human security (CHS 2003) led by Amartya 





 . . . to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and 
 human fulfilment. Human security means protecting fundamental Freedoms – freedoms 
 that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive 
 (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s 
 strengths and aspirations.  It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, 
 military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, 
 livelihood and dignity (CHS: 2003: 4). 
It is relevant to note that CHS (2003) formulation for human security is a consolidation 
and detailed consideration of the HDR (1994). This definition fundamentally seeks to 
reformulate the notion of security by deepening the concept and invigorating the need 
for more focus on human protection from threats (Aduloju and Pratt 2014). It stressed 
the need for rechannelling efforts to the protection of individuals’ and communities’ 
needs. It brings to the fore the multidimensionality of threats to human lives and the 
interrelation between security, human rights protection and development. Similarly, the 
definition advertises the need to re-conceptualise security as a human-centred issue that 
should integrate into the overall strategy for achieving sustainable peace and 
development (UNTFHS 2009). It, however, does not seek to replace the traditional 
military security concept entirely. Instead, human security aims to complement 
conventional military approach to security. 
2.6 Human Security: Complimentary to Military Strategy 
The people-centeredness of human security does not attempt to replace the traditional 
state-centric security. The two are complementary and mutually reinforcing (Aduloju 
and Pratt 2014). Ginwala (2002), underlines this point that state security ought not to be 
in any form of conflict with human security (human protection) or be the primary 
source of protection. She argues that human security seeks to comprehensively request 
the protection of individuals’ welfare by the state from threats and itself. This way, the 
state provides its primary role of protection against external aggression while paying 
adequate attention to non-military threats such as human rights violation, environmental 
degradation, acute food shortage and lack of access, inadequate and decaying 
infrastructure, unemployment, poverty, political marginalisation and so forth.  This 
condition will ensure the protection of collective human interest and individual freedom 
of rights and access to the primary livelihoods and survival needs of people and 
eventually violent free society (Ginwala 2002; CHS 2003).    
A synthesis of the complementarity of human security and military actions can be made 
from Pettman (2005). In his rather lengthy description of human security, Pettman 
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considers human security as eliminating threats that can undermine the wellbeing of 
individual or community. He believes human security should be:  
  . . . about the young child that did not die of neglect, the serious epidemic that did not 
break out, the job that was not cut, the gun that was not run, the ethnic prejudice that did 
not result in violence, the dissident voice that was not made silent, the landmine that was 
not sold and installed, the woman who was not trafficked across state borders and sexually 
abused, the agricultural product that was not dumped to the detriment of the poor farmers, 
the short-term capital investment that was not allowed to wreck an infant industry, the 
addictive product that was not produced and shipped, the refugee that was not forced to flee 
and remain abroad and so on (Pettman 2005:140). 
Pettman’s description of human security is in agreement with the HDR 1994 and CSH 
2003, whose definition of human security anchored on the importance of resolving the 
fundamental human needs. This consideration seeks to prevent the occurrence of any 
form of threat and ensure the development of capabilities to support human survival, 
including economic, food, health, environmental, personal and community challenges. 
The concept of security in this sense can be seen, therefore, as being human-centred. 
And its preventive nature can be a quick way to assessing the level of threat through 
indicators such as rate of crimes, environmental degradation, poverty level, income 
disparity, illiteracy level and so on (HDR 1994). Pettman (2005) considers that human 
security as a security alternative is attainable only if it is holistic and logical. He argues 
that achieving this lies in the ability to make a concerted effort to understand the 
limitations of the traditional state-centric approach and how their assumptions are 
articulated concerning human nature and protection. This effort ensures a better 
understanding to explain and describe the comprehensiveness of human security and its 
ability to solve the domestic and global security challenge.   
2.7 Threats to Human Security: Interlinked Dimensions 
Possible risks to human security vary from place to place owing to the variation in the 
individuls’ and communities’ socio-cultural, political and economic experiences. This 
variation, in no small extent, also influences the notion of what constitutes a threat to 
human security in different contexts (Acharya 2001). Given the need to minimise risks 
to people’s lives, the HDR (1994) provides a template of variables for consideration. 
These security variables whose vulnerability jeopardise peace include the economic, 
food, health, environment, political, personal and community security (Figure 2.1). 
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Securing those human challenges requires a comprehensive analysis of not only the 
individual elements but the interlinkages between them. 
Figure 2.1: Components of Human Security 
Source: Adapted from UNHDR 1994
2.7.1 Economic (In)security: Economic security ensures that individuals and 
households have access to a steady basic income - base on their need, through 
salary/wage, self-employment productivity or public fund (for the unemployed). 
Economic security implies the assurance that people have income inflow in a 
continuous and sustainable basis as a result of secured employment, a job that is 
consistent with individuals’ skills, within an environment that guarantees the safety of 
the workers and where skill development and self-actualisation (career development) is 
attainable.  It also means an inclusive decision on labour matters through an adequate 
representation of individuals or group (labour group) to ensure that those conditions are 
achieved (HDR 1994; International Labour Organization 2006; Lawal and Mbiba 2020). 
Economic security has a direct link to the ability of people to access the basic needs of 
Figure 2.1 has been removed from this 
version of the thesis due to copyright 
restrictions
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livelihoods such as food, shelter, healthcare and education. Access to basic needs, in 
turn, improves the quality of human capital accumulation through enhanced knowledge 
and skills, living standard, health and productivity. International Labour Organization 
(2006) report indicates that economic security has a direct and positive correlation with 
people’s happiness, which invariably translates to societal peace. The reverse of this 
may also be true, particularly in the presence of pervasive poverty and unemployment 
and wide disparity of income among people.  
Multi-country empirical evidence indicates a positive correlation between the most 
apparent effect of economic insecurity – poverty, and the risk of internal strife and civil 
war (Collier et al. 2004; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fearon 
and Laitin 2003; Murshed and Gates 2005; Stewart and Fitzgerald 2001). The risk of 
civil conflict is higher in developing countries especially in the more impoverished 
communities and economically less secured regions (Collier 2007; Deininger 2003; Do 
and Iyer 2007; Miguel et al. 2004; Murshed and Gates 2005; Sanchez and Chacon 
2006). Poor economic condition and its attendant socio-political challenges are both a 
cause and consequence of conflict. Conflict-ravaged communities often exhibit higher 
tendencies for increase poverty due to weakened individual and collective economic 
prosperity which may further expose them to the risk of conflict relapse (Collier et al. 
2004; Collier 2007; Stewart and Fitzgerald 2001). However, Justino (2012b) captures 
the transmission mechanism between poverty and conflict in two ways. First, the 
availability of a large pool of poor unemployed and unemployable individuals or groups 
forms an easy target for recruitment into rebel groups to incite conflict. Secondly, the 
role of poverty in violent conflict may be rationalised with its tendency for encouraging 
collective mobilisation for conflict due to shared grievances. Despite this concern, the 
economic insecurity has continued to be alarming in countries where conflict is 
prevalent while unsustainable efforts such as military are given more attention.  
According to the International Labour Organization (2006; 2015), World Youth Report 
(2015) and World Bank (2016), more than 70% of the world population faces economic 
insecurity. The projections (2019) do not indicate hope for the improvement of this 
condition. Youths and women are the most vulnerable to this security challenge. More 
than a third of the world youth population is unemployed and lacks adequate capacity - 
education and skills, to be gainfully employed (International Labour Organization 
2015). More women risk wage disparity and other economic insecurity than men due 
mostly to gender discrimination and socio-cultural practices (Alkadry and Tower 2006; 
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Lo Sasso et al. 2011). The negative impact and uncertainty faced by citizens –youth, in 
particular, to be gainfully employed is a primary source of threat not only to the 
individuals or group but to the state as well. Majority of crises in Africa (UN 2017) and 
Asia (Aubrey et al. 2016), for instance, are connected to youth unemployment. These 
conflicts also relate to high-income inequality among people. International Labour 
Organization (2015) report indicates the existence of compounding economic insecurity 
where the increasing disparity between the incomes of the richest and the poorest. The 
report attributes this condition to the changing nature of employment pattern where 
medium-skilled jobs are gradually fading out. The consequence of the disparity is that 
those from the medium-skilled level are forced to compete for lower-skilled jobs, 
thereby removing the medium income class and increasing the lowest class 
vulnerability. Increase in income inequality results in distrust for government and 
potentially fuels social tension and unrest (Stewart 2016).  
2.7.2 Food (In)security: Food security ensures that everyone can access food at all 
times and have the financial capacity to buy. It implies that foods that have adequate 
dietary and nutritional requirement are both readily available and accessible to 
individuals for consumption to enable them to undertake their daily productive 
endeavours. Availability of food refers to food production or stock level (Lawal and 
Mbiba 2020). According to George (1990) and Pinstrup-Andersen (2009), more food is 
produced than it is globally required, yet many lack access to it. A joined report of the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Fund for Agriculture (IFAD) 
and the World Food Programme (WFP), indicates that no fewer than 795 million people 
in the world lack access to adequate food to live a healthy life. Developing countries 
account for the higher proportion of the people that are undernourished due to lack of 
access to adequate food. The report estimates that there is one person in every four 
people that are hungry (FAO, IFAD and WFP 2015). Reports also indicate that about a 
half of the child mortality (3,100,000 children) in the world is caused by poor diet 
annually (The Lancet 2013; WHO 2012) while one out of every six children suffers 
nutrition-related illness (WHO 2012). The condition of lack of access to food suggests 
that securing global food production is not enough to solving food insecurity since 
people still live with hunger in spite of abundant food production.  
However, significant concern has been on the effective distribution and financial 
capacity of individuals and households to access the food they need. The effort on food 
access reflects in no small extent in the overall government policy and objective on food 
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security, income level and price mechanism of food at the market (HDR 1994; FAO 
1996). Increase in food prices is a critical food security challenge which has a 
significant negative implication on human security, particularly human capital 
accumulation. Nonetheless, the nexus between food insecurity as a catalyst for social 
unrest has rapidly gained attention following the 2007-2008 global food crisis, which 
caused significant protests in many countries (Brinkman and Hendrix 2011). Food 
insecurity as a conflict factor is debatable – concerning food prices, as being context-
specific, relating to the existing food policies, economic development, social support 
and demography (Messer and Cohen 2007; Brinkman and Hendrix 2011; Hendrix and 
Brinkman 2013). While it is arguable that food insecurity may not necessarily be a 
precipitating factor for large-scale political or civil conflict, the presence of hostile 
policies and conditions such as political exclusion and inequality, low-economic 
opportunities encourage collective mobilisation for civil war due to shared grievances 
(Pinstrup-Andersen and Shimokawa 2008; Hendrix and Brinkman 2013). These 
conditions exemplify the food-related conflict that caused the ouster of the presidents of 
Tunisia and Egypt following the 2011 global increase in food prices (Brinkman and 
Hendrix 2011). Similarly, food insecurity has a positive correlation with civil wars. 
Brinkman and Hendrix (2011) and Hendrix and Brinkman (2013), for instance, note that 
in 2010 the seven countries: Bangladesh, China, DRC, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia and 
Pakistan, which constitute sixty-five per cent of world food-insured nations (FAO and 
WFP 2010) have all, except China, experienced civil wars.  
Undoubtedly, civil war is a development challenge whose contribution to food 
insecurity is straight forward (Collier et al. 2004). The negative consequences of 
conflict such as forced migration and displacement, disease outbreak, injury and death 
and poverty directly affect food security adversely (Messer and Cohen 2007; Collier 
2007; Hendrix and Brinkman 2013). Conflict outbreak fundamentally undermines the 
main dimensions of food security, including availability, access, utilisation and stability 
(FAO 2008).  Conflict reduces access to, or loss of access to agricultural lands hence 
truncates food availability due to lack of production (Unruh 2004; Thu 2012; Matt 
2016; Pritchard 2016). Displacement, loss of social cohesion and trust, injuries and 
sicknesses adversely affect resilience and income, thereby undermine the financial 
capacity to access food even when it is available (Amirthalingam and Lakshman 2010). 
Adequate utilisation and stability of supplying food in conflict condition are often 
challenged by tension and fragile security environment coupled with conflict-related 
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illnesses such as trauma. Most importantly, however, is the cycle of livelihoods 
vulnerability that food insecurity exposes individuals or groups which are often argued 
to be a recipe for conflict recurrence (Licklider 1995; Doyle and Sambanis 2000 and 
Hartzell et al. 2001). 
Despite efforts at national and global levels, much is still left to be desired to overcome 
food insecurity. The conditional relationship and the effect of food insecurity and 
conflict suggest the need to have a broad-based and multi-sectoral approach to 
achieving sustainable food security and minimise those conditional enablers. This also 
requires continuous collaboration and innovative engagement among relevant 
stakeholders at different levels to ensure that food security is achieved through 
appropriate policies. The food security policies must encourage sustainable production 
(self-production), capacity to buy (purchasing power) and favourable government policy 
to ensure that people are equitably empowered to have access to nutritional food they 
desire (Nelson et al. 2012). The food security strategy implies not only making food 
available but building individuals’ or groups’ capacity to be able to buy or produce food 
for themselves. Furthermore, food insecurity ensures that adequate measures are put in 
place to protect the vulnerable groups who are unable to afford food through social 
safety nets.  
2.7.3 Health (In)security: Significant number of lives is lost to parasitic and 
infectious diseases around the globe annually. Majority of these deaths are avoidable 
and relate to the problem of malnutrition, unhealthy environmental practices, conflict 
and other lifestyles that is detrimental to good health. Although health insecurity is a 
global threat to human survival, there is a significant disparity in its distribution in terms 
of the type, region, gender, age and income groups. Reports indicate that mortality is 
generally higher in the developing and low-income regions than the developed area in a 
ratio of approximately 5:4:1 for every thousand deaths in the world (UN 2013; 
Population Report Bureau 2014; Lawal and Mbiba 2020). The predominant causes of 
deaths in developing countries are parasitic and infectious diseases while cancer and 
blood circulatory system-related diseases dominate the causes of deaths in developed 
economies (HDR 1994; WHO 2007, 2016). Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) has 
infected no fewer than 70 million persons while more than 35 million have died of it by 
2015 and more than 37.9 million persons still live with it by 2017 (WHO 2016; 
UNAIDS 2019). Africa accounts for close to 70% of these cases (WHO 2016). 
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Similarly, in 2015 alone, some 830 women died daily (approximately 303 million 
annually) due to avoidable pregnancy and childbirth-related complications caused by 
haemorrhage, hypertension, infections, inadequate facility and qualified healthcare 
officers. Nearly all of these deaths occurred within the low-income environment where 
access to health care and skilled birth officers is deficient (WHO 2016). 
Health security is significantly dependent on the availability of the healthcare services - 
infrastructure and personnel, accessibility and affordability as well as the government 
policies (e.g. environment, water, food, income) toward the sustainable provision of 
healthcare services. Intuitively, this dependency explains why conditions such as 
poverty and hunger, income inequalities and social injustice affect health security 
adversely. The complex interaction of these conditions creates a sense of hopelessness 
and disaffections among individuals or groups or towards government and in turn 
provides fertile ground for protests and civil unrest which may be exploited by 
opportunist rebels (Pinstrup-Andersen and Shimokawa 2008). Health insecurity often 
deteriorates drastically following the outbreak of conflict whose adverse legacy may last 
much longer after the battle (Justino 2011a). The health challenges compound during or 
after conflict due to increased risks of infectious diseases outbreak, transmission and 
mobility. Increased cases of physical injuries, trauma and death are common impacts of 
conflict. Large-scale conflict induces forced displacement of significant proportion 
(sometimes the whole) of a population which may be settled in camps that lack 
adequate basic human needs such as clean water and sanitation, food, shelter and 
medicines (Gayer et al. 2007; Mowafi 2011).  
Apart from the fact that displacement, itself, is traumatic, conditions of displacement 
camps increase the exposure of the displaced persons to diseases vectors (Justino 2011a; 
Mowafi 2011). Similarly, the transmission of diseases may be facilitated due to 
overcrowding in camps, thereby increasing the rate of spreading. Illnesses which are 
alien to a community may also be transported from the camps upon return due to 
inadequate treatment of diseases at the camps (Gayer et al. 2007). Moreover, post-
conflict situations are characterised with increased rate of sicknesses and deaths as a 
result of the disruption of healthcare system, destruction of healthcare infrastructure, 
inadequate or uncoordinated disease control programmes and lack of healthcare staff 
(Gayer et al. 2007; Pinstrup-Andersen and Shimokawa 2008; Brown et al. 2011; 
Mowafi 2011). Health insecurity creates short-term and long-term vulnerability whose 
implication has a significant adverse effect on human capital accumulation and 
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livelihoods. Cole and Neumayer (2006) find that poor health condition critically affects 
productivity, whose influence explains enduring underdevelopment in developing 
countries. Lack of development on the hand is a recipe not only for conflict but its 
recurrence due to persisting exposure to increased vulnerability.  
2.7.4 Personal (In)security: This implies shielding and empowering individuals 
against physical harm or violence. Threats to the personal security or safety of people 
can come in many forms including but not limited to: by one’s state (e.g. repressive 
policing and over militarisation), a foreign country, groups or gangs, based on age or 
gender or even own self (Lawal and Mbiba 2020). Threats to personal security by the 
state are forms of physical harm or violence meted on individuals by their government 
without legal justification. The threat comes in the form of harassment, torture, 
extrajudicial killing and state-sponsored assassination. Deaths caused by governments 
soon gained prominence upon the declined inter-state war-deaths after the Cold War. 
Kivimaki (2013), for instance, notes that governments have caused the deaths of six 
times more of their citizens than the deaths caused by wars in the twentieth century put 
together. The threat to personal security by the foreign state includes death, injury, harm 
or violence caused by another country to individuals either as a result of inter-state war 
and conflict or targeted individuals. The end of the Cold War ushered a decline of inter-
state conflict (World Development Report 2011). However, the persistence of invasion 
of individual countries by another has continued to undermine the personal security of 
individuals in the invaded countries. For example, the invasion of Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Libya and Syria by the US and its allies has caused the physical and psychological 
injuries and death of hundreds of thousands of unarmed civilians in their countries. 
Many more have been perpetually displaced (Burke 2004; Fawn 2006; Nurazzaman 
2013; Specia 2018).     
With increasing terrorism in the world, personal insecurity caused by groups has been 
on the increase. These are violence or physical harm directed to the individuals by a 
religious sect, ethnic group, terrorist groups, or other social community. For example, 
the human rights abuses and other atrocities that are carried out by the Shiite and Boko 
Haram sects constitute significant threats to the personal safety of individuals in Nigeria 
(Alao 2013; Zenn and Pearson 2014). Gangs, often for criminal exploitation, could 
threaten one’s safety. This threat includes physical harm directed at individuals by 
notorious bands such as armed robbers, cult group, and kidnappers as a result of violent 
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crime. Moser (2004) underlines that this type of personal insecurity is perhaps more 
prevalent in urban contexts, especially in poor neighbourhoods – slums. The unabating 
personal insecurity continues to make the vulnerable communities physically unsafe, 
especially for the weaker gender or group such as women and children (Moser 2004; 
Jutersonke et al. 2009). Personal insecurity caused by groups may also be significantly 
affected by the delicate interaction of socio-economic and political conditions in one’s 
country coupled with globalisation and foreign government intervention. The sudden 
unrest which caused the deaths of thousands of civilians in Libya and Syria, for 
example, represents the effect of Arab Spring through globalisation, existing socio-
political conditions and the US (and its allies) support for the rebel groups (Sadat and 
Jones 2009; Atlas 2012). The arm conflicts without recourse to corresponding socio-
economic intervention have continued to heighten the personal insecurity of citizens 
thereby truncate freedom, human rights and development (Louw and Lubbe 2017) 
Threats to personal safety that is gender-based are a common concern with women who 
suffer most of gender discriminatory form of violence such as rape, domestic violence, 
trafficking and forced prostitution, economic discrimination and other cultural 
deprivation (Moser 2004). Gender-based violence is by no means limited to women. 
However, women are more susceptible to abuses (Zack et al. 2016). There are instances 
where these abuses and violence may be state-endorsed and culturally unprohibited. The 
threat that is gender-based not only put the physical safety of the victims in jeopardy but 
undermines their rights to economic and civic liberty (Collins 2016; Zack et al. 2016). 
The relative vulnerability of female sex to gender abuse and inequality directly affect 
the personal security of children. The adverse effect of female gender susceptibility on 
children relates to the natural and cultural mother-child attachment as primary carers. 
Personal threats directed to children come in different forms such as child trafficking 
and forced child labour, child abuse and domestic violence, deprivation to education and 
care. Furthermore, threats to personal security are not limited to those posed by other 
persons or groups. It includes jeopardising one's safety by own self. Personal threats to 
own self could be but not limited to unhealthy habits and lifestyle which are detrimental 
to one’s safety. Examples of this threat include addiction to hard drugs, suicide 
tendency, irrational and risky ventures (HDR 1994).  
2.7.5 Community (In)security: The feeling of lack of protection (neglect) by 
individuals (who share specific collective identity) from physical and/or abstract harm 
consequent to their affiliation (to racial, political, ethnic, cultural, religion, gender, 
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demography etc.) has often been a significant security concern to many social groups. 
This vulnerability stems from the sense of protection and security derivable from being 
associated with some community or culture in the form of ethnic or religious groups and 
other social community such as cooperative club and youth movement due to their 
social benefits (HDR 1994; Lawal and Mbiba 2020). McLean (2009) considers that, like 
personal security, community security may be threatened by one’s state, a foreign state, 
other persons or group. In essence, community insecurity concerns relate to ‘freedom 
from fear’ (physical protection) as well as ‘freedom from want’ (socio-economic 
opportunities) where individuals’ lives (survival) and livelihoods are in jeopardy due to 
their affiliations. The threats are manifest in many instances of torture targeted at a 
particular group(s) and deliberate political marginalisation and exclusion and hate 
crimes. Community insecurity has often caused conflicts due to ethnic rivalry and 
power tussle, religious intolerance and extremism, gender and social inequality and 
violence and child abuse (McLean 2009; Caballero-Anthony 2015; Christensen 2018). 
At the macro level of the society, Pemunta and Rene Nkongho (2014), underline that 
deep-rooted history of social and welfare exclusion promotes political marginalisation 
of specific group(s). The caste system in India is a case on point, where the upper caste 
is favoured against the vulnerable tribe or groups such as the Dalits, Adivasi and 
Muslims. While this condition foments resentment among the marginalised groups, the 
ensuing poor civic engagement (public participation) exacerbates the tension and lack of 
trust which cause conflicts and the recurrence. The mechanism of transmission between 
community insecurity and violent conflict has been demonstrated in some of the worst 
ethnic and racial related violence such as the genocides in Indonesia (1960), Cambodia 
(1975-79), Rwandan (1994), and Myanmar (ongoing) (Call 2012; Caballero-Anthony 
2015; Human Rights Watch 2019). Call (2012) and Meagher (2013) indicates that the 
quest for ethnic and religious liberty informed by conditions of economic, social and 
political exclusion and marginalisation has driven many separatist movements such as 
in Nigeria and (South) Sudan. The separatists’ campaign, however, is often cited as 
justification by regimes (which may sometimes be bias or actors) for excessive use of 
military even in conditions that may be sustainably resolved through socio-economic 
efforts. 
In a more specific term, community insecurity represents a multi-dimensional inequality 
(horizontal) where unequal access to resources and opportunities drives collective 
mobilisation or sponsored conflict between socially defined groups (Langer et al. 2007; 
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Stewart 2011; 2016). While the analysis of this form of inequality often relates to larger 
geographic space, community insecurity may exist at a micro (community) level where 
diversity is much less. Micro-level community insecurity may occur as a class 
inequality (vertical inequality) within individuals or group with a similar social 
background (Stewart 2016). In elitist communities in northern Nigeria, for instance, 
economic insecurity exacerbates the community insecurity for the majority poor and 
lower class. The discriminatory tendency which deprives the lower class opportunities 
has been in the form of subtle reservation of specific lucrative job opportunities for the 
elite and their cohort at the expense of others (Meagher 2013; UNDP 2018). According 
to Khan (2016), in some instances where inequality-induced vulnerable groups have 
access to opportunities, they are usually insignificant or too few to alleviate the fear of 
the entire group. Langer et al. (2007) find that this kind of marginalisation not only 
undermines the human capital development but has a positive correlation with increased 
conflict prevalence in Nigeria, Ghana and Ivory Coast.     
2.7.6 Environmental (In)security: Contemporary human security challenges that 
emanate from environmental threats are enormous and complex. They are caused by 
sudden or long-term (cumulative) alteration of the physical environment through natural 
processes and mostly as a result of adverse environmental practices by humans. Threats 
to the environment are manifest in numerous kinds of pollution (air and water), drought, 
global warming, desertification, environmental (terrestrial) degradation, marine 
ecosystem destabilisation and species extinction. The causes and resultant impact of 
ecological threats may be localised or global, hence requires multi-level and multi-
sectoral collaboration to be able to mitigate them (Elliot 2015; Lawal and Mbiba 2020). 
Importantly, however, is the intrinsic threat the environment insecurity poses to the 
human wellbeing and survival due to the resultant socio-economic damages and conflict 
(Ohlsson 2000; United Nations Environment Programme 2007). United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) (2008) and Elliot (2015) concur that environmental 
destruction threatens human security and safety in such a way that it creates 
vulnerabilities through health challenges, resource depletion and scarcity and loss of 
livelihoods. These vulnerabilities are often exacerbated by poverty, which may both be 
an outcome as well as a cause of poor environmental practices and insecurity (Ohlsson 
2000; Global Leadership for Climate Action 2009).  
The conflict mechanism for environment insecurity reflects in the mutual symbiosis that 
exists between poverty and poor environmental practices. Ohlsson (2000) notes that 
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environmental insecurity in conflict discourse is best understood as both having 
reinforcing linkages with poverty and livelihoods loss, which precipitates conflict. This 
view draws on the concept of ‘environmental scarcity’, in which, at a micro-level, 
aggravates the vulnerabilities of individuals in low-income communities due to limited 
access to alternative sources of livelihoods opportunities (Ohlsson 2000; Global 
Leadership for Climate Action 2009; Elliot 2015). As a result, unsustainable 
exploitation of the natural environment is inevitable until scarcity, which creates 
competition, social and economic marginalisation emerges. This condition sets in 
motion the process which results in selective deprivations and (sometimes) catastrophic 
livelihoods outcomes that promote ethnic and sectional grievances and conflict 
(Ohlsson 2000; Wingqvist and Greene 2013). The adverse effect of environmental 
scarcity may help to understand the conflicts-environment mechanism following 
environmental resource exploitation in Nigeria, Angola, Sierra Leon, DRC and Liberia 
and the dreaded consequences (Gariba 2011; Wingqvist and Greene 2013; Herbert 
2014). It may seem, at first, that these examples do not have a bearing on environmental 
scarcity, however, the chronic livelihoods deprivation lay bare  the linkage wherein the 
large pool of unemployed people created by the process provides the foot soldiers for 
recruit by warlords who benefit from inciting conflict (Ohlsson 2000; Keen 2012).    
While poor environmental practices often start locally, their effect may be both 
domestic and global (Elliot 2015). For example, the quest to keep track of the ever-
growing world population demand for food has increased the practice of irrigation 
farming as well as the use of chemical (inorganic) fertiliser for improving crop 
production. Excessive irrigation and over-dependent on the chemical fertiliser are 
identified to have a long-term cumulative adverse effect on the environment, food 
production and human health (Food and Agriculture Organisation 2002; Environment 
2015). Excessive long-term and unchecked application of chemical fertilisers result in 
accumulation of components of the synthetic fertilisers (e.g. nitrogen, potassium, 
sulphur, calcium, magnesium) in the soil. The cumulative effect of these chemicals and 
other materials in the land result in increased soil acidity. This condition degrades soil 
fertility and productivity; contaminate groundwater, releases gasses (nitrogen oxides) 
that cause global warming and disruption of the aquatic ecosystem when flooded to a 
water body (Environment 2015). Climate change – an effect of global warming, 
represents one of the worst effects of environmental insecurity as ‘threat multiplier’ that 
aggravate livelihoods challenges, which results in conflicts across the globe (Elliot 
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2015). It is stressed, for example, that climate change is exacerbating the already 
weakened livelihoods conditions that have been closely linked with the dreaded Boko 
Haram insurgency ravaging the Chad Basin countries - Cameroon, Chad, Niger and 
Nigeria, due to the continued shrinking of Lake Chad (UNDP 2018; Vivekananda 
2019).     
2.7.7 Political (In)security: The HDR 1994 spells the element of political insecurity 
to include repression of people, violation of human rights and unjustified application of 
force on innocent and unarmed citizens either by the government or armed group. The 
report stressed that ‘one of the most critical aspects of human security is that people 
should live in a society that honours their fundamental human rights (Lawal and Mbiba 
2020). Political security may be construed as the aspect of human security that 
harmonises all other components based on informed government policy through a 
democratic and consensus process. There is a growing recognition that political security 
is achievable through good governance in an environment that guarantees public 
participation, the rule of law, consensus decisions, equality and inclusiveness, 
transparency and accountability and effective and responsive service delivery (UNDP 
2018). The crux of political security, therefore, is achieving service delivery and fair 
social treatment at the micro-level in ways that make individuals, households and 
communities feel that their interests and aspirations are protected. Cummings and 
Paudel (2019) and Gunasekara et al. (2019) underline that these concerns affect the 
legitimacy of a government and may lead to civil unrest when people perceive 
unfairness with regards to the way the government treat their social (e.g. ethnic and 
region) groups.    
While the desire to achieve political security – domestic and international, is not 
contended, the process and policy through which it may lead to attaining the 
fundamentals of human security - freedom from fear, freedom from want and dignity, 
has been a subject of debate (Caballero-Anthony 2015). Led by Canada, many 
developed economies in the West have tended to focus their domestic and foreign 
relations on promoting individual human rights and safety (freedom from fear) to 
ensuring political and human security. In doing this, the use of collective sanction may 
be applied to protect individual’s rights and dignity (DFAIT 2002; Hassan 2015). In 
contrast, however, the developing economies - especially Asia, prefer the ‘freedom from 
want’ strategy that targets eliminating development challenges to human social and 
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economic wellbeing (Caballero-Anthony 2015; Hassan 2015). Although these 
subjective dispositions toward political security reflect the diversity in cultural 
dynamics and contexts (Acharya 2001), human security or its components are hardly 
achievable in isolation. In other words, it is the complex and delicate balancing between 
all aspects of human security that can lead to sustainable overall social wellbeing and 
dignity. Caballero-Anthony (2015) concurs, for instance, to argue that despite the 
economic progress and political development in Southeast Asia, countries like Thailand, 
Indonesia, Myanmar and Philippines have continued to experience politically motivated 
ethnic and separatist conflicts.  
Amidst the need for balancing through issues on political power, state territorial 
integrity, human and economic development, ethnicity and social identities; politically 
motivated insecurity has continued at all levels in the world. Amnesty International 
(2016) report indicates that at least 122 countries illegally torture and maltreated their 
citizens. Another 30 countries were believed to have forced refugees out of their host 
countries even when it was apparent that their lives were in danger. The report also 
indicates that at least in 19 states, war-related crimes were committed either by 
government forces or armed groups who wreak havoc on innocent unarmed citizens. 
Regimes hide under the guise of national security to break their laws to perpetrate 
repression on their people. This scenario is a common sight in many countries (e.g. 
Syria, Russia, US, Egypt, Nigeria, Burundi, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Thailand, and North 
Korea) where anti-regime protesters and critics are physically or systematically 
restricted, arrested, tortured and killed. Civil unrests also provide a good avenue for 
government forces to unleash anger on political opposition (Amnesty International 
2016; HDR 1994; Human Rights Watch 2016). Salil Shetty - Secretary General of 
Amnesty International, expresses worry over the continued neglect of the fundamental 
rights of citizens by governments all over the world. Governments deliberately 
undermined the existing laws and systems that ensure the protection of human rights to 
dismantle the basis upon which many national and international human rights protection 
mechanisms rely (Shetty 2015).  
2.8 Features of Human Security: A Synthesis 
The primary interest of the human security concept is the need to ensure a safe and 
sustained livelihood and welfare that is free from all sorts of deprivation for individuals 
and groups. Human security focuses on all facet of livelihoods such that they can be 
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brought together to ensure the right to access and protection by state (UNTFHS 2009; 
Lawal and Mbiba 2020). The following are the essential characteristics of human 
security emerging from the various description of what is regarded as human security – 
as captured in the CHS 2003: 
2.8.1 Human-Oriented: Human security is a pro-people concept that places the 
wellbeing of individual and community at the centre. Unlike state security where 
protection of state sovereignty is the dominant concern, human security places more 
emphasis on the vast range of non-state threats whose adverse effect put individuals or 
communities in a condition of hardship or susceptible to danger.  The people-
centeredness of human security means that it seeks to guarantee human survival and 
secured livelihoods in a dignified manner and prescribe an analytical benchmark for 
assessment (Tadjbakhsh 2009; UNTFHS 2009; Lawal and Mbiba 2020). Since human 
security is about people, it means any form of intended intervention should involve 
them in generating relevant information regarding their needs and susceptibility. This 
process helps in identifying the remote causes of localised insecurity, their links hence 
useful in prioritising them for appropriate actions or interventions. Following this 
procedure is vital in developing an intervention and empowerment framework that 
recognises the strength and weakness of the local community to build resilience to 
insecurity (UNTFHS 2009).  
2.8.2 Multi-Dimensional: The fact that human security takes into account the whole 
of human wellbeing as a referent subject means that it can potentially be successful 
through a multi-disciplinary approach. This entails seeking a more in-depth analysis and 
understanding of the broad range of threats to human lives such as poverty, 
unemployment, famine and malnutrition, environmental degradation, climate change, 
acute water shortage, inadequate infrastructure, armed robbery, kidnapping, rape, 
communal conflict, religious conflict, political marginalization, poor governance and 
foreign aggression (HDR 1994; Lawal and Mbiba 2020). Emphasis is therefore placed 
not only on those specific threats but also on the link that exists between and among 
them. Analysis of the interlinkages between and among the components of human 
security is necessary because their risks are complementary in the sense that one threat 
potentially triggers another/others or the effect of a security breach in one region (or 
country) possibly spills to another. The usefulness of this characteristic is that it helps to 
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develop a policy that is consistent and sustainable to achieving sustainable human 
security (CHS 2003; UNTFHS 2009). 
2.8.3 Holistic: The multi-dimensionality and interdependence nature of human 
security components means that a comprehensive and holistic approach in dealing with 
the threats is only logical. This consideration is particularly important for policymakers 
to understand the difficulty of achieving human security through a disjointed response 
and intervention. The implication of this is that concerted effort and maximum 
cooperation is necessary from across all sectors as well as from all states to deal with 
human security challenges. Collaborative efforts help in establishing a harmonised 
multi-sector and multi-level intervention that is comprehensive through an integrated 
approach that considers aligning security, development and human rights challenges 
(CHS 2003; UNTFHS 2009; Lawal and Mbiba 2020). 
2.8.4 Case-based: The characteristic peculiarity of individuals and communities of 
humans and security concerns implies that hardly can a uniform intervention apply to all 
contexts to dealing with insecurity. In other words, there may be no one-size-fits-all 
solution to tackling human security challenges. The subjective nature of humans drives 
the variations for the possible security intervention for different contexts. Diverse social 
and cultural experiences require a variety of solutions to accommodate such diversities. 
For instance, the understanding and conceptualisation of what constitutes a security 
threat to a market woman in Nigeria could be far different from what a teacher in 
Britain sees as insecurity. The notion of vulnerability for a child in IDP camp in Syria 
would be significantly different from that of a farmer in Nigeria who is in perpetual 
conflict with herder due to the climate change problem. It is, therefore, imperative to 
have a critical understanding of individual case study to prioritise the localised 
aspiration (Gasper and Gomez 2015; Lawal and Mbiba 2020). For human security to 
make meaning to any given individual or community, it has to demonstrate an adequate 
understanding of the expectations of the people to work out what they consider as 
threats to their livelihoods thereby making an effort to strengthen their capacity to 
overcome such risks. Doing this is particularly important to be able to capture and 
prioritise what society perceived to have made them vulnerable. Similarly, this practice 
helps the researcher and policymakers to understand the dislocation between local needs 
for security and those that are prescribed at the national and international policy level 
(Tadjbakhsh 2009).   
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2.8.5 Preventive:  The CHS (2003) report considers the prevention characteristics of 
human security termed ‘bi-parts’ of the framework for intervention - protection and 
empowerment. The protection in this sense refers to measures that are put in place (by 
relevant actors) to shield individuals and communities from either sudden or gradual 
security threats. This notion recognises that risks to human security are usually beyond 
what individuals or community can on their own prevent and so require a top-down 
response. Empowerment, on the other hand, implies putting in place measures that 
enable people to quickly overcome and or adapt to change in their security condition 
when it happens. Empowerment, therefore, entails developing and strengthening the 
capacity of individuals and communities to attain their potentials to create resilience to 
threats through adequate participation in the decision-making process for solving their 
security problems (CHS 2003; UNTFHS 2009; Lawal and Mbiba 2020). 
2.9 Chapter Summary 
The concept of security during the Cold War period was primarily the need to deploy 
military capabilities for national-territorial protection. The global military struggles 
created a bi-power tussle between the former USSR and the USA. The power struggle 
produced a condition where superpower country or group (superpower and allies) apply 
military strength against any other, which is regarded as the enemy. The unfavourable 
outcome of the military notion of security triggered the paradigm shift to a more 
encompassing security concept – human security. Human security advocates securing 
all aspects of human life as components that need protection. Although the idea put 
human social concern at the centre, it does not seek to replace the state-centric security 
approach. Instead, they are taking to be mutually reinforcing. Human security also 
posits that lasting peace or sustainable human security does not necessarily stop at or 
means the absence of violent conflict. It implies that any condition that may result in 
deprivation of any element of human security constitutes a threat to individuals, groups 
or communities. These deprivations often lead to struggles which are violent and 
aggressive, thereby aggravate the living conditions of people. The failure of the lopsided 
deployment of military intervention for internal conflict supports the relevance of 
considering a strategy that pays critical attention to the living conditions of people for 
solving insecurity. Accordingly, the next chapter focuses on theories and concepts that 
elucidate some conditions that threaten human security. The analysis of living 
conditions leading to escalated situations of violent conflict and its recurrence form the 
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focus of the chapter. The review of literature explores and rationalise the utility of the 
























Theoretical Construction for Understanding Threat to Human Security: Condition 
for Conflict Mobilisation 
3.1 Introduction: Making a Case for the Livelihoods Approach 
The preceding chapter has reviewed the development and evolution of the concept of 
security and its ramifications. The shift in paradigm from the military (state) to human 
security (a combination of state and socio-economic) is a response to the changing 
dynamics of security threats after the Cold War. Human security advocates individual 
capacity developments to enable people to overcome threats to their living conditions 
by holistically resolving its inherent components. However, achieving sustainable 
human security and by extension, lasting peace, requires a balanced understanding of 
the complex linkages among its features. It is necessary, therefore, to probe the socio-
economic conditions that can truncate the realisation of peace and human development 
since sustainable human security does not end with the absence of conflict. This 
consideration is significant given that the interaction of precarious living conditions 
often leads to physical strife, violence and conflicts. The current chapter focuses on the 
critical examination of such conditions and how they threaten human security in a stable 
(non-conflict) and post-conflict situations. The discussions leverage on the existing 
debates, theories and concepts – e.g. resource curse, greed and grievance; regarding 
conditions or motivations that inform conflict onset and recurrence. Relevant syntheses 
are made from those concepts to articulate a justification for the utility of the livelihood 
approach for the investigation. The livelihood framework is articulated to inform the 
empirical study for conditions that threaten human security and potential for conflict 
resurgence, particularly in a post-conflict context.  
3.2 Condition for Conflict Mobilisation: A Natural Resource Curse Perspective 
There is a growing recognition that every conflict has its uniqueness in terms of 
dynamics. However, the property and human costs are often quite similar and consistent 
(Ikelegbe 2005; Obi 2009; Watts 2010). Understanding these dynamics and how they 
make individuals and communities vulnerable and the conditions that lead to insecurity 
is essential to reduce conflict risks. Underlying this consideration is the theoretical 
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construct and empirical evidence in support of motivations for conflict within specific 
contexts (Bannon and Collier 2003).  
One of the early considerations for conflict motivation relates to the economic 
deprivations, political instability and conflict that results from the over-dependence on a 
highly prized natural resource. The famous ‘Resource Curse’ thesis, postulates how 
paradoxically natural resource endowment (supposedly nature’s gift) causes physical 
and socio-economic underdevelopment. The thesis posits that economies with abundant 
natural resources tend to have slower or retarded economic growth and development 
(Leite and Jens 1999; Gylfason 2001). This negative correlation hinges on specific, 
measurable development indicators. According to Sachs and Warner (1997), for 
example, countries whose gross domestic product (GDP) to natural resource export is 
high tend to show slow growth. A World Bank (2002) report provides statistical 
evidence to support this assertion. It indicates that on the average countries whose 
resource dependency are less than 15%, and between 15% and 50% had an annual GDP 
decline by 0.7% and 1.1% respectively. Those who are more than 50% natural resource 
dependant had 2.3 yearly declines percentage of GDP. The implication of this for 
resource-dependent states is an increased susceptibility to internal strife due to the 
ensuing income decline and increase poverty among citizens. Ross (2001b) confirms 
this, that increased dependence on natural resources increases the level of 
impoverishment. Moreover, the higher the rate and severity of poverty among 
individuals and households in a state, the higher the risk of conflict (Bannon and Collier 
2003; Justino 2012a).    
The consideration of natural resource as a curse buttresses with Auty’s (2001) argument 
which correlates resource dependence with the relatively weak economic performance 
of resource-rich countries in the 1960s. The debate hinges on adverse effect of resource 
dependence whereby the revenue accrued from the dominance of natural resources (oil 
and gas and metals) tend to impede the development of other sectors of the economy 
(Otawa 2001). This phenomenon has since been coined ‘Dutch Disease’, after the 
adverse impact of the gas export on the manufacturing sector of the Netherlands 
economy in the 1950-60s. Many other countries (e.g. Nigeria, Venezuela, DRC, and 
Angola) have exhibited this trait in which the growth of the oil and gas export results in 
the slump of other production sectors like agricultural and manufacturing (Otaha 2012). 
The negative consequence of this phenomenon manifests in the form of recession as a 
result of a mixture of some unfavourable conditions. The high influx of revenue in 
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foreign currency, for instance, hikes exchange rate, which in turn increase the value of 
the countries’ currencies. This condition reduces competitiveness in the export of non-
resource products. It also leads to reduced direct foreign investment, thereby increasing 
unemployment and poverty due to weakened non-resource sectors. The unemployment 
and poverty condition exacerbates when the prices of the resource commodity fall due 
to the inherent volatility in the international markets.  
Natural resource dependence increases the conflict susceptibility of the resource-
dependent countries by undermining the quality of governance. Lack of accountability 
and transparency, corruption and weak government often characterised resource-based 
countries (Ikelegbe 2005; Busse and Gröning 2013). Over-reliance on proceeds of 
exporting natural resources implies that the bulk of the state’s income comes from the 
external remittance. This challenge, coupled with the volatility of prices and the sheer 
size of the proceeds, impedes potent tracking of payments. In effect, the condition 
encourages a lack of accountability and corruption. Dependence on highly-priced 
natural resources (especially those that require less sophisticated technology to extract) 
promotes the creation of criminal gangs that form parallel armies. These gangs fund 
their illicit activities through the exploitation of the resource, thereby reducing 
government control on such territory and activities (Ross 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 
2005). Ross (2003) underlines that ineffective territorial control has encouraged conflict 
in many countries (e.g. Nigeria, Liberia, DRC and Indonesia) that obtain a large 
proportion of their income from a natural resource. This condition also fuels the 
secessionist campaign and rebellion against the government. Saro-Wiwa (1989) and 
Gould (2011), for example, consider that some of the factors that influence secessionist 
agitation includes the sense of being unique (and different from other ethnic groups), 
and perceived neglect and the desire for resource control by the region. Such separatists 
movements (and other criminalities) get funds through either or combination of resource 
looting, extortion, kidnapping and significantly determine the severity and duration of 
conflict and civil wars (Ross 2003; Collier et al. 2004). These conditions typify the 
insecurity in Nigeria's Niger Delta. 
Resource curse thesis aptly characterises the typical scenario of many resource-
dependent countries. Critics of the theory, however, root their argument in the fact that 
not all resource-dependent countries exhibit traits mentioned above. There are good 
examples such as Australia, Botswana and Canada, whose economic growth is 
attributable to their resource utilisation (Mehlum et al. 2006). According to Mehlum et 
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al. (2006) and  Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), the provisions of country’s 
constitution and institutional quality for the management of the resources determine 
whether or not it would be a resource cursed, and not just the dependence on the 
resources. Resource-dependence causes income and growth decline only when the 
policies and institutional framework for the management of the resources favour few 
highly placed individuals who grab rent at the expense of the majority of the citizens. In 
other words, resource may be a curse when policies that guide the accruing benefits 
allow for resource-related criminal activities to thrive (Mehlum et al. 2006). 
Nonetheless, despite the strong arguments for or against the resource curse theory, its 
potential for conflicts prevalence and conceptual appropriateness is context-specific. 
This view hinges primarily on whether or not the potential threat to human security or 
conflict risks relates to the resource-dependence challenges in a context. It is, therefore, 
critical to analyse the contextual insecurity dynamics to determine the appropriate 
theoretical approach, especially in a setting that has vast internal diversity like Nigeria.   
It is apparent that Nigeria mainly runs a mono-economy, which is oil-dependent. As a 
country, Nigeria is a geographically large country with a considerable regional, cultural 
and economic diversity and varying resources access and utilisation. It is, therefore, 
unlikely that the resource-curse thesis would be a one-size-fits-all concept for analysing 
the insecurity dynamics in the country. Its applicability may be appropriate for 
consideration at the macro (national) level or at best within the region (Niger Delta) that 
is oil-rich. This study, however, asserts that the resource-curse concept may be 
inappropriate for understanding the insecurity dynamics of the other parts of the country 
– e.g. North(east), which are less oil-dependent (Otu 2014; Tella 2015; Ugwu 2015). 
This position hinges on the understanding that the insecurity situation in the other 
regions is much less natural resource-driven (next chapter discusses further detail on 
Nigeria’s regional insecurity variation). Regional disparity in the North-east, for 
instance, which manifests in a delicate combination of low education, poverty and 
unemployment, frustration due to inequality, small arms proliferation, inadequate 
infrastructure, religious extremism and bad governance form the remote cause of 
insecurity in the region (Katsina 2012; Muhammed 2013; Obasanjo 2014). The North-
east security challenge is an indirect consequence of neglect for human and physical 
development. According to Otu (2014), Tella (2015), Ugwu (2015) and Bamidele 
(2016), insecurity in North-east Nigeria is the apparent consequence of government 
failure to adequately address citizen’s needs. A concept that articulates these poor living 
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conditions into the analysis and understanding of conflict motivation may, therefore, be 
more appropriate. The next section explores this consideration by revisiting the greed 
and grievance proposition concerning the conflict. 
3.3 The Greed and Grievance Thesis: Economic Gains or Socio-political 
Grievance? 
It is increasingly evident that natural resources are not the only cause of violent conflict 
around the world. Conflicts and civil war are also being analysed from the lenses of 
citizens’ acute grievances leading to protest and rebellion. This perspective relates the 
role of the economic, political and ethnic circumstances of people with conflict 
occurrence. However, the causal mechanism that links these conditions with conflict 
onset is debatable. An economics account views violent conflict as a profit-making 
venture, where insurgents or rebels hide under the cloak of violence to undertake to 
‘loot’ as economic ends (Grossman 1991; 1999). This view features prominently in 
Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) greed and grievance thesis, which provides a further 
useful perspective to the discourse. Collier and Hoeffler assert that the economic agenda 
of rebels proxy grievances for considering the viability of rebellion. The thesis posits 
greed as the most crucial rebellion motive for financial gains (Collier and Hoeffler 
2004; Collier et al. 2005; Keen 2012). This conclusion follows the recognition that 
some common proxies for conflict such as inequality, political marginalisation, and so 
forth exhibit a weak correlation to rebellion initiation. However, the livelihoods 
condition of people - the level of education, per capita income, and so forth influence 
the opportunity for rebellion.  
Development economics and conflict analyses literature suggest that the participation of 
indigent individuals in a civil war is subject to the organisational and financial capacity 
for mobilisation which is often beyond their means (Muller and Seligson 1987; 
Goodhand 2001; Justino 2012b). Hirshleifer (2001), Grossman (2002), Walter (2004) 
and Keen (2005) suggest that poor living conditions due to a prolonged period of 
unemployment may make ‘soldering’ a means of survival for poor individuals since 
non-violent means provides limited hope. Participation of the poor in a civil war in this 
sense may be influenced by the need to survive, although the vulnerability presents the 
opportunity for exploitation by warlords. Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) find in an 
empirical study involving 1,000 Sierra Leone that almost half of ex-fighter who 
participated in the country’s civil war came from poor households and one of their 
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primary drives was to get basic needs and protection. The rebel leadership, however, 
tend to focus on looting, profiteering and power-grabbing from the conflicts (Walter 
2004; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). While analysing similar scenario of greed-
conflict relations in DRC, Liberia and Angola, Ohlsson (2000), points that rebel (elites) 
purposely create chaos as a way of forming a new system for profit-making and power 
seizing.       
However, the possibility of conflict onset because of greed-conflict relations may be 
rationalised in the cost of mobilising members with regards to the anticipated gains. 
Concerning the anticipation of economic benefits in conflict, the understanding is that if 
the livelihoods vulnerability – e.g. a low standard of living, is high, the viability of 
recruiting rebels to foster conflict is high. Collier et al. (2009) term this instance as the 
‘feasibility of civil war’. For example, low per capita income may translate to lower cost 
for recruiting rebels to incite a civil war. In contrast, the political science explanation to 
conflict motivation considers that grievances, which emanate from chronic 
dissatisfaction about social conditions force people into violence. Stewart (2008; 2011; 
2016) argues that precarious living condition of people is the most important driver of 
conflict. According to her, poverty, which is often the consequence of profound 
economic insecurity, inequality and political marginalisation are more dominant causes 
of grievance and conflict. Socio-economic and political inequality and the ensuing 
poverty may instigate collective mobilisation for conflict onset when the condition is 
critical enough to intensify social tie through collective grievance among the 
marginalised group(s) (Justino 2012b; Stewart 2016). While these arguments subsist, 
civil wars have been analysed to have occurred as a consequence of complex interaction 
between existing grievances and criminal greed (Keen 2012). Keen’s position is in 
tandem with Hirshleifer (1995; 2001) who construe the greed and grievance dichotomy 
as being mutually reinforcing. This way the grievances due to poor living conditions 
provide vulnerability context which is exploited by the greedy - e.g. the insurgents in 
the case of North-east Nigeria, for their criminal and economic interests (Fearon and 
Laitin 2003).  
This research, however, aligns with the greed and grievance proposition based on the 
mutual reinforcing perspective. Aligning with this theoretical position is justifiable, at 
least, giving that neither arguments (greed or grievance) have dispelled the implications 
of each other’s element of considerations on conflict entirely. Similarly, this stance 
takes into cognisance the manifestation of the complex interactions of genuine 
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grievances which are exploited to instigate civil wars by rebel groups in many contexts. 
This suggests that the delicate interplay of conditions leading to greed-grievance 
exploitation should be of more significant concern. The impact of this concern has 
manifested in the complex interaction of socio-economic grievances and insurgents’ 
greed in many contexts such as Syria, Tunisia and Nigeria (Aubrey et al. 2016; 
Barkindo 2016; Lamloum 2016). Aubrey et al. (2016) find that the conflict in Syria is 
the result of long-term interactions of complexities that relate to precarious economic 
conditions, oppression, deprivation of individual and community social needs and 
inadequate livelihood infrastructure. The vulnerability conditions provided feasible 
ground for the civil war, which attracts youths to take up arms financed by rebel groups. 
An age-long unresolved regional, political, social and economic disparity trigger the 
violent conflict of the border settlement in the Southeast Tunisia (Lamloum 2016). The 
consequences of these conflicts are shocks which come with negative impacts on 
livelihood assets - economic, physical, political, social, environmental and human 
capital assets, of individuals and communities. Failure to resolve these pre-conflict and 
post-conflict challenges may continue to threaten human security in the region.  
Similarly, Barkindo (2016) hinges the analysis of the insecurity and conflict of the 
North-east region of Nigeria on the historical antecedent of the area. He argues that 
carefully exploited religious extremism and ethnicity (he termed it ‘selective memory’) 
was indirectly employed to instigate the insurgency. This view considers insecurity as 
being intertwined with the struggle for ethnic-religious identity and history. He 
contends notwithstanding that the precarious livelihoods of people in the region 
provided the enabling incentive for the insurgency to thrive. Barkindo’s view is in 
concurrence with Hussaini Salisu (a cleric) who has warned that:  
 The level of frustration and poverty among youths in the country is a fertile ground for 
 activities of Boko Haram . . .  their conduct is totally un-Islamic but the whole 
 problem  boils down to the failure of government at all level to  make the welfare of the 
 citizenry a priority, a nation that allows its youths to be idle is sitting on a time bomb 
 because  frustrated people seek relief in religion (Tell, August 10, 2009: 38).  
 
While the narratives of, for example, Otu (2014), Tella (2015), Ugwu (2015), Bamidele 
(2016) and Barkindo (2016), on security dynamics in North-east Nigeria are valid, 
citizenship failure provides an added perspective to the discourse. This consideration 
may be construed from the condition where citizenship failure represents merely being a 
member of a country nominally. Whereas citizenship connotes the possession of the 
right to membership of a country to which comes obligations as well as certain 
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fundamental rights to claims and entitlements (Baylis and Smith 2001; Brysk and Shafir 
2004 and UNESCO 2017). These entitlement rights denote by Sen (1981) may be 
summarised as possessing the legitimacy to access one's basic needs (e.g. water, shelter, 
food, clothes, roads and electricity) either through an exchange - trading, employment 
and resources or through social security system - for the vulnerable. Active citizenship 
ensures that efforts and processes are put in place to enable citizens to attain this status 
for economic, political and general inclusiveness. The consequences of citizenship 
failure generate susceptibility characterised with a high rate of unemployment, poverty, 
starvation, inequality, and so forth (Wright 2011). These are the evident condition in the 
North-east of Nigeria, where government presence is absent. The deficient social 
participation and welfare rights deprivation incubate the vulnerability, which creates a 
sense of victimhood in people (Barkindo 2016), and the ensuing grievances set the 
people against the authorities. This vulnerability, as well as the feeling of helplessness 
and victimhood, was ‘cleverly’ exploited by the insurgents who use religion, ethnicity 
and financial inducement as an enticement for recruiting members. Having established 
causes of conflict onset; it is pertinent to probe the extent to which the pre-conflict 
factors or conditions can potentially instigate its recurrence. The following section 
explores the on-going debate concerning conflict recurrence. 
3.4 Beyond Conflict Onset: What for Conflict Recurrence? 
The phrase - violent conflict begets violent conflict, is often contextualised to emphasise 
the tendency for a violence onset to promote further violent behaviour. This tendency is 
perhaps more apparent for civil wars or armed conflicts. Kreutz (2010) for instance, 
notes that 159 (60%) of the 259 armed conflicts investigated in different countries 
reoccurred. In conflict studies, however, this condition has since been coined conflict 
recurrence, to indicate the repeat of a previous conflict in a given context. Conflict 
recurrence is often the manifestation and expression frustration due to unresolved 
grievances among dissenting and warring parties in a conflict (Gates et al. 2016). 
Nonetheless, there are contrasting views regarding ongoing debates on conflict 
recurrence especially in the light of post-conflict economic condition and how the 
previous conflict ended.    
The concern for resolving the precarious living condition of people derives from the 
wisdom of its positive correlation with conflict occurrence and its significant potential 
for causing conflict relapse (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; 
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Sambanis 2004). This notion draws on Collier and Hoeffler (2000), Call and Cousens 
(2008) and Collier et al. (2009) with regards to the probability and feasibility of civil 
war. The ‘feasibility of conflict’ proposition relates to the economic development and 
living conditions of people - e.g. level of per capita income, as a measure for the 
opportunity cost for conflict - relating the cost of recruitment to anticipated conflict 
gains (Quinn et al. 2007). This view coincides with Walter (2004) regarding the chances 
of conflict recurrence. According to her, conflict is unlikely to occur or recur in a 
condition where the living condition - primarily economic, of people is good, and in the 
absence of micro motive, civil war recurrence has little or nothing to do with previous 
ones. However, the precarious living condition which lowers the opportunity cost for 
recruiting rebels does instigate conflict recurrence (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Walter 
2004). Quinn et al. (2007), however, added a condition for the possibility of civil war 
recurrence. While upholding Walter’s view, they note that the manner with which the 
previous conflict ends has a direct implication on the chance of having conflict relapse. 
To this effect, conflict recurrence is a function of the extent to which conditions (victory 
for one side or peace agreement) that end an initial conflict can undo the circumstances 
that sustain what they refer to as ‘dual sovereignty’. Dual sovereignty to this effect 
connotes the organisational structure, human and financial capacities of the government 
and rebel group. Quinn et al. (2007) conclude, however, that civil wars whose end is 
brought about by the defeat of the rebel group have a higher chance of relapsing than 
those ended by rebel victory or negotiated settlement (with external third party). 
The rationale for Quinn et al. (2007) conclusion predicates on that government’s victory 
in civil war often ended as merely technical defeat whereby rebels are forced to lay 
down arms for fear of annihilation temporarily. The resulting suspension of hostility 
hardly dismantles the initial conflict motive and ideology and the organisational 
capacity of the rebellion. The rebels would usually blend into the civilian population 
unnoticed and reorganise and re-strategise upon return of favourable condition where 
resources are available, and the opportunity cost for rebellion is ‘sustainable’ (Quinn et 
al. 2007; Call 2012). However, a different conclusion to this view is presented by 
Joakim Kreutz, based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP). According to 
Kreutz (2010), civil war is unlikely to reoccur if it ends through rebel defeat or 
deployment of peacekeeper. He, however, adds that this condition may not hold where 
the rebel motive in the previous conflict is to take total control of the government or 
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ethnic liberation. These theoretical arguments present useful insights for analysing post-
conflict conditions regarding the potential for conflict recurrence in a context.  
In Nigeria, for instance, the preceding debates may be pertinent with regards to conflict 
motivation and outcome and the susceptibility to conflict recurrence for non-oil 
dependent regions of the country in which poor living conditions drive grievances. With 
regards to the North-east, for example, it may be argued, on the one hand, that 
unresolved weak living condition may lead to conflict relapse (Collier and Hoeffler 
2000; Call and Cousens 2008; Collier et al. 2009). This view derives from the 
understanding that living conditions may have deteriorated after the conflict episode 
(Aljazeera 2014; Daily Trust 2014; Sahara 2014; 2017). This condition hypothetically 
increases the susceptibility of the region to another round of conflict due to further 
impoverishment (Hegre et al. 2011). On the other hand, however, the contrasting views 
within the proponents of the ‘outcome of previous conflict’ thesis may require being 
appropriately rationalised with regards to the contextual dynamics. At the moment, the 
government claims it has technically defeat(ing) the insurgents (Munshi 2018; Onuah 
2018) while the option for peaceful negotiation has mostly been unexploited due to the 
lack of willingness of the insurgents (Kantiok 2014; Simon 2014; Onuah 2018).  
Similarly, the ‘revolutionary’ ideology and unhidden desire to take total control of the 
government to establish an entirely new order is visible in the insurgents’ mode of 
operations (UNDP 2018). At least this has been demonstrated when the insurgents 
captured certain territories in the past (Sahara 2017). The seeming analytical 
contradiction may have presented a condition of philosophical disagreement within the 
camp, which promotes the ‘outcome of previous conflict’ thesis regarding possible 
conflict recurrence. Since on one side, if the government is victorious the chance of the 
conflict relapse is high (Quinn et al. 2007; Call 2012) and on the other hand, when the 
government wins, there is less chance of conflict recurrence (Kreutz 2010). However, 
the exception that the latter presents may be a ground to conceptually argue the 
possibility of conflict relapse in North-east Nigeria, for instance, since the government 
is wining and the insurgents are not willing to embrace peaceful dialogue. Given the 
scenario, the insurgents’ suspension of hostility may have been due to superior military 
capability of the government. The chance of the conflict resurgence, therefore, may 
mainly be determined by the insurgents’ ability to regroup upon the favourable 
condition to exploit the post-conflict vulnerabilities, especially the worsening living 
conditions in the region.  
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The above consideration may have informed Kantiok’s (2014) call for minimising 
conflict (recurrence) threats in the North-east by exploring strategies for improving 
governance and living conditions of people to discourage the tendency of joining the 
insurgent group. In line with Walter (204), Kreutz (2010), Hegre et al. (2011) and 
Kantiok (2014) it may be appropriate, therefore, to posit that while interaction of 
unresolved pre-conflict challenges and the post-conflict living conditions are the 
essential factors for consideration, the chance of conflict resurgence depends mainly on 
the ability of the rebels to regroup and exploit the post-conflict vulnerabilities. The 
livelihoods condition of the people becomes the most critical determinant of the conflict  
recurrence in the given circumstance. Exploring the utility of the concept of the 
livelihoods with regards to post-conflict vulnerability become inevitable for this 
research. This consideration informs the focus of the next section on the livelihoods 
approach in a post-conflict setting. 
3.5 Livelihoods Approach to Human Security: A Development Consideration 
The appropriateness of adopting a particular theoretical framework for assessing the 
security challenge may depend on the adequate understanding of the underlying 
insecurity dynamics within the context. Given the conceptual background of the 
possible livelihoods implications for this research, analysing the security challenges 
through the livelihoods lens is appropriate. Rakodi and Lloyd-Jones (2002) have drawn 
from the strength of sustainable livelihood as an analytical tool for evaluating the 
vulnerability (poor wellbeing and deprivation) of households – particularly the poor, in 
the rural and urban context. Livelihood approach conceptualises the basis upon which 
rational understanding of the complex livelihoods issues is drawn. The analysis of the 
livelihoods concept is with the view to determining the appropriate policy for poverty 
intervention. Many livelihood approaches exist, but the sustainable livelihood approach 
(SLA) – base on Chambers and Conway (1992), has enjoyed wide acceptability and 
adapted by many development organisations such as the Oxfam and World Bank. 
Developed by the British Department for International Development (DFID), 
sustainable livelihoods framework (SLF) has been widely employed as a development 
practice framework primarily for rural poverty alleviation (GLOPP 2008). 
A livelihood comprises of capabilities, assets and activities required for the means of living. 
A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and 
maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and future while not undermining 
the natural resource base (DFID 2000:1).  
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The primary target of sustainable livelihood is to eliminate the vulnerability of 
individuals or households by improving their capacities and strength to enable them to 
sustainably access their assets thereby achieve the desired minimum level of wellbeing 
(GLOPP 2008). This notion suggests the need for providing and improving the capacity 
of people to access their physical and non-physical needs to fulfil individual and 
societal goals and resilience. Kollmair and Gamper (2002) note the basic tenets of 
sustainable livelihoods as follows: 
People-centeredness is a fundamental consideration in that survival and wellbeing of 
people is the ultimate priority rather than the resources. This proposition builds on the 
notion that human vulnerability and undesired consequences emanate from poor policy 
decisions and structures for managing resources rather than its availability. Livelihood 
approach’s people-oriented idea is taken to mean developing a critical analysis of the 
multiplicity of issues about people's' livelihoods in a holistic manner. The conditions, 
policies and institutions that shape the livelihoods of people are dynamic and so should 
be the approach for livelihoods interventions; to be flexible and dynamic to 
accommodate the constant changes that take place. As mentioned, the core of this 
approach is to capitalise on strengthening the capacity of people to overcome or 
remove those obstacles to realising their desired potentials on their own. The approach 
stressed the need to establish sufficient link between the local (micro) and general 
(macro) development agenda such that mismatch of needs and decisions can be avoided 
at various level to achieve sustainability. For the approach to be sustainable, it has to be 
resilient over uncertainties (e.g. shocks and stress) and achieve desired long-term goal 
with greater independence from external support without jeopardising the chance of 
others to attain their livelihoods.        
The DFID approach to livelihoods recognises that having a critical grasp of living 
condition (livelihood analysis) of the poor is the basis for effective planning and 
appropriate prioritisation of needs. However, the flexibility of the approach allows for 
the design of a strategy to fit into peculiar circumstances and needs of people to make 
the best possible prioritisation for intervention to suit different contexts (GLOPP 2008). 
DFID's sustainable livelihoods framework (SLF) (Figure 3.1) is structured as a concept 
for understanding people’s response within a context and how the combination of 
vulnerability condition, institutional policy and processes and access to available assets 
influence their choices for livelihood outcomes (de Stage et al. 2002).  
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The framework depicts stakeholders as operating in a context of vulnerability, within which 
they have access to certain assets. Assets gain weight and value through the prevailing 
social, institutional and organizational environment (policy and processes). This context 
decisively shapes the livelihood strategies that are open to people in pursuit of their self-
defined beneficial livelihood outcomes (Kollmair and Gamper 2002). 
Figure 3.1: Sustainable Livelihoods Framework 
 Source: Adapted from DFID (1999)
The sustainable livelihood approach anchors on development strategy as a conduit to 
providing an analytical tool for understanding the living condition of the poor with the 
view to improving their wellbeing by strengthening their capacities. As noted by Carney 
(1998), the livelihoods framework primarily helps to (a) establish and analyse 
underlying factors that affect livelihoods (b) manage the complexity of livelihoods 
assets and (c) determining suitable livelihoods intervention in a context. It is crucial to 
highlight that the approach is primarily designed as an analytical and response tool for 
poverty reduction in the rural (non-conflict) context.   
Notwithstanding, sustainable livelihoods approach has its areas of weakness. The 
immediate critics of the sustainable livelihoods approach relates to its excessive focus 
on the development of individuals’ and households’ capability based on the internally 
available assets in a context (Morse et al. 2009). This consideration potentially 
undermines possible consideration for exploring interaction with external assets - e.g. 
networking, whose accruing benefit may improve the capacities of individuals and 
households in the context. This may be particularly relevant in the current rapidly 
changing global trends and globalisation where inter-human interaction for economic 
and social benefits does not necessarily require sharing common relations or geography. 
The fact that no economy survives in isolation is undisputedly more relevant now than 
ever before. Another setback to the livelihoods approach is its weak consideration for 
Figure 3.1 has been removed from this 




the politics of access to available assets. Scoones (2015; 2019) concurs that 
development stakeholders have often paid little attention to the political dynamics in the 
assessment of livelihoods of contexts. This view argues that this happens because the 
intellectual underpinning for the livelihoods framework finds its way into the global 
development discourse in a constraint manner such that it simply focus attention on the 
evaluation - assets availability, of the poor (marginalised) people in a context (Sneyd 
2017). In essence, analysis of the livelihoods of people may not be enough to 
understand their development challenges without critically relating it to the prevailing 
political economy of the context (Scoones 2015). 
Despite the critics of the livelihoods approach, however, the strength of its inherent 
features have continued to sustain its relevance in the development literature more than 
two decades after its launch. The approach's flexibility and compatibility with other 
concepts are perhaps most important in this regards. Scoones (2019), for example, 
argues that the integration of sustainable livelihoods framework with the SDGs could 
help to achieve its goals by eliminating its weak sectoral linkages which is one of the 
strengths of the SLA. This consideration is adopted for this research to merge the 
concept of human security (social) with the SLA (this is discussed further below). The 
flexibility of SLA supports the utility of the framework in other settings, including 
stable, unstable (conflict) and transition (post-conflict) communities. For instance, 
Jacobsen notes that:  
In communities facing conflict and displacement, livelihoods comprise how people access 
and mobilize resources enabling them to increase their economic security, thereby reducing 
the vulnerability created and exacerbated by conflict, and how they pursue goals necessary 
for survival and possible return (Jacobsen 2002:99). 
Jacobsen’s submission suggests that post-conflict livelihoods are primarily about 
survival and access to assets that reduce people’s vulnerability. The vulnerability may 
be as a result of post-conflict challenges including unresolved pre-conflict and post-
conflict livelihoods difficulties.  This research, therefore, draws on Jacobsen (2002), to 
consider the post-conflict adaptation of the livelihoods approach as an appropriate 
framework for post-conflict investigation. Exploring the livelihoods framework 
invariably provides an opportunity to expand further and adopt the strategy to improve 
existing understanding of its utility for post-conflict livelihoods intervention for this 
research. In doing so, analysis of the livelihoods assets based on the framework and 
livelihoods changes would be invaluable in theorising the inherent vulnerabilities and 
their implication for conflict recurrence. The integration of the concepts – human 
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security and SLA, helps in doing the assessment to highlight both economic and social 
dynamics to understand vulnerability. Discussion and analysis of post-conflict 
livelihoods vulnerability form the focus in the next section. However, shedding light on 
the nexus between the human security concept and livelihoods approach is useful for 
this research to highlight the interrelatedness between the two concepts.    
Human security concept has had significant global acceptability since its inception. 
Nonetheless, its desired target and objectives for attaining long-term peace and 
wellbeing for individuals and communities has not been achieved. Human security 
failure may be evident when each of the integral aspects of the concept is analysed 
(Caballero-Anthony 2015). The situation is particularly dire in developing countries 
where essential means of survival and livelihoods are always in short supply. Human 
rights and dignity are continually being truncated (Aduloju and Pratt 2014; Magcamit, 
2014; Song 2015). For developing countries, human insecurity relates to gross human 
and infrastructural underdevelopment. These have led to economic, social and political 
deprivation and human rights violations which have fuelled many internal strife and 
conflicts. Human security and livelihoods - development, approaches are closely related 
to human development since inception. The primary goal of economic growth and 
development is the need to create sustainable human development – particularly in 
transition contexts (UNDP 2018). Stewart (2004) starkly demonstrates this in the 
tripartite relationships that exist between development and human security. In her work 
‘Development and Security’, Stewart argues that (a) achieving secured wellbeing 
(human security) is the ultimate goal of people, which is also the core objective of 
development. (b) The absence of human security hurts the socio-economic capacity of 
people (poverty) which can lead to underdevelopment and (c) unhealthy development - 
based on inequality and deprivation, is a potential source of conflict and violence. She 
concludes that achieving sustainable development is possible only if human security is 
assured. 
The consideration for the nexus between human security and livelihoods seeks to 
portray the two concepts as being two sides of the same coin which despite having 
similar targets can exist as reinforcing concepts (Gasper and Gomez 2015). In essence, 
the strength of the reinforcement between development (livelihoods) and human 
security may be a useful strategy for defining the success in minimising wellbeing 
vulnerability for individuals (Jehangir 2012). Similarly, the relationship between these 
two concepts may be construed from the sheer similarities between their components. 
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While human security embodied the notion of safety beyond the traditional sense of it, 
human development – livelihoods, empowers individuals with the capacity to optimally 
exploit available choices to achieve peace (UNDP 2018). It is, therefore, relevant to 
address post-conflict challenges through this lens. Each of the components of the 
concepts is almost (if not all) captured in each other except that human security draws 
more on social consideration while livelihoods on economic. Furthermore, wisdom may 
be tapped from Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Walter (2004) and Collier et al. (2009) for 
instance, regarding the impacts of deficient livelihoods on human security or the 
reverse. This mutual relationship tells of the positive correlation between the concepts 
of human security and livelihoods. It is often difficult, for instance, to make a 
distinction when analysing the components of human security and livelihoods 
framework. It would appear that the analysis of the elements of human security means 
examining those of the livelihood framework. Importantly also for the convergence of 
the these concepts is the deliberate focus on the individuals’ and households’ wellbeign 
as the unit of analysis.  
3.6 Post-conflict Livelihoods Change: A Transition Between Pre-conflict and Post-
conflict Conditions 
There is a growing quest for understanding post-conflict livelihoods coping strategies in 
communities that have experienced conflict-induced livelihoods disruption. This 
attempt is to analyse their vulnerabilities and theorising a sustainable intervention that 
can be used to prevent possible conflict recurrence. The analysis of post-conflict 
livelihood is particularly relevant given the inherent inability of the short-term post-
conflict interventions (e.g. humanitarian aid) to address long-term needs of transition 
communities effectively. The short-term nature of most humanitarian supports for post-
conflict societies makes livelihood recovery slow and full of uncertainty with a high 
level of vulnerabilities. The consequence is evident in the unabating precarious 
livelihoods that results in the inadequacies due to lack of access to long-term livelihoods 
supports. There is often the mismatch of needs and available choices for conflict victims 
(Shah and Shahbaz 2015; Levine 2016). This dislocation of needs poses significant 
concern given the resultant vulnerability and the risk of conflicts resurgence.  The 
pursuit for a long-term post-conflict intervention may have influenced the recognition of 
the need to address both short-term and long-term livelihoods challenges in conflict-
affected communities. Achieving the long-term post-conflict sustainability require 
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concerted efforts, which focuses on analysing conditions that trigger the initial conflict 
and additional problems that emanate afterwards to prevent recurrence (IRIN 2005). 
Livelihoods in a post-conflict context come with distortion of the pre-conflict conditions 
and these manifest in a sudden decline in the basic needs of people. This circumstance 
exposes conflict victims to a variety of vulnerable conditions that is capable of fuelling 
the relapse of conflicts (Malual 2008). The conceptualised scenario of this sort shows in 
figure 3.2 below. Analysis of the post-conflict livelihood changes become necessary to 
have a legitimate understanding of the nature of the ensuing livelihoods vulnerabilities. 
This analysis also helps to theorise the coping strategies of conflict-affected 
communities, thereby determine the appropriate intervention. 
Figure 3.2: Livelihoods in Post-conflict Context
 Source: Adaptation of DFID (2000); PCLI = Post Conflict Livelihoods Interventions
Foremost victims of conflicts are human and physical assets. Death, injuries and 
unattended illnesses are a common sight in a large scale conflict and post-conflict 
situations. Destruction of infrastructures such as houses, schools, clinics, and the road is 
a strategic way of dealing with ‘enemy' in conflicts (Stewart 2011; Bangura 2016; 
Corbin and Hall 2019). The insurgency in Nigeria's North-east, for instance, has caused 
the death of no fewer than twenty-seven thousand people while more than two million 
are displaced between 2009 and 2018. Properties worth nine billion dollars ($9bn) are 
estimated to have been destroyed (NAN 2016; The Guardian 2017; Munshi 2018). 
Similarly, World Without Genocide (2015) reports that six million people died in the 
protracted crisis of Democratic Republic of Congo amidst rampant looting, property 
destruction and violation of human rights (e.g. rape and torture). A sudden eruption of 
conflict and the resultant displacement accompanies the destruction of social assets in 
Figure 3.2 has been removed from this 




the form of loss of family ties, friends and other social networks. These are essential 
survival tools for many people, and the loss of the social asset exposes members of 
affected communities to economic challenges and other forms of vulnerability such as 
psychological injuries, trauma, human right abuse and loss of dignity (Bangura 2016; 
Corbin and Hall 2019). Violent conflicts also come with a loss of valuable economic 
assets and means of income and savings. Malual (2008) reports that the significant 
economic losses such as agricultural land, livestock and forest resources that support the 
livelihoods of agrarian communities during the protracted conflict in South Sudan. One 
of the consequences of these livelihoods disruption is widespread poverty and 
deprivation that characterises most post-conflict context (Branch 2013; Bangura 2016; 
Tollefsen 2017; Corbin and Hall 2019).   
However, one of the conventional (often immediate) sources of post-conflict livelihood 
support is direct humanitarian assistance which provides relief for conflict-affected 
communities and to support and strengthen government capacity to ameliorate the 
predicaments of its citizens (Collier and Hoeffler 2002). The short-term nature of aid 
couple with poor coordination, mismatch of needs and support provided and selective 
access to the support; could create dissatisfaction and hostility (in extreme cases) among 
victims (Grossman 1991; Esman and Herring 2003). For example, the withdrawal of the 
aid organisations from Gulu district of northern Uganda creates a condition of sudden 
cut in the supply of humanitarian assistance for the displaced. This withdrawal creates 
new forms of livelihoods challenges within the context, given the government’s 
inability to provide needed livelihoods support for its citizens (Branch 2013). The 
condition degenerated into internal struggle and rebellion against the government and 
created a new form of insecurity. The rationale for the short-term post-conflict 
interventions relates to the urgent need to shore up support in providing the immediate 
needs of conflict victims. The primary target of humanitarian assistance is giving 
sustenance to ease victims’ predicaments of lack of capacity to meet their immediate 
livelihoods needs. Interventions such as cash disbursement, food aid, shelter, and so 
forth are a common practice in the short-term post-conflict assistance (Shah and 
Shahbaz 2015). There is, however, negligible evidence to suggest that post-conflict 
humanitarian aid has a significant long-term impact on the livelihoods of conflict-
affected communities. This assertion is in part attributable to the lack of adequate 
understanding of the existing local dynamics for post-conflict needs and coping 
strategy. The condition often leads to the failure to meet the relevant livelihoods 
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aspiration of conflict victims (Jacobsen 2005; Porter et al. 2008; Omata 2012; Shah and 
Shahbaz 2015; Levine 2016). It is therefore not surprising that many post-conflict 
communities experience a relapse of conflict from the similar (or worsen) vulnerability 
conditions that cause the previous one.   
The ability and pace with which communities recover from conflict shocks may have a 
bearing (among other things) on the level of livelihoods devastation experienced in a 
conflict (Justino 2012a). The level of devastation also determines the degree of post-
conflict changes that may emanate from the disruption and destruction of people's 
livelihoods. This livelihoods change creates vulnerability trend that deprives people 
access to their livelihoods, thereby forcing them to depend on any available means of 
survival (Justino 2012a) including those that may become another source of insecurity. 
This condition underscores the importance of the need to analyse the post-conflict 
livelihoods conditions and the implications of changes that occur therein. The analysis 
may provide useful insight into the post-conflict processes and livelihood coping 
strategies for conflict-affected communities. Examining those livelihoods change in a 
post-conflict context is the main focus of this research. 
3.7 Coping Strategies in Post-Conflict Context: Resilience and Adaptation to Post-
Conflict Livelihood Change 
The complexities and extensive application of the concept of resilience by a wide range 
of disciplines (e.g. engineering, ecology, psychology and economics) have made its 
definition quite slippery (Greene et al. 2004; Menkhaus 2013). While the denotation of 
the concept varies for different stakeholders, terms, such as flexibility, adaptation, 
coping and change to certain conditions in a system remain consistent. In other words, 
the capacity of a system to survive, adapt and carry on in the face of existential threat is 
central to the concept of resilience. This notion presents the opportunity for the adoption 
and use of the concept in ways that add value to the understanding and analysis in 
conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding studies (Menkhaus 2013). With regards 
peacebuilding, Justino (2012) and Menkhaus (2013) suggest the relationship between 
conflict challenges and resilience exists at different possible stages. First, resilience may 
relate to the ability to prevent conflict onset in which case individuals and households 
defy threats to their peace. This way, the resilience capacity helps to sustain positive 
peace. Second, resilience capacity may be exhibited in another form of conflict 
prevention in a circumstance where individual and households or groups can transform 
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a negative peace into a positive one. This may be in the form of the ability to demand in 
a peaceful but transformative manner for changes in, for instance, oppressive regime. 
Third, resilience plays a critical role in minimising the livelihoods vulnerabilities that 
emanate from the challenges and negative consequences after a conflict to prevent 
reccuranece.  
With reference post-conflict livelihoods setting, however, resilience may refer to the 
ability of individuals or groups to survive, cope, adapt and recover from livelihoods 
changes and challenges that are caused by conflict to minimise the resulting 
vulnerabilities which may foster conflict recurrence (Bujones et al. 2013). Jacobsen 
(2002) rationalises the application of livelihoods approach in a post-conflict setting as a 
useful tool for the analysis of resilience capacity of individuals, households and groups 
to explore livelihoods opportunities for survival and increase economic security to 
reduce vulnerabilities. The analyses of the post-conflict livelihoods resilience for the 
individual components of the framework is a useful starting point for understanding 
resilience. However, categorising these into institutional (e.g. legitimacy, efficiency), 
resource (e.g. availability, accessibility, diversity, utilisation) and adaptive flexibility 
(e.g. networking, value, behaviour, innovation) helps to understand their relationships 
better (Bujones et al. 2013). Jacobsen (2002) and Menkhaus (2013) underscore the 
importance of this relationship in a post-conflict context since these resilience 
components (institutional, resource and adaptive flexibility) operate in a delicate and 
complementary manner to achieve overall livelihoods resilience and sustainability. This 
consideration indicates that a post-conflict livelihoods resilience is dependent on 
achieving the institutional, resource and adaptive flexibility synchronously (Jacobsen 
2002; Menkhaus 2013; Suarez 2013). Furthermore, resilience may vary between 
individuals, groups or communities since the capacity to access and utilise those aspects 
of livelihoods resilience differs (Jacobsen 2002; Bujones et al. 2013). A resilient 
livelihood is, therefore, one in which the elements of its resilience is comprehensive and 
complementary and are accessible and utilised to cope and minimise vulnerability.               
The term coping or coping strategy have been widely used in conflict studies to describe 
victims’ response to devastating consequences following a conflict. Post-conflict coping 
strategies relate to how individuals, households and communities address these 
livelihoods predicaments and changes such as financial and economic needs, changing 
social fabric, psychological trauma, infrastructure inadequacy and so forth (Justino 
2012). While the magnitude and effect of conflict vary from one context to another, 
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adopting a coping strategy reflects specific contextual livelihoods dynamics in the 
setting (Amirthalingam and Lakshman 2009; 2010; Justino 2012; 2012a). Although 
post-conflict livelihoods coping strategy targets improving the adaptation and resilience 
to the ensuing challenges, not all efforts lead to sustainable post-conflict livelihoods 
development (Werker 2007; Amirthalingam and Lakshman 2009; 2010). This scenario 
may be more so for vulnerable victims and who may be unable to access adequate post-
conflict supports to improve their adaptive and resilience capacity (Justino 2012).  
There is an emerging pool of research understanding of the livelihoods coping strategy 
and post-conflict development of communities – especially for refugee and internally 
displaced persons (IDPs). Long-term improvement of the wellbeing of people and 
communities is the primary target of sustainable livelihood framework (SLF) (DFID 
2000). Unruh (2004) links the long-term sustainability in a post-conflict context to two 
crucial features of the SLF - resilience capacity of individuals and communities and the 
ability to survive within the locally available and accessible assets. There is the view 
(e.g. Azam et al. 1994; Bundervoet 2006, De Walque 2004,) that most of the available 
means of survival or coping in a post-conflict situation are destroyed during the conflict. 
This condition weakens the post-conflict resilience capacity of conflict victims in many 
possible ways. The ensuing vulnerability potentially develops into what Collier (2007) 
and Justino (2012a) refers to conflict and poverty traps, respectively. This is an 
indication of poor livelihoods resilience (Justino 2012a) Analysis of the post-conflict 
livelihoods coping strategies becomes necessary in theorising livelihoods change and 
their implications for conflict recurrence.   
Economic and financial resilience are some of the most critical coping and recovery 
strategy in post-conflict transition contexts. This view may relate to the consideration 
that the apparent difference between individuals in conflict-affected communities (e.g. 
refugee and IDP camps) and stable communities is their level of vulnerabilities due to 
availability (or non-availability) of economic opportunities (Jacobsen 2002; 
Amirthalingam and Lakshman 2010). In other words, individuals and families (conflict 
survivors) in conflict-affected communities have the capacity and resourcefulness to 
engage in active economic activities to attain self-reliance. However, they often lack 
relevant long-term opportunities to sustain their post-conflict livelihoods. According to 
Amirthalingam and Lakshman (2010), pre-conflict savings of ‘movable' physical assets 
(e.g. jewellery) is one useful source of financing livelihoods in a post-conflict situation. 
Such assets, however, can hardly be considered to have the potential for long-term 
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sustainability since it is easily exhaustible. What then becomes the survival strategy 
afterwards in the absence of other assets and choices?  Promotion of long-term strategy 
for sustainable economic self-reliance is a crucial means of achieving post-conflict 
livelihoods (Omata 2012). According to Jacobsen (2002), the pursuit for improved 
income for individual refugees improves human security of both refugees and host 
community since economic empowerment has the potential to resuscitate the social and 
economic interdependence within them. This proposition is particularly relevant in a 
refugee/IDP context where host community harbour the feeling that refugee presence 
adds to their existing economic pressure. Dissatisfaction and agitation within host 
communities may fuel new form of insecurity as observed in Gulu, Northern Uganda 
and Sri Lanka, for instance (Branch 2013; Thu 2012). Income-generating programs (as a 
means of capacity development) and improved financial access for livelihoods has 
excellent potentials of removing the burden on the host community. The strategy may 
be useful in promoting human security, mainly when it is inclusive and bottom-up 
(Jacobsen 2002).   
The productivity of refugees is shaped by the refugee/IDP policies of a host community 
or country regarding restriction on movement and work as well as the spatial context 
(isolation) of the camp. As noted by Werker (2007) and Porter et al. (2008), the 
complex interaction of refugee policies (and their outcome), humanitarian support and 
the demographic composition of the camp determine the economic wellbeing- 
livelihood, of the refugees. The sustainable livelihood framework holds that desirable 
livelihoods outcome is achievable through accessibility and interactions among assets 
and institutional environment. It, therefore, means that an economic strategy in a post-
conflict context must be analysed with regards to the other livelihood assets to be 
comprehensive. Korf (2004) upholds similar sentiment as he sought to model the 
adaptability of the DFID livelihood framework for a post-conflict camp context. He 
focuses mainly on the tripartite concern on household livelihoods strategies where he 
contends that coping strategy in the presence of a high level of vulnerability, 
household’s adaptation to economic and social capitals and political assets are essential 
determinants for long-term post-conflict livelihoods development. The empirical 
analysis of his findings in Sri Lanka, suggests that political and social assets are crucial 
to household coping strategy in a post-conflict context in addition to economic and 
financial assets. Access to social assets and networks within and outside refugee camps 
provides useful survival support for conflict-displaced migrants – IDPs. The ability of 
59 
 
refugees/IDPs to access available assets in a restricted camp environment may depend 
on complex social networking as a means of earning a living and livelihoods strategy 
for refugee-host relations. Porter et al. (2008) demonstrate that there are negative 
livelihoods implications for refugees who lack networks - internal or external, in a 
restricted camp context. In the event of short supply which characterises humanitarian 
supports, external networks are a vital source of income to many refugees. 
Alternatively, the ability to adapt and form new networks within the context of the host 
community is an essential strategy for survival. Complex social networking through 
adaptation of host community language, participation in peer activities and blending 
into the ‘new culture’ are crucial ways of creating new social networks (Porter et al. 
2008). Coping strategies in a post-conflict context can be quite diverse and complex 
depending on the degree of prevailing changes in livelihoods of people and the 
alternatives available to them. The spatial context of the new environment for displaced 
persons has a tremendous effect on their resilience and may exacerbate their inability to 
secure livelihoods. One of the significant causes of livelihoods disruption in a post-
conflict context is displacement, which often increases livelihoods vulnerability for 
conflict affect-communities. This vulnerability is commonly due to mismatch of the 
available labour of the camp residents and the local labour needs. According to 
Amirthalingan and Lakshman (2009), post-conflict displacement has different 
implications for different labour skills. The difference depends on the categories and 
applicability of refugee’s human resources stock concerning the local needs of host 
communities.  
3.8 Knowledge Gap: A Case for Post-conflict Livelihoods Change  
Analysis of the above-mentioned post-conflict analysis - refugee/IDP context, confirms 
the utility of the livelihoods framework for understanding post-conflict vulnerabilities. 
They provide useful insight into the coping strategies for conflict victims. Analysis of 
those cases also offers the opportunity to explore further and expand the approach to 
improve existing theorising of the post-conflict challenges. While the current research 
provides valuable insight into post-conflict livelihoods vulnerabilities in the context of 
refugees/IDPs, there appears a knowledge gap in understanding similar condition in a 
non-camp (self-settled) context. Are the post-conflict susceptibility the same for the 
refugee/IDP and the non-camp self-settle settings? What can we learn from the 
difference (if any)? Similarly, Levine (2016) asserts that not all post-conflict livelihoods 
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difficulties are the direct implication of violent conflict. Does this apply to both camp 
and non-camp contexts? What impact does it have on long-term post-conflict 
vulnerability? These and many more questions confirm Justino’s (2011; 2012) concern 
that research study on post-conflict vulnerabilities is understudied. Her call relates more 
to the need to improve the theorising on the implications of post-conflict livelihood 
change where she argues that the existing studies have mainly focused on the direct 
impact of conflict - physical destructions, whereas more need to be done to have a 
comprehensive knowledge of post-conflict vulnerabilities.  
Justino (2012a) reviews existing literature in an attempt to establish ‘channels of 
transmission’ between conflict and poverty leading to a repeated cycle of unrest. While 
focusing on the conflict-induced impact of social and political changes on livelihoods, 
the analysis is limited to war-time context whose conditions may be different from post-
conflict livelihoods dynamics. This thesis, however, addresses this post-conflict time-
dynamics limitation. Post-conflict theorising must adequately address both the direct 
and indirect impacts of conflicts (Justino 2012). The indirect implications of conflict, in 
this sense, relates to the livelihoods change that emanates from the direct effects. 
Although post-conflict debates and analysis acknowledge livelihoods destruction and 
disruption, investigation on the specific implications of the changes, especially for 
conflict recurrence is limited. Analysis of the nature of these changes and their 
implications for conflict recurrence would undoubtedly add a perspective to the existing 
debate and theorising on this subject.  
As noted in the preceding section, these studies have analysed post-conflict coping 
strategies with regards to individual livelihoods components. For instance, 
Amirthalingam and Lakshman (2010) and Jacobsen (2002) examine the economic and 
financial coping strategies for refugee and IDP contexts. Amirthalingam and Lakshman 
(2009) consider the survival of different categories of skill sets (human capital) of 
conflict victims and its implication on their level of post-conflict impoverishment. For 
Korf (2004) and Porter et al. (2008), social assets and political networks prominently 
feature in the discussions for post-conflict coping strategy. According to Werker (2007), 
existing post-conflict policies and institutional framework is a crucial determinant to 
accessing available assets for conflict victims. There seems to be no contention on the 
inevitability of the interdependence among the livelihood components. Analysis of 
individual components of the livelihoods in isolation may, therefore, undermine the 
significance of comprehensiveness which is a crucial feature of the livelihoods 
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framework in achieving a holistic perspective of a context (DFID 2000). Similarly, 
analysis and implications of the post-conflict infrastructures (e.g. roads, water, 
telecommunications, electricity, houses, and hospital) seem non-existent despite the 
understanding that infrastructure forms the basis upon which other livelihood assets 
may be accessed (Malual 2008). Analysis of the post-conflict physical infrastructure 
may further enrich this investigation, given the intricate connection that exists between 
access to physical infrastructure and livelihood success that may be achievable, 
especially in a post-conflict context.  
Human loss is a common consequence of large-scale violent conflict, and the condition 
can significantly distort the economy of families, especially when the casualties are the 
family heads or breadwinners. These losses potentially create environments of 
vulnerability for families – especially women and children, thereby making life more 
challenging - a situation which is a recipe for conflict recurrence (Collier 2007; Justino 
2012a; Branch 2013; Corbin and Hall 2019). Understanding the livelihoods changes for 
women and children who are the primary victims of losing breadwinners should be of 
great interest in a post-conflict discourse. Furthermore, conflict displacement is an 
integral feature in a post-conflict setting. While the displaced families reside in another 
community, they often lose their natural rights and access to livelihoods assets (Branch 
2013; Corbin and Hall 2019). The vulnerability condition that emanates from the 
displacement may be enormous as a result of livelihoods changes through the loss of 
lands, social ties (network), loss of business, loss of dignity, and so on. Predicaments of 
displaced people compound when they cannot access the livelihoods assets or are 
unable to take part in activities they have skills for in their new environment 
(Amirthalingam and Lakshman 2009). The livelihood vulnerabilities of this group in a 
non-camp condition would add to the understanding of the possible cause of conflict 
relapse discourse.  
Nonetheless, this investigation draws on Justino (2009; 2011; 2012) to broaden the 
theoretical analysis of post-conflict challenges in ways that pay critical attention to 
livelihoods changes. Review of the interlinkages among the aspects of livelihoods is as 
vital as the components themselves. Accordingly, the research probes the 
interdependence of infrastructure change and other livelihood components. The 
investigation seeks to analyse the implications of the outcome of the interactions of the 
changed livelihoods components on the possible conflict recurrence. In line with Justino 
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(2009; 2011; 2012), the objective of this research is to respond to the following specific 
questions, as shown in figure 3.3. 
1. What is the nature of livelihoods change in a post-conflict transition non-
camp context?  
Examination of the nature of livelihoods change is a useful starting point for this study, 
given the widespread destruction of both social and economic infrastructure in the case 
study of the investigation. The analysis of the nature of the damage may reveal the 
detailed level of livelihood changes in terms of devastation and possible vulnerabilities. 
Also, attacks and disruptions may be construed as one of the most typical methods of 
expressing frustration and grievances by individuals or groups. The analysis of the 
destruction pattern may, therefore, reveal actors' motivations as well as the possibility of 
the violence recurrence. 
2. What is the implication of the livelihoods change for conflict recurrence?  
Analysis of the level of devastation may offer a rough understanding of the impact of 
conflict on victims' livelihoods. However, an in-depth analysis of the effects of conflict 
and the post-conflict challenges is best understood when the narrative is from the 
victims themselves. Accordingly, interpretation of conflict victims’ story of what they 
make of the post-conflict livelihood changes would provide a sense of the significance 
and level of impoverishment. A useful conclusion may then be drawn on the possible 
implications of the post-conflict livelihoods changes for conflict recurrence.  
Response to these questions provides the answer to the primary question of this 
research:  
To what extent is post-conflict livelihoods change a potential contributor to 
conflict recurrence and a threat to human security?  
The aim of the research, therefore, is: 
To adapt then use the sustainable livelihoods framework for improved 
understanding and theorising of the nature of livelihoods changes and their 
implication on post-conflict human security and conflict recurrence in a non-
camp context. 
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Figure 3.3: Proposed Livelihoods Framework for a Post-conflict Context 
Source: Adaptation of DFID (2000); PCLI = Post-Conflict Livelihoods Interventions 
3.9 Chapter summary 
This chapter has reviewed the theories and concepts that establish the causes of threats 
to human security, leading to conflict incidence. Theoretical considerations on the 
variety of motivations for conflicts onset and recurrence focused on the resources-curse, 
greed and grievance, Dutch disease and sustainable livelihoods theses respectively. The 
contextual consideration for the case study helps to articulate and adopt the livelihood 
approach as an appropriate theoretical framework for this research. This was necessary 
to highlight the premise upon which the theoretical construct hinges in the context of 
this research. Similarly, the review of some examples of post-conflict cases studies 
further strengthens the justification for the utility and appropriateness of adopting the 
livelihoods framework. Furthermore, the contextualisation of the proposed framework 
helps in articulating the knowledge gap for this research thereby specifies the research 
question(s) and aim. However, to provide a relevant response to the research question 
(s) and achieve the aim of this investigation, an appropriate methodology is necessary to
identify a suitable and relevant method of data collection and analysis for the research. 
Accordingly, the next chapter focuses on the methodological consideration for the 
study.  
Figure 3.3 has been removed from this 
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Introduction to the Research Case Study 
4.1 Introduction: Buni Yadi in the Context of Diverse Insecurity in Nigeria 
The earlier chapters have explored the rationale and theoretical underpinning for this 
study. Chapter two reviews the concept of human security covering its evolution, 
components and ramifications. To deepen the understanding of threats to human 
security, chapter three critically examine the discourse concerning theories on 
conditions that trigger conflicts onset and recurrence. The conceptual analysis helped to 
situate the context (North-east, Nigeria) of this research within the theoretical debate, 
thereby articulate the justification for adopting the livelihoods concept for a post-
conflict setting as an appropriate framework. It is pertinent, however, to establish the 
specific case study within which the investigation is undertaken. To achieve this, the 
chapter analyses the broader context of Nigeria to identify relevant specific setting that 
is suitable for the inquiry given the diverse regional insecurity dynamics and problem in 
the country. The chapter also justifies the selection of Buni Yadi as the case study for 
the research.  
4.2 Broad Regional Pattern of Insecurity in Nigeria 
Nigeria is an example of a post-colonial country with increasing and recurring conflicts 
since independence (1960). The series of civil disputes in Nigeria include the ‘Biafra 
War’ - in the late 1960s (Orobator 1983; Diamond 2007; Iruonagbo and George 2007; 
Oparaku et al. 2017), and ‘Maitatsine’ uprising of 1970s and 1980s (Hickey 1984; 
Kastfelt 1989; Adesoji 2011). Recent conflicts occur after Nigeria’s return to 
democratic rule (post-2000) (Okafor 2011), which preceded the increased ethnoreligious 
violence across many regions. The Niger-Delta militancy, North-east Boko Haram 
insurgency and the farmer-herder conflicts in the North-central are examples of 
significant disputes in the country in recent times (Akinbi 2015; Nwankwo 2015; 
Dimelu et al. 2016; Ajodo-Adebanjoko 2017; Idowu 2017).  
Insecurity in Nigeria also manifests in the incessant and increasing cases of crimes, 
violence, uncertainty and fear across the country (Adagba et al. 2012; Ahmed 2014). 
Researchers and policy analysts have widely described the security threats in the 
country as ones that concern basic human needs (Katsina 2012; Ahmed 2014). Salkida 
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(2016), however, contends that interventions have relied more on military actions while 
sustainable means of discouraging acts of criminality and violence in the form of 
development have received relatively less attention. Odo (2012) acknowledges the 
effort of Nigeria security agencies in providing physical security but argues that a 
lasting solution to insecurity depends on government’s ability to create livelihoods 
opportunities to end the existing precarious living conditions of people. This view has 
informed a growing recognition of the need to complement military efforts with 
improvement in socio-economic wellbeing and general livelihoods in the country – 
particularly in the North-east region, which is one of the most impoverished. It may be 
relevant, however, to question the effectiveness of any possible intervention - which 
does not critically assess the changes in the post-conflict livelihoods of the individuals. 
The analysis of the livelihood conditions is particularly critical in a context such as 
Nigeria where there is tremendous regional and economic diversity. 
A good starting point for insecurity interventions in a country with sizeable internal 
diversity like Nigeria requires an understanding of the underlying causes and dynamics 
(Achumba et al. 2013). Peterside (2014) and Dambazau (2015) note that Nigeria’s 
insecurity is regionally diverse with different factors which trigger conflicts and general 
instability (Figure 4.1). Examining the conditions that cause regional instability is 
necessary to distinguish those dynamics as a critical strategy to unravelling the relevant 
concept for approaching the challenge (see Table 4.1). The analysis is vital since 
different insecurity drivers may require different approaches for sustainable 
interventions (Achumba et al. 2013). The review of the diversity provides useful insight 
for identifying pertinent underlying causes of insecurity for each region, thereby 
informing the appropriate conceptual approach to tackling their peculiarities. Achumba 
et al. (2013) suggest that this is necessary to avoid the age-long unsustainable 
consideration that a one-size-fits-all intervention is sufficient for addressing insecurity 
in Nigeria. This section, therefore, focuses on the analysis of the broad regional 
distribution of security vulnerabilities in Nigeria. At least six regions can be determined 
based on the geopolitical zoning in the country (Figure 4.1). 
4.2.1 Resource Curse in the Niger Delta (South-south Region) 
The social unrest and violent conflict in the Niger Delta – South-south, region of 
Nigeria can be traced to the pre-colonial and independent periods (Ajodo-Adebanjoko 
2017). Protests, occasioned with violence formed the response against economic 
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domination, alienation and oppression (Joab-Peterside 2007). The discovery of crude oil 
and subsequent attainment of Nigeria's independence in 1960 soon transformed the 
protests into the demand for a fair share of the proceeds of the regions’ resources - 
mostly oil and gas (Obi 2009).  In recent times, strong demand for full control of the 
resources which form the mainstay of the country’s economy and sometimes 
secessionist agitation dominates the violence and insecurity in the region (Joab-
Peterside 2007; Obi 2009). The movement and campaign against apparent neglect 
primarily associated with the violence in the Delta region leading to further deplorable 
living conditions of people and communities; where resources that the country depends 
on are extracted (Nwankwo 2015; Ajodo-Adebanjoko 2017).  
Table 4.1: Regional Security Dynamics in Nigeria 
Regional Security Dynamics in Nigeria 







North East – Insurgency, 
banditry, poor education, 
high rate of unemployment 
and poverty. 
Collier and Sambanis (2002); Collier 
et al. (2004); Walter (2004); Eze et al. 
(2014); Tayo and Nasrullah (2016); 
Abbas (2012); Hoffman 2017); Otu 






North West – Ethno-religious 
conflict, Cattle rustling, 
banditry, poor education, 
high rate of unemployment 
and poverty. 
Collier and Sambanis (2002); Collier 
et al. (2004); Walter (2004); Eze et al. 
(2014); Tayo and Nasrullah (2016); 
Abbas (2012); Hoffman 2017); Otu 






North Central – Ethno-
religious violent, farmer-
herder disputes, banditry, 
high rate of unemployment 
and poverty. 
Collier and Sambanis (2002); Collier 
et al. (2004); Walter (2004); Eze et al. 
(2014); Tayo and Nasrullah (2016); 
Abbas (2012); Hoffman 2017); Otu 




South West – Thuggery, 
robbery, cultism, high rate of 
youth unemployment. 
Okwuashi et al. (2011); Oyesola 
(2012) 
Resource Curse South-south – Militancy, 
cultism, kidnapping, poor 
education, youths’ 
unemployment and poverty. 
Collier et al. (2004); Ross (2006); 
Joab-Peterside (2007); Obi (2009) 
Ajodo-Adebanjoko (2017); Nwankwo 





South East – Secessionist 
agitation, kidnapping, human 
trafficking, youths’ 
unemployment and poverty. 
Collier et al. (2004); Oparaku et al. 
(2017); Obi-Ani (2009); Onuoha 
(2011); Ike (2012); Smith (2014) 
Source: Adapted based on Peterside (2014) and Dambazau (2015) 
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The impoverished conditions of communities (especially oil-producing) are attributable 
to the environmental degradation due to oil exploration and the spillages which render 
arable lands into wastelands and waters (Asuni 2009). Oil exploration has also 
adversely affected the forest ecosystem in the region while the continued destruction of 
the rich and diverse ecological zones has caused the depletion of the region’s 
biodiversity thereby distorts its ecological balance (Eragha and Irughe 2009). Oil spills 
contaminate water, thus making it unsafe for human consumption and destroy aquatic 
plants and animals. Air pollutants from gas flaring have been a primary atmospheric 
contaminant which results in critical respiratory health challenges in the region (Ajodo-
Adebanjoko 2017). Despite all these problems, the level of economic and social support 
for the communities in the area has been widely acknowledged to be significantly 
inadequate to offset the continued damage to the local means of livelihoods of the 
indigenes (Nwankwo 2015). And where efforts are made to enhance the deplorable 
conditions of the people, they hardly reach the poor given the difficulties caused by the 
characteristic poor governance, occasioned with a high level of corruption - by top 
government officials and the oil companies (Ikelegbe 2005).  
Figure 4.1: Broad Regional Distribution of Insecurity in Nigeria.
Source: Adapted based on Peterside (2014) and Dambazau (2015) 
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The combined effect and activities of genuine agitators for improved living and 
environmental conditions and the criminal gangs – mostly militants and cultists, who 
take advantage of the situation, have been the cause of continuing violence and armed 
confrontations in the South-south (Asuni 2009). Johnson et al. (2010) note that 
depriving the indigenous people the oil proceeds and competition for scarce resources 
and political exclusion form some of the significant causes of insecurity in the Delta 
region. The effect of these unresolved practices is manifest in the numerous communal 
clashes among communities due to the struggle for scarce resources (Ikelegbe 2005; 
Joab-Peterside 2007) and the armed battle between the government forces, and the rebel 
groups is a notable form of a violent clash in the region. The oil companies are not 
spared in the violence where both genuine agitating groups and criminals launch attacks 
on oil installations and pipeline purposely to scuttle oil activities and production and 
perpetuate oil theft (Watts 2007). The kidnapping of oil workers (especially expatriates) 
and rich people for ransoms makes media headlines regularly (Obi 2009).  
4.2.2 Historical Legacy of Secessionism in the South-east Region: Before and 
After Biafra War 
The insecurity in the South Eastern region has widely been considered to be deeply 
rooted in the controversies that preceded the 1914 amalgamation which culminates into 
the creation of the current Nigerian State. As indicated by Ballard (1971) and Momah 
(2013), the then British colonial government merged the Northern (now North-west, 
North-central and North-east) and Southern (currently South-west, South-south and 
South-east) protectorates to form the current Nigerian State for efficient administration). 
The Eastern region (mainly present-day South-east) was said to have been coerced – 
against its will, into the union. According to Gould (2011), the rejection (by Eastern 
region) of the proposed amalgamation was on the ground of the region's consideration 
(or recognition) of being politically unique and the sharp cultural and religious 
differences that exist between its people and those from other areas. The discovery of 
oil in some parts of the region compounded the current unresolved issue leading to 
competition for the proceeds of the resources within the region and beyond. With 
regards to the Biafra war, for instance, Ken Saro-Wiwa stresses that …competition between 
the three majority groups [Igbo, Hausa and Yoruba] in Nigeria brought about civil war (Saro-Wiwa 
1989:11). These subsequently snowballed into the post-independence security 
challenges the country has had to contend. 
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Analysts of the region’s instability mostly hold that the South-east’s unresolved 
grievances form part of the motivations for the planning and execution of the first 
military (bloody) coup d’état and the subsequent counter-coup and resistance that led to 
the first Nigeria civil war in 1967. This narration supports the fact that, at least, the 
exercise was led and implemented mainly by the officers and soldiers of the Eastern 
extract (Oparaku et al. 2017). The Civil War (also called Biafra War) which lasted about 
three years (1967-70), was the result of the Eastern region’s secessionist campaign. The 
grievance triggered the campaign over the perceived economic and political unfairness 
(among other things) the area was said to have been subjected. As noted by James 
(2011) and Pellissier (2015), the Federal Government’s overwhelming military response 
claimed the lives of no fewer than 2 million people with many more displaced. Hence 
some (e.g. Orobator 1983; Diamond 2007; Iruonagbo and George 2007) have 
characterised it as genocide. The resultant destruction of lives, properties and the 
environment left the region and its people in a state of dire humanitarian crisis and 
almost (if not total) collapse where the general livelihoods were shattered and disrupted. 
However, the war ended with the re-integration of the region into the Nigerian State.   
The anticipated need for the full reconstruction of the physical, environmental, 
economic, and the general livelihoods of the region may have been largely unfulfilled. 
And agitations for the demand for better living conditions were suppressed mainly by 
the long period of military regimes in the country after the civil war (Obi-Ani 2009). 
Furthermore, the return to democratic rule in 1999 resurrected the Eastern region’s 
secessionist spirit whose campaign has remained a significant source of insecurity in the 
area and beyond in recent times (Onuoha 2011; Ike 2012; Smith 2014). At the moment, 
the campaign is on the grounds of economic and political marginalisation and exclusion. 
The evident poverty, decayed and deficient infrastructure and youth unemployment 
have been widely associated with the growing spate of violent conflicts in the region. 
Violent secessionist strife, communal clashes, ritual killings and cultism, armed 
robbery, human trafficking and kidnapping are some of the manifestations of insecurity 
in the South-east region (Peterside 2014; Dambazau 2015).     
4.2.3 Urbanization Induced Insecurity: The South-west Defective Urbanization   
South-west region provides a relatively different scenario for the problem of insecurity 
in Nigeria. Unlike the other southern parts, the security vulnerability in the South-west 
primarily emanates from decades of unguided and unsustainable urban development 
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(physical and social) and the resultant challenges of urbanisation (Okwuashi et al. 
2011). This region is among those that had the earliest contact with other parts of the 
world (including Europe) for commercial activities. A city from the South-west region 
(Lagos) was the colony of the then British government and later became Nigeria's 
capital upon the amalgamation of the North and South to form the Nigeria State, up 
until 1991 (Moore 1984; Adama 2007). This advantageous feature is still apparent in 
the region's prosperity and its unique role as the dominant economic and commercial 
centre in Nigeria (Campbell 2011). As noted by Oyesola (2012), the region houses more 
than two-thirds of the country’s commercial and industrial activities. The consequent 
concentration of administrative, commercial and industrial activities in the area created 
the agglomeration of people and businesses and the eventual rapid population growth 
due to migrations and natural births.   
Okwuashi et al. (2011) and Oyesola (2012) observe that sudden population growth in 
the cities of the South-west exerted unprecedented pressure on all facets of the urban 
fabrics. This pressure creates significant social, economic, environmental and political 
challenges which exposed the region to the threats of insecurity. Population increase in 
the cities caused urban sprawl wherein the available social amenities became 
insufficient and unsustainable to cater for the needs of the inhabitants. Consequently, 
this challenge creates substantial urban poor who live in the ever-expanding slum and 
poverty-stricken areas at the periphery of core areas of many cities in the region. This 
unhealthy and unsustainable growth manifests in the attendant increase in violent crimes 
including rampant armed robbery, cult activities and ritual killing, political 
assassinations, gangsterism, kidnapping, land grabbing, rape and other forms of social 
insecurity (Peterside 2014; Dambazau 2015).   
4.2.4 A Complex Scenario: Beyond Livelihoods in Northern Nigeria 
The Northern half of Nigeria is entrapped in perpetual insecurity which results from a 
complex mixture of unresolved economic, political and ethnoreligious challenges. At 
independence and beyond, the Northern region was the most underdeveloped - human 
and physical, area in comparison to the more prosperous Southern part (Campbell 
2011). As noted by Campbell (2011) and Eze et al. (2014), the North is more 
impoverished and usually ranks lowest in most of the country’s human development 
indicators such as income, education and literacy, mortality, healthcare, infrastructure 
and so forth. The low level of western education in the North, for instance, is 
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attributable to the negative perceptions about education held in the region for 
generations as being evil (Salihu 2012; UNDP 2018). The consequence is the high level 
of unemployable youths, given that the official measure of employability in Nigeria is 
western education. This condition explains the regions high rate of poverty and 
precarious livelihoods (Adekola et al. 2016; World Bank 2016). 
Geographically, the Northern region of Nigeria has by far the largest land area - 
approximately 78%, (Dudley 1968; Dear and Foot 1995) a great deal of which is arable 
(Figure 4.2). The development of the agriculture and agro-related economy mainstay of 
the region has mainly remained underdeveloped as a result of the continued 
deindustrialisation and inadequate infrastructure (Campbell 2011). This challenge in 
effect has confined the agricultural activities to the traditional subsistence farming and 
centuries-old nomadic animal herding practices. According to Tayo and Nasrullah 
(2016), however, these farming practices have fuelled a considerable number of clashes 
between farmers and herders. Increased competition for croplands and grazing areas has 
worsened the occurrence, recurrence and devastation of the conflicts in recent times. 
Traditionally, the pastoral animal herders practice seasonal migration in search for 
pasture to graze animals within the government designated grazing areas in the Northern 
region. However, the combined effect of increased demand for spaces for physical 
development; crop production, corrupt land acquisition and climate change have 
continued to diminish the reserved grazing sites. A first-class Emir narrates this scenario 
in the North: 
 [The] Grazing routes have been taken away by politicians. We have demographic 
 implosion in the North, desertification, reduction in water reserves and competition for 
 resources among various aspects of agriculture – crop production, animal husbandry and 
 fishing – Mohammad Sanusi II (Akinkuotu and Tyopuusu 2018).  
This forces animal herders to seek pasture and water for their animals outside the 
designated grazing area and have resulted in many cases of violent clashes between 
farmers and herders (Abbas 2012).  
By contrast, the Northern region is more populated (54% of the 2016 projected 
population of 193,392,517 persons) and ethnically and culturally more diverse than the 
South (National Bureau of Statistics 2016). This condition, together with other socio-
political factors – e.g. poor education, poverty, religious misapplication, political 
exclusion, have played a significant role in fostering many conflicts in the region. The 
cultural diversity coupled with religious bigotry has been exploited to fuel many 
internal struggles for political power, economic domination, territories, economic 
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opportunities and insurgency (Meagher 2013). This sophisticated and interwoven 
peculiarity of the North explains the long history of ethnoreligious tensions and 
conflicts in the region. It is more often than not related to the firmly held grievance, and 
perception – by minority tribes, of political and economic domination by the majority 
tribes or social class (Hoffman 2017) and the results of these create security 
vulnerabilities which escalate into violent conflicts on many occasions. Furthermore, 
the conditions provide fertile ground for exploitations and criminality wherein 
influential personalities and politicians, criminal gangs and religious extremists lure 
vulnerable youths into crimes including political thuggery, cattle rustling, 
farmer/herders clashes, drug abuse, kidnapping, and terrorism such as the one 
experienced in the North-east region.  
Figure 4.2: The North-South Land Coverage in Nigeria
Source: National Boundary Commission; National Bureau of Statistics, Nigeria (2016).
One of the recent insecurity, in the North-east for instance, according to Otu (2014), 
Tella (2015), Ugwu (2015) and Bamidele (2016), is the apparent consequence of 
government failure to adequately address citizen's needs. This condition results in 
Figure 4.2 has been removed from this 




deprivation and chronic high rate of poverty, low level of education, poor healthcare, 
injustice, inadequate infrastructure and arms proliferation. The effect culminates into 
unresolved grievances which are exploited to incite the violent insurgency. 
Development in the form of improved livelihoods conditions has been seen as a priority 
and strategy for improving the security challenge in the region (Otu 2014; Tella 2015; 
Ugwu 2015). Experts and policy analysts suggest the need for a holistic re-examination 
of the North-east security challenge through a livelihoods approach. This call indicates 
that deliberate efforts must be the focus on improving developmental problems 
sustainably to attain durable peace and security in the region (Bamidele 2016; UNHCR 
2016).  
Synthesis, as shown in table 4.1, presents a useful insight into Nigeria’s wide regional 
security variation, which may be helpful to contextualising each regions challenge and 
determine the particular approach to providing sustainable solutions. Achieving this, 
however, requires the identification of the relevant and useful conceptual approach for 
each of the regions. It is discernible that the susceptibility to conflict for the various 
areas relates to the grievances and challenges which are associated at least with lacking 
access or inequitable and unsustainable distribution of resources. Nonetheless, the 
underlying regional insecurity factors and their contextual interplay differ across the 
country (Peterside 2014; Dambazau 2015). These variations, therefore, support the 
consideration that insecurity in Nigeria requires a contextually different conceptual 
approach for analysing different regional instability as advocated by Achumba et al. 
(2013).  
Unlike the relatively more prosperous South, insecurity in the Northern part of Nigeria 
relates more to the interplay of precarious living conditions. The complex interaction of 
the ensuing low-level human and physical development makes the region susceptible to 
perpetual unrest (Collier and Sambanis 2002; Collier et al. 2004; Walter 2004). 
Vulnerability to conflict is particularly apparent in the North-east given the complex 
interaction of poor living conditions and how they are being exploited by the insurgents 
to incite conflict (Otu 2014; Tella 2015; Ugwu; 2015; Bamidele 2016). Careful analysis 
of the North-east security dynamic suggests the relevance of approaching the case 
study’s conflict and its possible recurrence through the livelihoods lens (Collier and 
Sambanis 2002; Collier et al. 2004; Walter 2004; Eze et al. 2014).  The theoretical basis 
and justification for considering the livelihoods approach for investigating the insecurity 
in the case study of this research have been presented in Chapter three.    
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4.3 Research Case Study Area: Buni Yadi, North-east Nigeria  
The case study for this research is Buni Yadi, geographically situated at 11o16’8’’ North 
of Equator and 11o59’49’’ East of the Greenwich covering an approximately 4.6Km2 
land area (Figure 1.5). Buni Yadi is about 55.8 Km and nearly 50-minute drive through 
the famous Damaturu-Biu road southward to the Yobe State capital, Damaturu. The 
settlements which include Bularafa, Buni Gari, Dokshi, Wagir and Ajigin border the 
case study which is famous for its abundant agricultural and business activities making 
it one of the major business hubs in the region (Government of Yobe State 2018). Gujba 
Local government, whose 2016 projected population is 184,200 persons (National 
Bureau of statistics 2016) has its headquarter in Buni Yadi.  
Gujba Emirate, historically was an independent kingdom which existed (from 13th 
century) for about 650 years until the traditional setting was altered following the 
invasion by Shehu Umar El-Kanemi in the 19th century. El-kanemi was the second 
Shehu (Emir) of the old Bornu Empire whose reign lasted between 1837 and 1881. 
Gujba kingdom was eventually annexed having been conquered and controlled by the 
old Bornu Empire. The kingdom was, therefore, administered as a province under the 
old Bornu Empire through its representative – traditionally called Aja (Gujba Emirate 
Council 2018). The old Gujba Emirate shared similar cultural identity with the old 
Bornu Empire whose major traditional ethnic groups include Kunuri, Babur and Magas. 
This ethnic makeup continued until the Fulani Jihadist invasion of the Usman Dan 
Fodio of some parts of old Burnu Empire in the late 19th century. This invasion and 
conqueror of part of the Empire caused a major upset in the ethnic composition due to 
the infiltration by other tribes particularly the Hausa-Fulani who govern those territories 
under the command of the Dan Fodio. Like other Kanuri-dominated territories, the 
British colonial rule further opens up the Gujba to other tribes due to the colonial 
administration (Hickey 1984; Joel 2014). Present day Buni Yadi has a population whose 
origins cut across the length and breadth of Nigeria.  
Although Kanuri is the dominant tribe in the case study, the major local dialects are 
Kanuri and Hausa languages. The heterogeneity of Buni Yadi settlement is identifiable 
from its internal delineation based on spatial feature - streets which divide the entire 
community into six geographic clusters (micro-subdivisions). These clusters include 
Mairi (head of the settlement area), Kasakchiya (migrants), Hausari (Hausa-majority 
neighbourhood), Shuwari (Shuwa-majority neighbourhood), Ngomari (Ngoma-majority 
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neighbourhood) and Fulatari (Fulani-majority neighbourhood) (Figure 4.4). Buni Yadi 
is located within the Sudan Savannah belt of Nigeria with a climate condition that is 
characterised with annual long and short dry and rainy seasons respectively. The 
scrubby vegetation interspersed with trees as well as the alluvial flood plain soil suitably 
supports crop farming (Ali et al. 2009; Diarra et al. 2010; Mulima 2015). This climate 
condition and vegetation also supports the pastoral animal herding. These traditional 
activities – crop and animal farming, are the primary economic activities in Buni Yadi, 
thereby making it a major centre for commerce in the region due to trading of 
agricultural commodities (Sule et al. 2013 Edikpo et al. 2014). The people of Buni Yadi 
are predominantly Muslims. The teaching and practice of Islam are believed to have 
been imported into the region since 11th century and this has continued to play a critical 
role in almost all the day-to-day life among the people including the legal jurisprudence, 
marriage, food, dress code, interpersonal relations and so forth. It is a common practice 
to enrol children into Arabic and Qur’anic schools (often informal) at a tender age 
particularly to sustain the religious ethics (Abubakar 2017). This has made the Islamic 
education the dominant knowledge in the area.  
Similarly, as permissible in Islam, men in Buni Yadu are polygamous. This practice and 
the traditional extended family system encourages formation of compound houses in 
which multiple households (small family units) live. Men double as heads and major 
decision makers on issues relating to the families affairs. Women in this area are simply 
adored and treated delicately, hence married women are often secluded while all her 
economic and social needs are provided for by the husband (Abubakar 2017). However, 
Buni Yadi is one of the North-east settlements (Figure 4.4) that have witnessed the 
recent violent attacks by the insurgent group, Boko Haram, where thousands of people 
including school children have been murdered in the deadly attacks (McElroy 2013; 
Aljazeera 2014). A significant proportion of the infrastructure has been destroyed as 
well. The attackers have targeted and destroyed both public and private properties 
including schools, hospitals, police stations, water sources, electricity and 
telecommunication facilities, businesses and houses (further details in chapter 6 and 7) 
(Aljazeera 2014; Daily Trust 2014; Sahara 2014; 2017). The town was taken over in 
2014 by the insurgents leading to the complete displacement of its people. It was, 
however, reclaimed after the intense military offensive consequent to which the 
residents had returned and resettled since 2015 (Sahara 2017).  
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Nonetheless, a lot may have changed for the people of Buni Yadi given the high level of 
destruction and distortion of livelihoods in the community (Channels 2016). This 
condition further supports the appropriateness of approaching the case study’s security 
challenge from livelihood perspective, as highlighted in table 4.1. Understanding the 
challenges this livelihoods distortion brings to people, and its implication on long term 
post-conflict development forms the main thrust of this research. The investigation is 
specific to the concern of the changes in those livelihoods and their potential for causing 
conflict recurrence.  The insecurity dynamics in the North-east region of Nigeria present 
unique features that make it suitable for this study. Unlike other areas (e.g. South-
south), North-east security challenge is not primarily natural resource-based. Similarly, 
it is unlikely for the region’s insecurity to be urbanisation or industrialisation driven 
considering the current underdevelopment (both human and physical) in the area. 
Figure 4.3: Buni Yadi in the Context of North-East Nigeria
Source: National Space Research and Development Agency (NASRDA), Nigeria (2018)
However, the North-east region is one of the poorest and ranks lowest in the level of 
human development in the country. According to Akinbi (2015), a high rate of 
joblessness, abject poverty and poor education are some of the significant insecurity 
factors in the North-east. These vulnerability conditions put people (especially youths) 
in a situation where they can be easily manipulated and recruited for rebellion. The 
region’s insecurity presents a unique opportunity for theorising conflict within the 
Figure 4.3 has been removed from this 




livelihoods – grievance, debate as a condition for the onset and potential for recurrence 
(through livelihoods change) (Collier et al. 2004; Walter 2004).  
The choice of Buni Yadi for this study predicated on four primary conditions which 
make the settlement suitable for the investigation and supports the research argument. 
These conditions include safety concern, presence of returnees and migrants, non-camp 
setting and fulfilment of the requirements for post-conflict settlement. Oxford Brookes 
University’s, University Research Ethics Committee’s (UREC) approval for this 
research was granted based on the assurance for the safety of the researcher and 
research participants. This safety concern is crucial, given the fragility of the context 
haven recently emerged and recovering from conflict experience.  
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Figure 4.4: Residential Satellite Image of Buni Yadi
 Source: National Space Research and Development Agency (NASRDA), Nigeria (2018). 
 
Figure 4.4 has been removed from this 
version of the thesis due to copyright 
restrictions
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Buni Yadi presents substantially safer physical condition to undertake the study. This 
assessment was based on extensive consultation with acquaintance and community 
leaders from the area who confirmed the absence of threats other than day-to-day risks. 
Informants from other proposed settlement options – e.g. Bama and Madagali were 
unable to guarantee safety for conducting the fieldwork. Buni Yadi serves as a haven 
both for returnees and conflict migrants from other communities following the military 
certification and voluntary return from displacement. The presence of these migrants 
compensates for the need to use additional context to examine the livelihoods of conflict 
migrants since one of the research targets is to understand the post-conflict conditions of 
the migrants. Historical residents and migrants currently live in Buni Yadi without 
physical or administrative restriction, except in very few areas where there is safety 
concern – e.g. possible land mine. The settlement also fulfils conditions for designating 
post-conflict context as discussed below.   
4.4 Buni Yadi – A Returnee Post-conflict Transition Context 
Post-conflict implies a situation whereby open physical confrontation or hostility has 
ended after a conflict. Tension often lingers in post-conflict contexts for many years 
after the conflict depending on how the conflict ended and the peacebuilding efforts that 
follow. In other words, the post-conflict condition does not necessarily mean the 
attainment of real peace. Conceptually, however, the designation of a war-ravaged 
community as a post-conflict context is often not straight forward given that violence 
hardly stops at a discrete-time within the setting of intra-state conflict. As noted by 
Brown et al. (2011), depending on the conflict dynamics, the beginning of the end to 
physical hostility and attacks is often not the same for all conflict contexts. However, 
some level of atrocities may be witnessed often in a guerrilla form after a declaration - 
formally or informally, of the end to the conflict (Call 2012). Brown et al. (2011) argue 
that it would be counterproductive to consider the post-conflict condition as a discretely 
time-bound event or period; instead, it should be viewed as a transition process through 
which permanent peace may be realised. This process-oriented reflection of post-
conflict setting describes Buni Yadi context given the relevance of the prevailing 
indicators such as the end to hostility, the return of the displaced, existence of civic 
rules and economic recovery. Although these indicators relate primarily to spatially 
macro-scale (state), they seem appropriate to be adopted for the relatively micro context 
of Buni Yadi as follows:    
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End to Open Hostility: Cessation of violence may be brought about by a peace 
agreement between warring parties (sometimes including a third party) in a civil war as 
it was the case in, for example, Liberia (1990-1996 Abuja Accord), Zimbabwe (1987 
ZANU and ZAPU Power-sharing Agreement) and Central African Republic (1997 
Bangui Agreement) intra-state conflicts (Call 2012). The end to an armed conflict may 
also come through victory for one side over other(s) parties involved in the conflict 
through superior military capability as seen in cases of Afghanistan (2001) and Sri 
Lanka (2009) (Call 2012; Kreutz 2010). In Buni Yadi, however, cessation of hostility 
and violent attacks by the insurgents is achieved through military intervention in which 
the government troops overpower the armed insurgents. The town had subsequently not 
witnessed open attack up until early 2018 when an attempted suicide bomber was 
foiled. The settlement may, therefore, be considered to be in the process of the absence 
of a violent attack.  
Return of the Displaced – Often, communities (e.g. Sri Lanka, DRC, Somalia, South 
Sudan, and Burundi) face forceful displacement from their homes during significant 
conflicts. This condition creates a considerable burden of internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) or refugees. The voluntary repatriation of IDPs or refugees to their original 
communities is one of the indicators of return of peace after the end of open hostility 
(UNHCR 2016), and the case of Buni Yadi is no exception. Given the modus operandi 
of the insurgents, they targeted and destroyed the town purposely to displace the people 
and the presence of government and take control of local resources and administration. 
However, upon retaking and re-opening of the town by the military, residents have 
voluntarily returned at the end of 2015. This decision followed the military certification 
of the town as being safe for civilian habitation. Buni Yadi is, therefore, a post-conflict 
returnee community in which people (original residents and conflict migrants) live 
freely and as self-residents.  
Establishing Civic Rules – The return of the residents to the town upon reopening 
ushers the re-establishment of a functional civil society in which the residents live 
peacefully within the dictate of the rule of law. Public institutions are gradually being 
restored to minimise impunity and engender the civic practices in the community. 
Although there is a military presence in the settlement, they are meant to support the 
police to boost confidence and ensure the general safety of residents. The police and 
other local authorities oversee the day-to-day civil affairs of the town.   
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Economic Recovery and Development – This may be said to be the current state in 
Buni Yadi given the residents’ effort to rebuild their disrupted livelihoods. Although at 
an abysmal pace, efforts are being made to rebuild destroyed infrastructure and social 
lives. These efforts target the stimulation of social and economic recovery and 
development and reduce vulnerability. It is an ongoing process which requires an 
adequate understanding of the peculiarity of the context (Brown et al. 2011) to ensure 
that an appropriate strategy for intervention. This analysis of the post-conflict livelihood 
dynamics, especially regarding their changes is vital to prevent possible relapse to 
conflict due to increased vulnerability (Collier 2007; Walter 2004).  
4.5 Chapter Summary  
This chapter starts with an analysis of the broader context of insecurity in Nigeria. The 
regional security dynamics were examined to identify the relevant approach for these 
regional security variations. While justifying the appropriateness of adopting the 
livelihoods approach for the North-east, Nigeria, Buni Yadi presents conditions that 
make it suitable for the case study of this research. The justification for selecting the 
case study predicates on its current conditions, including which support the theoretical 
underpinning of the study. However, the next chapter focuses on the methodological 













Research Design and Methodology 
5.1  Introduction: Methodological Consideration 
The previous chapter has established a specific case study for this research. As an 
empirical investigation, however, this chapter focuses on the methodological 
consideration for undertaking the research. The methodological process provides 
standardised procedures for providing verifiable empirical evidence that is suitable for 
the study. Based on the theoretical framework; this chapter explains the aspects of the 
data collection methods and analysis which premise on the relevant philosophical and 
epistemological paradigm for conducting research. The chapter also discusses the 
justification for adopting the methods and ethical reflection for the conduct of the 
fieldwork. Before presenting the details of the methodology, however, a reminder of the 
aim and research question is worth a while.    
5.1.1 Research Aim: 
To adapt then use the sustainable livelihoods framework for improved 
understanding and theorising of the nature of livelihoods changes and their 
implication on post-conflict human security and conflict recurrence in a non-
camp context. 
5.1.2 Primary Research Question: 
To what extent is post-conflict livelihoods change threat to human security and 
potential for conflict recurrence? 
Sub-research Questions: 
1. What is the nature of livelihoods change in a post-conflict transition non-camp
context?




5.2 Research Strategy: Pragmatism  
The theoretical position for this research is that precarious livelihoods are important 
insecurity drivers in the case study area. The research contends that post-conflict 
livelihoods change affects human security and has the potential for causing conflict  
relapse. However, the objective of this chapter is to develop a suitable methodology for 
obtaining relevant empirical evidence to test the hypothesis. The underlying research 
argument influences the choice of a research strategy and the case study to collect the 
desired empirical data (de Melo 2017). This strategy is necessary for selecting a method 
that is deemed appropriate for an investigation. The approach underpinning 
(philosophy) plays a significant role in determining the processes and type of data used, 
which reflects on the collection and analysis. Both spatial and non-spatial data are 
necessary for this research, including thematic components of livelihoods such as 
human, social, physical environmental and economic variables. However, the plurality 
of the data required for the investigation necessitates the consideration for multiple 
sources approach for data collection. Multi-sources approach is consistent with the 
pragmatic philosophical reflection for this research. The pragmatic approach derives its 
strength from the promotion of pluralistic viewpoints to research investigation. Its 
worldview about research posits that critical understanding of social problems (e.g. 
situations and consequences of actions) in necessary instead of an excessively rigid 
methodological construct (Creswell 2014). 
Pragmatic philosophy hinges on adopting ideas and practices that are both useful and 
workable as necessary criteria for understanding the truth about a social issue (Reason 
2003; Anyigor 2012). Johnson and Onwuegbuzie emphasise the premise that 
pragmatism:  
. . . offers a practical and outcome-oriented method of inquiry that is based on actions and 
leads, iteratively, for further action and elimination of doubts (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie (2004:17).     
According to Patton (1990), Morgan (2007) and Tashakkori and Teddlie (2010), 
Pragmatism offers the opportunity for using multiple approaches to understanding 
social research problems wherein mixed methods are employed to undertake research. 
This research strategy presents an advantage that is leveraged upon to ensure data 
triangulation (Holborn 2004).  Anyigor (2012) has used this strategy to researching the 
effect of weak social capital on economic development in a case study of South-east 
Nigeria. He notes that it allows for the use of data that are collected from multiple 
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sources (both primary and secondary) using multiple methods (e.g. qualitative, 
quantitative and observation). The multi-sources strategy ensures that data is rich and 
comprehensive, thereby increases their validity for analysis. The liberal stance of 
pragmatism is indicative of its ‘non-allegiance’ to any one particular approach. Its offers 
for a pluralistic philosophical approach to research and presents the advantage of 
combining, for instance, quantitative, qualitative and observation methods in a study to 
gain more insight into the reality of the social problem. This notion embeds in a 
philosophical consideration that the social world varies greatly, hence the need to 
accommodate a combination of methods for data collection and analysis for a realistic 
outcome (Cherryholmes 1992; Morgan 2007 and Creswell 2014). The need for reliable 
data for an in-depth analysis of thematic components of post-conflict livelihoods 
changes influences the choice of adopting the pragmatic worldview to research in which 
primary data is sourced from the original context of the conflict. This strategy refers to a 
case study design or method (Yin 2014).   
5.3 Case Study Design 
The post-conflict transition context of this research requires critical and in-depth 
analysis of a range of elements that constitute livelihoods in the settlement. This 
analysis is necessary to gain insight into the impact of conflict on livelihoods thereby 
identify possible changes to theorise their implications on conflict recurrence. It is, 
therefore, appropriate to undertake the study within the original context where the 
phenomenon – conflict, took place. Case study research design suffices for this need. 
Yin (2014) describes the case study research: 
. . . as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the case) in depth 
and within its real-world context. . . . Yin (2014:16). 
The case study design has been widely applied across disciplines to investigate social 
events that require holistic analysis of phenomenon (Harrison et al. 2017; Zaidah 2007). 
Post-conflict studies are no exception. The case study design is probably the most 
appropriate for investigating conflict and post-conflict conditions given the need for 
conducting the study within the original context. Case study design, for instance, has 
provided a valuable research outcome for Amirthalingam and Lakshman (2009; 2010), 
Werker (2007) and Jacobsen (2002) in their investigation of post-conflict coping 
strategies analysis. This implies the utility and appropriateness of adopting the research 
design for investigating social issue such as post-conflict livelihoods change.   
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Zaidah (2007) and Harrison et al. (2017) underlines that the case study design has some 
alignment with the pragmatic research philosophy. This view premises on the case 
study’s flexibility, which allows for the use of multiple (mixed) approaches for data 
collection - mostly quantitative and qualitative. Mixed methods strategy enable the 
researcher to generate corroborative answers to research questions through the use of 
quantitative and qualitative (and other) data collection methods. Case study research by 
its nature is conducted within a specific time - cross-section or over a specified period - 
longitudinal (Yin 2014). The cross-section case study design is, however, deemed 
appropriate for this research. Adoption of the cross-section method owes to the need for 
the collection and analyses of the thematic data regarding the components of livelihoods 
of the case study at a particular time. The collection of the array of data suggests the 
need for a multiple (mixed) methods in which a corroborative analysis is possible. Case 
study design supports this approach to investigation.  
5.4 Mixed Methods Approach     
Mixed methods approach is deemed appropriate for this study to take advantage of its 
strengths for minimising the weaknesses inherent in any standalone method such as 
qualitative, quantitative and other (observation) approaches (Creswell 2014; Bryman 
2016). Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) underline that mixed methods provide a 
practical and results-based approach to research. The constituent methods within a 
mixed-methods approach are mutually reinforcing, thereby ensures reliable results and 
research outcome. Creswell (2014) identifies different possible types of mixed methods 
research including convergent, explanatory and exploratory mixed methods. The 
explanatory sequential mixed method is deemed appropriate for this research 
considering the order with which data collection methods are undertaken. The choice of 
this method followed its consistency with the research design for the study in which 
data collection is designed to support the exploratory approach in two phases to explore 
the potential livelihoods changes and their implications. The quantitative and physical 
(observation) surveys are conducted first to ascertain conflict impacts, and the 
possibility of livelihoods change in the case study.   
Nonetheless, the strength of using the mixed methods strategies may as well forms its 
drawback. The apparent reason that it involves multiple sources and techniques makes 
the process complex and therefore, may be challenging to manage. The constituent 
methods used often require the use of different data collection strategies, processing and 
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presentation hence require high skill to manage (Adolphus 2020). Brannen (2005) 
underlines, for example, that coherently harmonising the findings and presentation of 
the numbers, words and other evidence in the different aspects may be challenging to 
achieve due to discrepancies that may arise from their interpretations. The mixed-
methods approach requires relatively more time and resources for planning and 
implementation.   
It was sequentially appropriate for this study to start with the quantitative and 
observation methods given that outcomes of the analysis from the data provide a 
preliminary answer(s) to the research questions - the nature of livelihoods change. 
Results of the surveys were used to articulate the appropriate qualitative approach for an 
in-depth study and analysis. The reverse of this method - explanatory, is unlikely to 
provide this outcome. Although in a stable context, an exploratory method has been 
applied by Anyigor (2012) in livelihoods study, which produced a reliable research 
outcome. A similar approach has also been used in some post-conflict studies such as 
Jacobsen (2002) and Amirthalingam and Lakshman (2009; 2010). These have produced 
research outcomes that have a robust corroborative richness of evidence.    
The first phase of this research involved the use of the quantitative technique –survey 
method, where numerical variables regarding livelihoods components and their changes 
were obtained. This method is relevant to determine the preliminary validation of the 
possibility that post-conflict livelihoods changes have a possible negative implication 
on human security and conflict resurgence. Similarly, the appropriateness of the 
quantitative method hinged on its usefulness for collecting data which are a descriptive 
narrative of the livelihoods change as a result of the conflict in Buni Yadi. This 
consideration necessitated the adoption of survey strategy to provide an adequate 
representative description of the characteristics of livelihoods and their changes in the 
case study. The nature of this research made it inevitable to undertake spatial mapping 
for the analysis of the pattern of infrastructure destruction in the case study area. The 
spatial data provided corroborative evidence and ensured the richness of the data in the 
first phase of the empirical investigation. Similarly, it helped in achieving a robust 
understanding of the interplay of different elements of livelihoods and how their change 
has a potential influence on conflict recurrence in Buni Yadi.  
The second phase of the research used a qualitative method, mainly through focus group 
discussion and individual interviews as the data collection technique. The need for these 
methods arose from the desire to gain an in-depth understanding of the livelihoods 
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changes in the case study area as well as the interpretations of what the residents make 
of them. A more detailed insight into the impacts and implications of the conflict and 
the livelihoods changes is obtainable when narratives come from the perspectives of the 
primary victims in their community (Holt 1997).  Accordingly, the next section 
highlights the detailed processes of applying these research strategies (methods) - 
namely quantitative, observation and qualitative methods, respectively. 
5.4.1 Quantitative Research: Survey Sampling and Data Collection 
The quantitative design primarily associates with the positivist philosophical ideology 
which employs a deductive process in social research (Golafshani 2003; Bryman 2016; 
Creswell 2014). In practice, the quantitative strategy uses the natural science procedure 
for investigation where social reality is treated objectively without researchers influence 
on participants’ views. The approach relies on the quantification of social variables 
using numbers as a means of data collection and analysis (Bryman 2016). Basic features 
of quantitative research are identifiable from its epistemological underpinning. 
Amaratunga et al. (2002) and Bryman (2016) identify some discernible features that 
characterise quantitative research strategy, namely measurement, causality, 
generalisation, replication and validity and reliability. These features are commonly 
considered as some of the strength of the quantitative research strategy (Amaratunga et 
al. 2002). As indicated by Campbell and Stanley (1963), Thomas (1999) and Creswell 
(2012); quantitative research design is broadly categorised into experimental (or true 
experiment) and quasi-experimental and non-experimental quantitative research. 
Experimental research seeks to provide answers to research question relating to why a 
certain phenomenon takes place under a specific condition. The aim is to examine and 
find an explanation about how a condition influences certain events. Primarily, this 
method applies for analysing cause-effect relations in social or natural settings (Cooper 
and Schindler 2011). Experimental research is, therefore, considered appropriate for the 
quantitative aspect of this research. The experimental quantitative strategy was useful in 
part for rationalising the possible cause-effect relation of precarious livelihoods and 
conflict onset and recurrence in the case study.   
The first phase of this study focused on the generation of quantitative (non-spatial) and 
spatial data. The non-spatial data included the conditions of basic human needs – 
livelihoods, which underlie conflicts in the case study. It also consisted of the changes 
in access to those needs as a result of the conflict. Relevant data required for the 
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empirical investigation included residents' levels of income, level of education, 
employment status, housing, access to water, electricity, health facilities, and so forth. 
Also, it examined changes in those basic needs by way of a descriptive comparison of 
the pre-conflict and post-conflict conditions where possible. The relevant data were 
generated through a primary field survey using a systematic random sampling for 
selecting participants’ household who volunteer information. The quantitative method 
of the study involved the participation of 450 households, which constitutes 
approximately 10% of the total households in Buni Yadi. However, the desire to obtain 
an unbiased selection of participants influenced the choice of a systematic random 
sampling technique given the scarcity of reliable secondary data that could be used to 
predetermine the selection and number of households in the case study. Other 
probability sampling methods such as the simple, stratified and cohort or cluster 
sampling may not be appropriate for the research in such circumstance. The systematic 
random sampling used involved the selection of ‘1 in 10’ households as representative 
samples of households in the case study area. This method of selection ensured the 
objectivity of the study and even the spread of selected participants across the case 
study. The responses from the sampled representative households were assumed to 
reflect the views of the entire residents of the case study (Henn et al. 2006; Bryman 
2016).   
The household selection process was made by way of taking the first ten households 
from the beginning of the settlement from which a household is selected on a random 
basis as the first potential participant. The tenth next household was selected as the 
subsequent participant household after the first selection, and the process is repeated 
until the entire settlement was covered. The case study area may be described as being 
mostly rural with predominantly bungalow type of buildings. These buildings are 
socially structured such that related families live in compound buildings comprising of 
few family households (between 2 and 5). Members of these compound houses know 
one another. This arrangement made it easy to identify households within buildings with 
a residents’ assistance whose effort supplements the effort of identifying and 
ascertaining the number of household in buildings. This rigour checked the possible 
error of considering all buildings as being a single household. The residential map 
(Figure 4.4) of the case study was used for this exercise. Residential imagery of the case 
study was studied together with a research assistant who is conversant with the 
settlement. The assistant was requested to be thorough in identifying individual 
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buildings that have more than one household to ascertain the number of households in 
each building in the case study. 
The researcher envisaged the need for research assistants for the study, given his limited 
knowledge of coupled with the sizeable spatial expanse of Buni Yadi with regards to the 
available time for undertaking the fieldwork. Three local research assistants – including 
a female, were recruited (for the quantitative and qualitative exercise) from the pool of 
researchers assigned from the Local Council researchers. The procedure has been that a 
request is made to the local council for researchers who are locals and have requisite 
field experience with excellent communication ability and understand both Kanuri and 
Hausa (the major local dialects). The head of personnel responsible for assigning 
research assistant was contacted to make a request which was granted upon presentation 
of Oxford Brookes University, University Research Ethics Committee’s approval for 
the fieldwork.  The research assistants were adequately briefed about the study and the 
specific tasks they were requested to do. The remit of the research assistants was 
helping the researcher in the aspect of data collection, including identification of 
prospective participant households, questionnaire administration and retrieval and co-
facilitation of focus group discussions. The assistants were encouraged to ask for 
clarifications on tasks or issues that were not clear to them throughout the fieldwork.    
One representative of each household (often family head) was requested, through 
invitation (appendix 2) to participate by completing a structured questionnaire. The 
questionnaire was administered after participants volunteer to take part in the study. 
Before volunteering to participate, potential participants were given the participant’s 
information sheet (appendix 1) to read and understand the purpose and benefits of the 
study. However, the researcher interpreted the translation (in Hausa dialect) of the 
participant’s information for the prospective participants if they were unable to read. 
The completed questionnaires were returned to the researcher on site. The process of 
questionnaire administration was through a face to face method where the researcher 
visited the household of participants and administered the questionnaires for completion 
by a representative of the families. The researcher, together with respondents went 





5.4.2 Structured Questionnaire      
The application of a structured questionnaire to collect information about the livelihood 
conditions of households was deemed appropriate for this research. The desire to 
achieve full coverage of the case study influenced the choice of a questionnaire. As 
noted by Phellas et al. (2012), the use of a questionnaire for data collection eliminates 
bias, enables greater geographic coverage and reduces time/resources wastage. The 
nature of this research and the desired information necessitated the use of households 
instead of individuals. Unlike an individual, the household survey provided holistic 
livelihoods characteristics of families and the effect of conflict on the livelihoods of 
those families. Amirthalingam and Lakshman (2010), for instance, used the quantitative 
method as part of the mixed methods in their post-conflict studies. By contrast, 
however, their structured questionnaire captures only the livelihoods conditions for 
individuals. This study considered the individual survey as being inadequate as it leaves 
out a vital part of the household livelihoods condition from other members of the 
families. Using the individual survey may render the data noncomprehensive for 
instance if the livelihood contributions or conditions of, for example, mother or adult 
child, who contribute to the family economy is not part of the analysis. 
Accordingly, the questionnaire asked questions concerning the socio-economic 
conditions of the respondents (family representative) and those of other members of the 
families as affected by conflict. This approach was a necessary way to obtain a 
comprehensive understanding of the livelihoods conditions of households in the case 
study. Heads of families (male or female) were, therefore, preferred to respond to the 
questionnaires as they may have a better appreciation of their families’ economy and the 
conditions. However, the desire to obtain an objective and reliable social reality through 
quantitative method (Shuttleworth 2008; Matveev 2002) has often led to research 
‘stiffness’. Criticism of the quantitative approach relates to the rigidity of the 
methodological processes which fails to distinguish between natural world order (object 
of nature) and human social behaviour (Schutz 1962) in its measurement of social 
reality. As highlighted by Cicourel (1982), excessive reliance on quantitative 
measurement instrument - e.g. devices, structured questionnaire, hinders adequate 
understanding of the reality of everyday life of people. Quantitative research does not 
offer respondents the opportunity to express their opinion based on their experiences, 
interpretations and meanings they attached to social events or phenomenon (Bryman 
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2016). These weaknesses inform the choice of applying the mixed methods for this 
study such that the weakness of one method is compensated for by another to achieve a 
robust empirical methodology and outcome.   
For clarity and simplification of questions, the survey questionnaire (appendix 3) was 
divided into five sections to cover the different components of livelihoods of the 
respondents' household. The opening section asked questions about general information 
of the respondents such as age, gender, level of education, and so forth. The subsequent 
sections contained questions that relate to the impacts of conflict and changes in 
income, road, social assets, housing and other infrastructure. Although the questionnaire 
was primarily structured, the desire to have more information from the perspective of 
the respondents necessitated the inclusion of some open-ended questions such as ‘Why 
did you leave your original community?’ These open questions, however, minimised the 
restrictiveness of the structured questionnaire. Similarly, open-ended questions provide 
the researcher with the opportunity to clarify certain areas of the questionnaire where 
respondents requested additional explanations. Giving further clarifications for 
respondents was noted to be particularly helpful as some of the respondents preferred to 
respond in the native language – Hausa. This preference also informed the choice for 
the physical contact (face-to-face) to administer the questionnaires. 
5.5 Spatial Data: Observation 
The spatial data required for this study included a locational map (Figure 4.3) and 
residential imagery of the case study (Figure 4.4). To spatially locate the damaged 
infrastructures residential imagery was used to prepare a digitised spatial pattern of the 
infrastructure destruction for facilities, utilities and services in the case study (Figure 
7.1). The residential satellite imagery of the case study area, which formed the basis of 
this spatial method was sourced from the archives of the National Space Research and 
Development Agency (NASRDA), Nigeria. NASRDA is a medium spatial resolution 
satellite image provider in Nigeria. The spatial data was acquired mainly through 
physical surveys by observation to identify infrastructures destruction in the conflict. 
The spatial map, which was prepared using ArcGIS software, presents the distribution 
and the pattern of physical damage that occur in the case study area. Physical 
observation also involved the collection of physical information using photographs to 
corroborate or complements information that was obtainable through the questionnaire. 
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A note-taking and digital camera were the primary methods used for physical 
observation. Data collected through this method involved the physical observation to 
identify locations and conditions (nature of destruction) and general destruction pattern 
of houses, schools, hospitals, electricity and water supply facilities and roads networks 
and other infrastructure. 
5.5.1 Data Analysis: Processing and Presentation of Survey Results 
The survey phase of this research provided a descriptive statistical pattern of livelihoods 
and the impact of conflict on the livelihoods of people in the case study. It also provided 
an insight into the livelihoods changes of the residents. The analysis of result from this 
stage essentially determined the occurrence of livelihoods changes in the case study. 
And this outcome provided the basis for the qualitative method. Considering the above, 
descriptive statistical and spatial tools were employed for the analysis and presentation 
of the survey data. Descriptive analysis was deemed appropriate for the quantitative 
study, given its utility for organising and presenting quantitative sample data in a 
summarised form. The pattern and distribution of livelihoods variables and the changes 
were easily discernible using this process. Descriptive statistical tools, together with 
graphical analysis, are used for fundamental descriptive analysis (Henn et al. 2006; 
Trochim 2005). Statistical tools such as frequency distribution table, charts, and data 
percentages were used to summarise and present the components of livelihoods where 
the comparisons between the pre-conflict and post-conflict results were used to 
ascertain the existence of a change in livelihoods of the participants. The descriptive 
results provided a simplified and sharp overview of livelihoods conditions in the case 
study (Blaikie 2003). The spatial data was presented in the form of a digitised map 
which shows the pattern and distribution of infrastructure destruction in the case study. 
Pictorial evidence was used to complement the spatial plan for the analysis and 
presentation of the results of the physical survey (see appendix 13 for further details). 
5.6 Qualitative Research: Consideration for Focus Group and Individual Interview 
Techniques 
The qualitative technique derives its essence from the interpretive paradigm in research 
(Bryman 2016). This research paradigm gains prominence during the late 20th and early 
21st centuries as a valuable alternative that accommodates the deficiency of quantitative 
analysis in social research (Creswell 2014). Unlike quantitative research, qualitative 
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research follows the inductive procedure by asking hypothetical questions about the 
phenomenon to develop a relevant theory(s) regarding a subject of interest (Henn et al. 
2006; Bryman 2012). These theories and ideas are developed through rigorous and in-
depth interaction with the subject of the social world – notably humans. Researcher 
interacts with the subjects of an investigation with a view to understanding and 
interprets the people's day-to-day experiences as individuals, groups and community 
concerning a phenomenon. The decision or conclusions that a researcher draws about a 
social subject derives from the adequate understanding of the meaning and 
interpretations the actors have on the subject.  Qualitative research strategy adopts data 
collection and analysis procedure base on word text obtained from participants who 
discuss their experiences, perceptions and assumptions about social events in their 
context. According to Flick (2014), the need to adopt a qualitative approach to research 
should be influenced by the recognition that social phenomenon is dynamic and human 
knowledge about the dynamism is limited. Creswell (2014), Flick (2014) and Bryman 
(2016), also note that many qualitative research strategies are in use owing to their 
peculiar applicability for different context and subjects. 
As noted, qualitative research is broadly categorised into the narrative and 
phenomenological study (Bryman 2016). The phenomenological analysis is a research 
design where the researcher strives to understand and describe the experiences of 
participants concerning certain events based on their accounts (Creswell 2014). 
According to Moustakas (1994) and Giorgi (2009), research strategies in this category 
predominantly use interviews (sometimes observations) as the data collection process. 
Many types of phenomenological research exist, but some of the commonly used ones 
include ground theory, ethnography and case study research (Law et al. 1998; Bryman 
2012; Creswell 2014). The phenomenological case study was, however, deemed 
appropriate to maintain a methodological consistency wherein individual interviews and 
focus group discussions were used for data collection. Many post-conflict studies use 
this method either as stand-alone (e.g. Werker 2007) or mixed methods 
(e.g.  Amirthalingam and Lakshman 2009; 2010) and useful research outcomes were 
obtained.  
The second phase of the field study of this research built on the results of the 
quantitative and observation methods. The quantitative research results provided initial 
insight for identifying livelihoods change in Buni Yadi. It was from these results that 
questions for focus group discussions and individual interviews were articulated. The 
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combined use of the focus group discussions and interviews was deemed appropriate for 
the qualitative aspect of the research given its utility for an in-depth investigation where 
a proper understanding of the opinions of the participants may be obtained concerning 
livelihoods changes. However, Shah and Shahbaz (2015) have deployed an individual 
interview as a stand-alone qualitative technique for a post-conflict study. This research 
considers that using interview alone may be inadequate as it may potentially leave out 
some useful details that could only be tapped using a focus group technique. As noted 
by Kitzinger (1995) and Powell and Single (1996), the focus group is the gathering of 
individuals whose purpose is to discuss social issues (or phenomenon) of interest. The 
use of such a study is to obtain a first-hand and genuine understanding of the underlying 
problems, based on the experiences and opinions of participants.   
Similarly, according to Powell et al. (1996), focus group discussion provides an 
appropriate platform for identifying potential issues or clarification about a known 
subject which may not be adequately achieved by other techniques. The choice of the 
focus group technique was influenced by its usefulness not only for understanding the 
experiences and opinions of participants but the rationale behind the construct of their 
thoughts (Kitzinger 1995).  Similarly, it provided a quick and easy way of generating 
data from many people at the same time. Interactions between participants encouraged 
increase participation, especially those whose response may be less accessible in a one-
on-one interview. Furthermore, focus group discussion provides the platform for cross-
fertilisation of ideas, experiences, opinions and clarifications as they discuss the open-
ended questions (Kitzinger 1995; Powell et al. 1996). It is also a viable avenue through 
which contrasting views may be identified about the subject of the investigation (Rabiee 
2004).  
5.6.1 Focus Group Structure     
There appear to be no strict standard or consensus as to how many participants should 
constitute a focus group. There is no agreement on the appropriate number of focus 
groups in a study either.  However, Macintosh (1993), Rabiee (2004) and Morgan 
(2013) highlight some primary considerations which commonly guide focus group 
discussions. These include homogeneity of participants who should be between six and 
ten number of people in groups of between three and five per research. These 
considerations, however, must be exercised with caution so as not to restrict researcher 
from optimally utilising options that could generate better outcome (Morgan 2013). 
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Focus group discussions involving some homogeneous (e.g. occupation, origin, gender) 
and heterogeneous (e.g. age and gender)  participants from the case study were 
employed to generate relevant and robust information for this research. There were five 
categories for the focus group discussions, including migrants who currently reside in 
Buni Yadi as a result of conflict displacement from their original communities. Others 
included local farmers, local market people, women and youth groups. Each of the focus 
groups consists of 6 individuals to ensure adequate and efficient management of the 
discussion proceedings (Rabiee 2004). Cultural considerations informed the choice of 
employing homogeneous categories (particularly for age and gender). Culturally, the 
level of interaction and association among people of the case study is a function of their 
age and gender classifications. The researcher envisaged that it would be challenging 
for young adults to freely express their opinions if they were classified into the same 
group with the older adults. A similar consideration applies to women in a cultural 
environment where the opinions of men are dominant. Anyigor (2012) underscores this 
cultural difficulty. Although he employed a mixed gender and age for the focus groups, 
he reflects that better research results may have been obtained with homogeneous 
groups. Participants were selected from each of the six residential clusters in the 
community to achieve extensive opinion coverage and avoid bias to ensure reliability 
and richness of data obtained. The criteria for participants selection in each group is 
shown below: 
Migrants Group – Migrants who currently reside in Buni Yadi as a result of conflict 
displacement from their original communities. It is worth repeating that the community 
as a whole was once displaced during the conflict but have returned to their homes. 
Upon return, people from other communities who have had similar experiences (conflict 
displacement) but could not go back found Buni Yadi as a haven. So, participants for 
this group were mainly those who are initially non-indigenes of Buni Yadi but now 
reside there due to conflict displacement. Migrants could be from any conflict-affected 
community within the North-east region. This group is considered to be relevant for this 
research because the condition of participants in the group indicates one of the 
significant impacts (displacement) of conflict. The consequential changes in availability 
and accessibility to livelihoods assets they experience have theoretical significance for 
this research. Discussion with this group provided useful insight into the peculiar 
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experience of conflict migrants (IDPs), and the livelihoods changes and challenges they 
encountered in a non-restricted or camp environment. 
Farmers Group - Farming is the mainstay of the economy of the Buni Yadi. 
Participation of local farmers becomes naturally inevitable. Participants in this group 
included residents of Buni Yadi whose primary livelihood activity/occupation is 
farming. Only residents of the case study whose farm location was within its geographic 
boundary are eligible for participation in this group. The case study area is mostly an 
agrarian settlement with most of its population engaging in agriculture and 
agriculturally related endeavours. The conflict had affected farming activities in the area 
due to the destruction of farmlands and farming facilities. This invariably affects the 
known means of earning a living for this group, hence its relevance for this study. 
Local market group – Medium and small scale agro-related businesses are perhaps the 
second most crucial livelihood activity in Buni Yadi. The participants for this group, 
therefore, included residents whose primary livelihood activity was business or trading 
in Buni Yadi. Business sustained many households before the conflict. However, the 
conflict destroyed many private properties (livelihood assets) and businesses. The 
inclusion of this group was useful to understand the changes and accessibility to their 
livelihood assets. Discussion with the group also helped to understand the post-conflict 
implication of these changes and the alternative survival choices they adopt. 
Women Group – Women constitute a significant proportion of the population in the 
case study; therefore, including them in this investigation was inevitable to ensure 
gender balance. Participants of this group included women who were residents in Buni 
Yadi. Married, divorced, widows and unmarried women were eligible for participation 
in the group. Women are known to be one of the most vulnerable groups in conflict or 
post-conflict situation like those experienced in the case study of this research (Call 
2012; Corbin and Hall 2018). Hence, the need to register the opinion of women ensured 
that given the cultural dominance of their male counterparts. Discussion on the ethical 
and cultural consideration for interaction between the researcher and the women group 
is contained in the ethics section.    
Youths Group – Buni Yadi has a population that has significant proportion which is 
youth. The delineation of age brackets for defining youths varies from society to society 
as it is often the reflection of existing peculiarities and objective considerations for 
political and socio-economic realities in different contexts. The Nigeria Youth Policy 
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(2009) for instance, defines youth as citizens of Nigeria who are within the age limit of 
18 years and 35 years old. For this study; therefore, youth is considered to be a resident 
of Buni Yadi who is between the age of 18 years and 35 years old. This group 
constitutes a vulnerable group who usually are both actors and victims of conflicts 
(Bangura 2016) and yet constitutes a significant active population of the case study area. 
The vulnerability of this category of the population is the one which is often exploited 
to incite conflict. The need for engaging the youth group in a discussion to reveal the 
possible causes and potentials for conflict resurgence cannot be overemphasised.  
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the categorisation for the focus groups is a 
simplification of the possible social groupings in the case study given that many 
residents engage in more than one livelihood activity for survival. Grouping them by 
these multiple livelihoods activities may render the process difficult and could prevent 
obtaining a reliable outcome. Furthermore, all participants for the study were local 
adults of the case study area whose age was 18 years or above. Religion, political 
affiliation and origin (except for migrant group) of participants were not relevant 
inclusion/exclusion criteria for the study provided the participants were resident in Buni 
Yadi. Regarding the recruitment of individuals for the focus groups, the researcher 
reached out to the prospective participants through local social platforms such as 
mosques, churches, markets associations and youth and women groups. Upon 
consultation, the community head and youths leader assisted the researcher in 
identifying the social networks within which members and individuals were requested 
to participate in the focus groups voluntarily. The identified potential participants were 
asked to contact – through the mobile number provided, the researcher when they 
decided to participate to register their interest. Like in the quantitative research process, 
individuals who expressed interest to participate were given the participant’s 
information sheet (appendix 1) to read and understand the purpose of the research and 
the details about their participation. A translation was read to those who were unable to 
read, upon request. After the final decision to participate, a follow-up phone call/text 
messages were made by the researcher to agree on a date, time and venue for the 
discussions. 
5.6.2 The Process of Focus Group Discussion 
Each session of the focus group discussions began with an introduction of the researcher 
and the study. The interaction with some local leaders in the community before the 
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survey indicated a preference for local language as a medium of communication. Given 
this preference and the level of the researcher’s understanding of the local language, 
Hausa - one of the most spoken, was adopted as a means of communication throughout 
the sessions. The participants were requested to introduce themselves at the start of each 
discussion session for familiarity purpose among themselves and the researcher. This 
gesture created a friendly environment for the discussions. The researcher coordinated 
and moderated each group discussion by introducing discussion topics and subtopics 
from the discussion questionnaire (appendices 7-11) while participants had the chance 
to express their opinions freely in the focus group discussions that lasted between 60-90 
minutes with 15 minutes break in-between. Although a communal space - community 
hall, was proposed as a venue for the conduct of the discussions; this could not be 
accessed given that it was destroyed in the conflict. The palace of a community leader 
(locally called Lawani) who voluntarily offered the space was used instead. The 
researcher ensures that the venue for the group discussion was well lit and ventilated, 
and the setting and sitting arrangement was such that it encouraged informal interaction 
to provide a relaxed environment for participants. An African proverb says that you 
don't ask for a chair when you are in a place where the chief himself sits on the floor. 
Culturally, the people of Buni Yadi enjoy socialising while sitting on mats spread on the 
floor; hence, the practice was adopted for the conduct of the focus group discussions. 
Participants sat on the mat in a circular form, thereby ensuring a culturally conducive 
and informal setting. Individuals in each of these groups had the opportunity to express 
their views and perceptions in detail freely. The discussion sessions were recorded by 
way of note-taking and audio player with written consent (appendix 5) of the 
participants.  
5.6.3 Individual Interviews Technique 
The focus group sessions were anticipated to open up an avenue for further information 
generation about post-conflict livelihoods change in Buni Yadi. Individual’s interviews 
were deemed appropriate to obtain such additional insight which the focus group 
discussions are unable to harness. Potentials for those kinds of questions were identified 
from individuals who participated in the group discussions and were envisaged to have 
more valuable information to provide willingly. Such individuals included those who 
exhibited unique and peculiar opinions in the course of the focus group discussions. The 
individual interviews where semi-structured and open-ended questions were employed 
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for the identified individuals considering their suitability for this kind of inquiry 
(Sauders et al. 2003). The open questions for these interviews offered the opportunity 
for flexibility in exploring participants’ new detailed opinions about questions 
highlighted from the focus group sessions. Participants for the individual interview were 
identified and selected from the five focus groups to ensure full coverage of the case 
area and avoid bias. Each of these participants was interviewed at their chosen locations 
and convenient times. Like the focus group sessions, the interviews were conducted 
using Hausa language and recorded by audio and note-taking. 
5.6.4 Data Analysis 
The need to gain an accurate and in-depth analysis of the post-conflict livelihoods 
change in Buni Yadi influenced the choice of adopting the Hausa language. It was used 
as a medium of communication in the group discussions and interviews. The use of 
Hausa language was deemed necessary following the participants' preference for 
responding to questions using local dialects during the quantitative study. The audio 
recordings of the responses obtained from the discussions and interviews were 
transcribed into word documents and translated into the English language. Analysis of 
the transcribed word document was generated based on the thematic elements of 
livelihoods and patterns that arose during the discussions and interviews (see appendix 
13 for further details). The qualitative data analyses contain discussions and narrative 
quotes from participants. These were used as evidence to support further discussions in 
the study.  
5.7 Ethical Considerations in the Research  
Ethical considerations (also refers to ‘research morality') ensures the rights and 
wellbeing of participants are fully protected. Research ethics is a necessity given the 
required attention for fulfilling the recommended minimum acceptable standard for 
research practices (Cobanoglu and Cobanuglu 2003). The need for research morality is 
particularly essential when there is human participation to ensure that rights and 
wellbeing of participants are not undermined or taken for granted as a result of their 
involvement in the research. The need to adhere to research ethics for this study was 
necessary considering the sensitive nature of the study – post-conflict. This concern also 
relates directly to the need to avoid the possibility of undermining the vulnerability 
conditions of the research participants who have been through a conflict situation. 
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Oxford Brookes University Code of Practice for Research Ethics for Research Involving 
Human Participation provides a valuable basis upon which the human recruitment and 
participation for this research were conducted. In line with the ethical requirement for 
research at Oxford Brookes University, participants for this study were formally invited 
(appendices 2 and 4) to participate in the study.  
Similarly, the participants were made to be fully aware of the purpose, benefits of the 
research as contained in the participants’ information sheet (appendices 1and 6). The 
need for the participants to participate in the investigation was also clearly highlighted 
and adequate information was provided to them about the nature of the research and the 
specific tasks they were required to do during their involvement. All participants for the 
study were adults – 18-year-old and above. The adult-only participation policy for the 
research was to ensure that participants had the mental capacity to understand the nature 
of the study and to be able to give consent and make informed decision to participate. 
Participation in this research was strictly voluntary given that participation was by their 
informed written consent (appendix 5) without any form of undue pressure. 
Participation was subject to participants’ approval to accept the audio recording of the 
discussion and interview sessions. 
Confidentiality of participants' personal information was of great significance in the 
conduct of this research. The confidentiality for the study was in line with the Data 
Protection Regulations of Oxford Brookes University. Responses of participants that 
contained personal identities or information were securely handled to prevent access by 
unauthorised persons. All notes, transcripts and audio records of proceeding were 
always securely stored in the researcher's lockable safe. Electronic data were stored in 
electronic devices (laptop or hard drive) which were encrypted (password protected) at 
researcher's residence during the fieldwork and at Oxford Brookes University for 
processing and analysis. A backup copy of the research document was stored in Google 
Drive that is linked to the researcher's Brookes Google account, to be available in an 
unlikely case of data loss. Similarly, the research assistants who were recruited to 
support the researcher were requested to sign the confidentiality agreement form 
(appendix 12) for their involvement in the study. This procedure was a further step to 
ensure confidentiality and to prevent unauthorised access to information from this 
study. 
Furthermore, the cultural requirement for interaction with people (especially women) in 
the case study was adhered to adequately. Culturally, prolong interaction between 
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unrelated men and women put women in a state of discomfort. To avoid this condition 
and balance the cultural requirement, the service of experience female research assistant 
was employed as a co-facilitator of focus group sessions. The presence of a female in 
the focus group for women not only makde them relaxed but encouraged them to 
express their opinions and experiences freely and confidently. Similarly, cultural 
concerns for all other groups were taken into consideration adequately during the 
sessions. To ensure due process and adherence to laid down procedures for undertaking 
research fieldwork in Oxford Brookes University approval was requested and granted 
for both quantitative and qualitative data phases after meeting all requirements.  
5.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presents the details of the philosophical and epistemological underpinning 
for applying the research methodology, which is consistent with the theoretical 
consideration of the investigation. Considering the post-conflict nature of this study and 
its context the justification for adopting the case study design and multi-sources mixed 
methods strategy were presented as the suitable methodological processes for data 
collection and analysis. The mixed-methods comprised of the quantitative survey using 
questionnaire, physical surveys by observations and the qualitative technique, which 
involved the focus groups and individual interviews. The chapter also discusses the 
details of the procedures for undertaking each of these techniques as well as the cultural 
and ethical concerns for conducting social research that involves human participation. 
These methodological processes guided the fieldwork activities for the collection of 
relevant data for the investigation. However, the subsequent chapters present the 
analysis of the empirical results sequentially in the order of quantitative, observations 



















Results of the Quantitative Survey: Structured Questionnaire 
The preceding section has discussed the relevant methodological considerations which 
guide the data collection and analysis for this research. Using the case study design 
mixed-methods data collection and analysis considered include the quantitative, 
observation and qualitative surveys. Based on the data collected using the survey 
technique through questionnaires, this chapter, however, presents the results of the 
quantitative method. The survey results are based on the 450 sampled household 
participants who provided information about both individual and household post-
conflict livelihoods conditions. The summarised data are displayed using charts and 
graphs in the form of proportions and relative distribution - such as percentages, of 
livelihoods variables. 
6.1 Reason for Migration from Buni Yadi 
This section shows empirical evidence to support the claim that conflict once displaced 
residents of the case study. As shown (Figure 6.1), the survey results indicate that 
insurgency was the primary cause of displacement in Buni Yadi. During the movement, 
the residents migrated to various places within and outside Yobe State including IDP 
camps and non-camps settlements in states such as Kano, Bauchi and Kaduna. The 
choice of the destination for the conflict migration may have been influenced by factors 
such as the level of affluence, presence of networks and relations outside Buni Yadi. 
These choices for destinations had deferring implications for the post-conflict 
livelihoods experiences of the residents. For example, the conflict victims who migrated 
to the IDP camp are likely to be more impoverished after the return due to the 
unfavourable livelihoods conditions in camps.  Similarly, residents who migrated to 
faraway places where the majority of the residents are not aware faced the difficult 
challenge of lack of trust due to suspicion upon return (see section 6.7). However, 
further discussion on the impact of the displacement is in the focus group discussion 
(chapter eight)   
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Figure 6.1: Reason for migration from Buni Yadi 
6.2 Reason for the Return to Buni Yadi 
It is crucial to determine whether residents of the case study have returned to their 
community after conflict displacement. This evidence is critical to support the 
theoretical consideration for selecting a case study, which is a non-camp post-conflict 
settlement. Figure 6.2 indicates that residents have returned to Buni Yadi from the 
displacement for one reason or more. Responses of the respondents suggest that their 
resettlement is voluntary, giving that the return of peace and livelihoods activities, e.g. 
farming and business constitute the primary reasons. This condition also confirms that 
the case study is a self-settled context. This status fulfils one of the critical requirements 
for designating post-conflict setting upon which the research argument for this 






























Reason for Migration from Buni Yadi (n=386) 
104 
Figure 6.2: Reason for the return to Buni Yadi 
6.3 Post-conflict Duration of Stay in Buni Yadi 
This section shows the length of stay of respondents in Buni Yadi to establish evidence 
for the presence of recent migrants (conflict) who are now living in the case study as a 
self-settled community. The lengths of stay in the case study differ among the current 
residents, as shown in figure 6.3. About 18% of the respondents who have lived in the 
case study for between one and three years are the recent migrants whose migration to 
Buni Yadi coincides with the period of return from conflict displacement. This 
condition justifies using Buni Yadi as a lone case study giving the presence of both 
historical residents who are now returnees and migrants from other conflict 
communities. These conflict migrants, however, may have peculiar predicaments in the 
case study, hence deserves attention (in addition to the historical residents) to have an 
in-depth understanding of the livelihoods changes of the group. Discussions with the 
migrants enrich the research by identifying possible variation between the conditions 
and coping mechanism of conflict migrants in a restricted camp and those in the 
unrestricted and non-camp context. It may also be useful for a deeper understanding of 
the possible variation in the coping strategies of the original residents of the case study 
and those of the conflict migrant despite living unrestrictive lives. The discussion may 
also help to unravel potential friction between these migrants and the returnees as is 
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Figure 6.3: Post-conflict duration of stay in Buni Yadi 
6.4 Post-conflict Human Capital Change in Buni Yadi 
6.4.1 Age and Sex Distribution in Buni Yadi 
The results indicate that both male and female genders participated in the survey in 
which the male-female participation ratio is about 2:1, respectively (Figure 6.4). This 
figure indicates the male - household heads, dominated responses. The male dominance 
may be a reflection of the male-dominant cultural environment of the case study where 
the women participation was subject to men approval or the absence of the male, 
thereby limiting the women participation. Giving this cultural setting, this level of 
female participation may be seen as a change that is brought about by conflict, possibly 
due to deaths of male household heads thereby shifting the responsibility of heading 
family affairs to women. This change may have also distorted the household economy, 
given the limitation of what or how much a female gender can do to make provision for 
the family in a male-dominated environment. Similarly, the demographic representation 
is nearly balanced for all participants across the age classifications, except for the young 
adults (18-24 years) who are least represented (7%). The low representation of this 
group may be attributable to the focus on household heads who are mostly older adult. 
This condition may limit the youths – an essential segment of the population, from 
voicing their post-conflict situations and experiences. Apart from ensuring inclusive 
narratives and gender balance, further engagement with the women and youth groups in 
discussions may help to unravel unique post-conflict livelihoods experiences that may 
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Figure 6.4: Age and sex distribution in Buni Yadi 
6.4.2 Post-conflict Education Level in Buni Yadi 
The survey results show five categories of educational qualification for participants of 
the research (Figure 6.5). The residents of the case study indicate a significant poor 
educational status whereby a large proportion (59%) of the population have no formal 
education and 20% of those who had formal education have not gone beyond primary 
(elementary) level. The conflict may not have been the cause of this education status, 
but it indicates a weak post-conflict human capital. The traditional informal Qur’anic 
education, which about 51% of the population acquired may not gain them employment 
for formal jobs since the official measure of employability is western/formal education 
in Nigeria. But even with formal training, securing jobs in a setting where the 
unemployment rate is surprisingly highest among those who have post-secondary 
education (UNDP 2018) may not be a guarantee for economic security. While formal 
education is linked with improved human capital accumulation and its positive effect on 
livelihoods (Justino 2012a), informal economic activities which may not require 
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Figure 6.5: Education level in Buni Yadi 
6.5 Post-conflict Change in Economic Conditions in Buni Yadi 
6.5.1 Pre-conflict Means of Livelihood in Buni Yadi 
The survey results show that the means of livelihoods in the case study include 
artisanship, labour work, farming, civil service and business. Figure 6.6 shows the 
distribution of the means of livelihoods before the conflict. As indicated, the pre-
conflict livelihood means was predominantly informal, and business (mostly small to 
medium scale trading) and farming were the primary activities. Employment in the 
formal sector (civil servants) was significantly low (3%). This condition may be a 
reflection of the high rate of low-level formal education, coupled with the 
unemployment among the educated residents. However, the low-rate pre-conflict 
unemployment (7%) does not seem significant to have been a critical motivating factor 
for a collective mobilisation for conflict in the case study. If the economic factor was 
substantial, this might raise the question of how gainfully employed, or the pattern of 
distribution within the community was. The break down of the pre-conflict livelihoods 
into the six zones in Buni Yadi indicates an unequal distribution of livelihoods. Table 
6.1 shows that livelihoods in Hausari, Shuwari and Ngomari were better off than in 
Mairi, Fulatari and Kasakchiya and Mairi had the highest unemployment rate and 
labourers. This scenario may be relevant for understanding the possibility of the impact 
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Figure 6.6: Pre-conflict livelihood in Buni Yadi 
Cross-tabulation of Pre-Conflict Livelihoods in Buni Yadi 
Pre-conflict livelihood Mairi Fulatari Hausari Shuwari Ngomari Kasakchiya 
Business 5 3 14 19 14 9 
Farming 7 18 17 35 36 5 
Artisan 2 7 9 3 12 4 
Civil Servant 2 2 7 6 4 3 
Labourer 4 1 2 0 0 0 
Unemployed 27 9 4 9 6 3 
Table 6.1: Cross-tabulation of pre-conflict livelihoods in Buni Yadi; Source: Field survey (2017)  
6.5.2 Post-conflict Livelihoods Change in Buni Yadi 
The post-conflict livelihoods of the survey respondents indicate alteration of the pre-
conflict means of livelihoods. Figure 6.7 shows distortions and deterioration of means 
of livelihoods after the conflict in Buni Yadi. As a typical post-conflict setting, 
unemployment increased more than five folds while businesses crumbled significantly. 
An increase in labourer job may imply devising new means of livelihoods to survive. 
The rise in farming may be as a result of the post-conflict deplorable economic 
condition which pushes more people into subsistence farming as an alternative to 
buying foods. The number of people in the civil service (e.g. teacher and healthcare 
workers) remained unchanged after conflict. The consistency in the public service is 
because the government is the primary employer for this group, and the conflict did not 
affect their employment status. This condition suggests that formal sector employment 
is more resilient to shock than the informal activities in the case study. Although it is 
difficult to accurately establish the proportion of civil servants who have returned after 





























Pre-conflict Means of Livelihood in Buni-Yadi (n=354) 
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Buni Yadi. This scenario implies that the large informal economy is more susceptible to 
conflict shocks. The next section highlights the effects of conflict on livelihoods assets 
and coping strategy of the residents within this condition.     
Figure 6.7: Post-conflict livelihoods change in Buni Yadi 
6.5.3 Impact of Conflict on Livelihoods Assets of Individual 
The conflict in the case study has negatively affected the livelihoods of a significant 
proportion of the residents, especially those in the informal sector, due to the change in 
means of livelihoods. Figure 6.8 shows the susceptibility of livelihoods in Buni Yadi as 
a result of the distortion of access to individuals’ livelihoods assets. The most 
significant effects of the conflict on livelihoods are the destruction and looting of the 
residents’ assets by the insurgents. Displacement - especially for the migrants and 
reduced business patronage also contribute to the post-conflict livelihoods challenges. 
The impact of this condition may be significant, giving the predominantly informal 
economy where individual bear the risks of their means of livelihoods. This condition 
adversely affects livelihoods resilience, mainly because access to compensation or 
insurance cover is alien to Buni Yadi.  
However, a similarity exists between the household and individuals concerning the 
effect of conflict on access to means of livelihoods assets. As noted in figure 6.9, assets 
destruction is significant for households as it is for individuals, although looting is not 




























Post-conflict Livelihood Change in Buni-Yadi (n=364) 
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fear of attacks or blockage for safety concerns, is a critical post-conflict means of 
livelihoods challenges. Loss of jobs by household member contributes to the effect of 
livelihoods predicament in Buni Yadi. While the variations in the change in access to 
means of livelihoods between individuals and households are apparently due to the 
aggregation of the experiences of individuals in the households, the overall condition 
portrays a negative trend whose consequences on the post-conflict livelihoods resilience 
is critical in the community.  

































Effect of Conflict on Access to Individual Livelihood Assets in Buni-Yadi 
(n=307) 
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Figure 6.9: Effect of conflict on the livelihoods of households 
6.5.4 Post-conflict Household Coping Strategy for Change in Access to 
Livelihoods Assets in Buni Yadi 
The survey results show different post-conflict livelihoods coping strategies in Buni 
Yadi. Figure 6.10 highlights the three primary ways in which the residents are coping 
with the post-conflict challenge due to the change in access to their means of 
livelihoods. The condition indicates a weakness in livelihoods resilience as a significant 
proportion (38%) relies on humanitarian support for survival. While devising a new 
means of livelihoods for survival may be challenging, the reduction of consumption can 
significantly affect the health condition of the population, especially the children. 
Anyone of these coping strategies has a negative implication for post-conflict Buni 
Yadi. The category that devises new means of survival, for example, would have to 
learn how to do and make a living from the newfound means of livelihoods. This 
process may be significantly challenging for individuals in a fragile economic 
environment with limited opportunities and the need to get means of sustenance. The 
possible negative health implication of the reduction of consumption may impair the 
post-conflict human capital accumulation of the residents due to poor health and the 
ensuing poverty. It is difficult to ascertain the mechanism adopted by the minority 
group (1%) whose livelihoods are not affected by the conflict using this quantitative 
method. While further insight may be developed from the focus group discussion, 
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    Figure 6.10: Household coping strategies for change in access to livelihood assets in Buni Yadi 
6.5.5 Effect of Conflict on Household Income in Buni-Yadi 
With a weakened economic resilience, the change in income levels of households in 
Buni Yadi is inevitable. The survey results indicate that a variety of post-conflict 
conditions lead to a decline in the household level of income. Figure 6.11shows another 
livelihoods weakness due to unsustainable informality of Buni Yadi economy as the 
decline in business patronage, loss of jobs, injuries and loss of family members and loss 
of assets combined to induce income reduction. While specific statistics concerning this 
income decline could not be ascertained due to this informal setting, income 
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Figure 6.11: Effect of conflict on household income in Buni-Yadi
6.6 Post-Conflict Social Assets Change in Buni Yadi  
6.6.1 The Significance of Social Network Before Conflict in Buni Yadi 
Different people attached varying significance to social networking before conflict 
broke out in Buni Yadi. The social platforms in which the residents associated include 
but limited to family and relations, age-related associations, e.g. youths association, 
farmers association, women association and market associations. While a significant 
proportion of the population indicated that their associations were useful before the 
conflict, a minority indicated that social network was not beneficial for them (Figure 
6.12). Some of the benefits of the social networks for farmers, for example, includes 
securing cheaper fertiliser for members. Women had used their networking platform as 
a medium for assisting one another in the time of needs through financial contribution 
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Figure 6.12: Significance of social networks before the conflict
6.6.2 Effect of Conflict on Social Network in Buni Yadi 
The outbreak of conflict and the ensuing challenges have caused a significant adverse 
effect on the social capital of Buni Yadi residents. As noted in figure 6.13, loss of social 
ties due to displacement is the most important factor that affected social assets in the 
community. Loss of social ties and the accruing livelihoods benefits is also affected by 
the deaths of family members and friends. Displacement of the residents to different 
places during the conflict created a significant level of lack of trust among the residents 
upon return. This lack of trust emanates from the suspicions among the residents 
towards former associates of being covert members of the insurgent group. The effect of 
this suspicious atmosphere creates the condition of unwillingness to assist one another 
in the critical condition. Social networks in Buni Yadi seemed largely horizontal 
whereby associations are often within people who live in the same context or with 
similar social status. This condition may have contributed to the level of the devastation 
the conflict has on this asset, given the lack of vertical social networking that may be 
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Figure 6.13: Effect of conflict on the social network in Buni Yadi
6.6.3 Post-conflict Coping Strategy for Household on Social Network Change 
The survey results show that different residents of Buni Yadi adopt varying coping 
strategies for social network change after conflict. Figure 6.14 indicates that while a 
significant part of the residents (68%) are rebuilding trust and relations, others apply 
caution in social interactions. Another segment of the population is simply helpless as 
the conflict has adversely affected their social assets and the accruing benefits beyond 
repairs. This group is worst-off, probably due to the effect of the dominance of 
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Figure 6.14: Post-conflict coping strategy for the household on social network change 
6.7 Post-conflict Infrastructure Change in Buni Yadi 
6.7.1 Effect of Conflict on Housing in Buni Yadi 
Figure 6.15 shows a summary of the results for the effect of conflict on housing in Buni 
Yadi. The conflict has caused significant damage to the housing infrastructure in which 
more than two-thirds of the households were affected directly or indirectly. The level of 
destruction varies for different households where a significant proportion (43%) of the 
community had their houses destroyed completely. There are others whose houses had 
major damage such as burnt roofs and collapsed walls. The third category of the 
residents is those whose houses had minor damages such as cracked walls and broken 
doors or windows. Further details on the analysis of the physical observations on the 
nature of the housing destruction are in the next chapter. However, these changes in the 
housing infrastructure affect the residents differently and consequently influences 
different coping strategies. Figure 6.16 shows the different coping strategies residents 
adopt following the changes in their housing conditions.  
As shown, a  category which constitutes about 28% of the residents have been rendered 
homeless, and they resort to using public spaces such as damaged public schools as a 
temporary shelter. These residents are likely to be among those whose houses were 
completely damaged and are unable to find or rent one. They may also be those who do 
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homeless when they cannot afford to migrate to another community. Half of the 
residents have to endure overcrowding due to the housing scarcity and poor housing 
conditions. The third category is for those residents whose poor housing conditions have 
forced them to live in buildings that are in poor states and physically unsafe for 
habitation. The people in this category live in broken houses in which they create 
partitions with makeshift materials such as metal sheets and plastic bags. While a tiny 
fraction of the residents resorts to spending more money to rent a house, a negligible 
proportion have to keep their families elsewhere while they live in Buni Yadi. This 
latter group still consider themselves displaced  
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Figure 6.16: Coping with Effect of Housing Destruction in Buni-Yadi 
Conflict in Buni Yadi has a significant negative impact on the residents’ housing 
condition, and the consequences undermine the wellbeing of the majority of the 
residents. However, the residents’ opinions differ concerning possible strategies for 
improving the poor housing condition where two to three discernible views emerge. As 
shown in figure 6.17, the first category favours direct intervention by government or 
aids agencies. In this group, more than 60% of the residents hold the view that 
government (at all levels) should intervene by reconstructing their homes. The large size 
of the group who hold this opinion may be a reflection of a pervasive impoverishment 
where people feel they cannot afford to rebuild their houses but rely on the intervention 
from the government they hardly trust. The second classification is for those who 
believe in pulling themselves out of the current condition if they have access to 
necessary support. They believe that the best strategy for improving the post-conflict 
housing condition is through jobs creation and financial assistance. These residents hold 
the view that when people get necessary financial supports through loans for business or 
employment, they will be able to make savings and rebuild their houses themselves. 
This way, they will improve not only their houses but their economic resilience. The 
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   Figure 6.17: Opinion on post-conflict housing improvement 
6.7.2 Post-conflict Road Condition in Buni Yadi 
Roads are essential livelihoods infrastructure, especially in a post-conflict context. The 
post-conflict road condition is a vital component of the livelihoods framework, given its 
critical role in supporting other livelihoods capitals such as economic assets. Four 
categories of road conditions are identified based on the assessment of the quantitative 
opinions of the survey respondents. Figure 6.18 shows that while some roads are in 
good condition and accessible others in similar condition are inaccessible. The category 
of roads which the residents referred to as good and accessible is the recently 
reconstructed major inter-city road (Damaturu-Biu road) which crosses and links Buni 
Yadi with Damatu. The good but inaccessible roads are those that may have been 
barricaded for safety concerns such as fear of possible land mines. The chart also 
indicates pervasive bad roads which are accessible. However, a few roads are bad and 
inaccessible. Further details on the physical conditions of roads and the implication for 
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Figure 6.18: Post-conflict road condition in Buni Yadi
These deplorable road conditions have adverse effects on roads accessibility in the case 
study area. The challenge of post-conflict road accessibility emanates from four primary 
conflict impacts on the road infrastructure. Figure 6.19 indicates that destruction of road 
infrastructure – e.g. bridge, by the insurgents is a major cause of road inaccessibility. 
Another significant cause of lack of access to the road is the damage due to lack of 
maintenance. This condition is likely to have been the consequence of neglect because 
of the long period of displacement. There are residents whose access to the road is 
truncated due to the fear of being attacked by insurgents, especially when they travel far 
from home into the farms. However, very few respondents indicated that their post-
conflict road access is not affected. This category may be for the residents whose 
livelihoods activities do not require frequent travelling, hence the feeling that post-
conflict deplorable road condition is not a challenge for them. Nonetheless, the 
implication of road inaccessibility may still be affecting them indirectly as shall be 
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Figure 6.19: Effect of conflict on road accessibility
The change in access to roads adversely affect livelihoods of Buni Yadi residents. 
Figure 6.20 indicates that reduced access to important livelihoods assets – e.g. farmland, 
and travelling difficulties for businesses are widespread after conflict due to change in 
road accessibility. This condition constitutes a significant post-conflict economic threat 
given that farming and business are the major livelihoods activities in Buni Yadi. 
Discussion on the specific implications of this condition on the post-conflict livelihoods 
and conflict is made in further depth in chapter nine. Change in access to roads has also 
caused a rise in the cost of commuting due to bad road conditions. One of the possible 
implications of this effect is the increase in the cost of doing business and inefficiency, 
which potentially increases the cost of living in the case study. This condition may 
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Figure 6.20: Effects of changed road accessibility on livelihood in Buni Yadi
6.7.3 Post-conflict Access to Water in Buni Yadi 
The conflict has affected the supply and access to portable water in Buni Yadi. The 
survey results (Figure 6.21) show that a significant proportion of the residents is 
adversely affected by this change in access to water. However, the post-conflict sources 
and access to water are not the same for the residents who have access. The 
predominant source of water, especially for those who have access is the borehole 
which may be manually operated or motorised. Other sources of water include tap, 
wells, stream and purchase from commercial water vendors (see next chapter). Water 
supply in Buni Yadi is often a public infrastructure except, for example, in a few cases 
where individuals build wells in their houses or boreholes (for the effluents). However, 
the survey results show that the residents spent varying times to access water due to the 
changes. As shown in figure 6.22, while it takes larger parts of the population to access 
water within 30 minutes, a significant proportion spent between 31 minutes and more 
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Figure 6.21: Post-conflict access to water in Buni Yadi 
Figure 6.22: Post-conflict duration for accessing water in Buni Yadi
It is apparent that the change in access to water in the case study affects the residents 
differently, and this may have informed the variation in the coping strategies. Figure 
6.23 indicates that the largest segment of the community spends more scarce resources 
(money) to buy water, especially from the water vendors. The largely impoverished 
residents resolve to travel to nearby communities for water, most likely because they 
cannot afford to buy it every day. Others rely on humanitarian organisations who from 
time to time supply water to the community using water tanker. This condition of lack 
of access implies that a large section of the residents wastes valuable time on sourcing 
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used for other needs is wasted on one basic need in a fragile economy with a high rate 
of impoverishment.  
 Figure 6.23: Post-conflict Effect of change in access to water and coping strategy in Buni Yadi 
6.7.4 Post-conflict Access to Healthcare Services and their Proximity to Users in 
Buni Yadi 
Like other infrastructure, health facilities have been badly affected by the conflict in 
Buni Yadi. The survey results (Figure 6.24) indicate that a significant proportion (22%) 
of the residents could not access healthcare services due to the destruction of healthcare 
facilities. A larger proportion of the residents who indicate that they can access 
healthcare after conflict relies on the local private pharmaceutical store or clinic who 
dispense simple medical service such as a prescription for fever. However, the post-
conflict access to healthcare varies among Buni Yadi residents. While the majority of 
the residents patronise the local options for their healthcare services, others have to 
travel to nearby communities to access healthcare services. More than 30% of the 
residents in Buni Yadi are forced to travel to the State capital city (Damaturu) or other 
states to access healthcare services. This is often for health conditions which are beyond 
what can be treated locally. Others rely on the alternative means of accessing healthcare 
- e.g. traditional medicines. The resort to traditional alternative for healthcare may be a
reflection of either lack of means for accessing the services from the available 
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It may also be the combination of these conditions that make this group stick to 
traditional medicine.  
Figure 6.24: Post-conflict access to healthcare services and their proximity to users in Buni Yadi 
The difference in the proximity and access to healthcare services in Buni Yadi reflects 
on the time spent in accessing the service after conflict. Figure 6.25 shows a semblance 
of how the proximity to a healthcare facility may have affected the duration for 
accessing the services. For example, a large proportion of the residents who can access 
healthcare services from Buni Yadi (Figure 6.24) coincides with the proportion that 
spent between 1 and 2 hours to access healthcare services in the community. Those that 
have to travel to nearby communities, city and other states reflect the longer duration (3 
hours or more) for accessing healthcare service. However, this study is unable to 
immediately ascertain the impact of conflict on healthcare using the quantitative 
technique because of the lack of data to have a clear sense of the condition before the 
conflict. Accordingly, attempt is made for further discussion on the impact of the 
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Figure 6.25: Post-conflict duration for accessing healthcare in Buni Yadi
6.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter has presented the results of the quantitative survey which cover the 
conditions of the existing thematic livelihoods components in the case study for 
individuals and households. The current livelihoods conditions constitute the changes 
from the pre-conflict in which the effects and coping strategies of residents are 
examined. The preliminary results indicate alterations in livelihoods of the residents in 
the case study, which suggest the deterioration of living conditions and increase 
vulnerabilities. However, the survey part of this investigation comprises of the 
questionnaire and the physical observations. The results of the physical (observations) 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Results of the Physical Surveys: Condition of Post-conflict Infrastructure in Buni 
Yadi 
The results of the quantitative surveys have been reported in the preceding chapter 
covering the analysis of the thematic components of livelihoods and changes that have 
occurred due to conflict. This chapter covers the aspects of physical surveys. The 
purpose of this additional aspect of the study, as mentioned in chapter four, is to apply 
multiple sources methods for producing corroborative evidence and robust research 
outcome. The outcome of this chapter is particularly relevant for the study given the 
significance of the need to understand the infrastructure changes and analysis of the 
pattern of destruction and the implications. The results presented in this chapter 
supplement the ones discussed in the previous chapter. The observation results of the 
post-conflict conditions of infrastructure are primarily shown in pictographic evidence 




7.1 Change in Housing Infrastructure 
A substantial section of residential buildings is confirmed to have been destroyed in the 
case study consequent to the conflict (as noted in section 6.7.1) (Figure 7.1). While 
some of these are already undergoing rehabilitation, many others are still in the 
condition of disrepair. The observation also confirms the variation in the degree of 
destruction (Figure 6.15). It is, however, observed that the destruction might have taken 
a particular pattern in which selected houses are targeted and destroyed. As shown in 
figure 7.1a, houses made from cement blocks are targeted and destroyed. Physically 
those houses indicate the possibility of being owned by more affluent social categories 
in the community. Majority of these type of houses are fenced and gated, and the 
observations suggest that their destruction is mostly by fire and other physical means. 
Another category of destroyed houses is the ones made from mud blocks. There is no 
evidence to suggest that this category of buildings is destroyed by fire or by physical 
means. As shown in figure 7.1b, the poor state of the buildings are better conceived as 
being the effect of adverse climate conditions such as rain and wind, which may have 
damaged the houses. The observation considers that the current conditions of the mud 
buildings could have been aided by the two-year displacement, which prevented the 
owners from carrying out maintenance. 
Figure 7.1a: Post-conflict condition of cement block houses in Buni Yadi 
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Figure 7.1b: Post-conflict condition of mud-block houses in Buni Yadi 
This selective pattern of destruction in Buni Yadi is observed to have a possible 
correlation with the livelihoods distribution (table 6.1) across the community. As shown 
in figure 7.1, the concentration of the destruction, especially houses and business 
premises, is higher within the zones that have better livelihoods before the conflict. 
Destructions within the weaker livelihoods area are often the targeted ‘features of 
interest’ such as Emirs palace, police stations and schools or houses that were destroyed 
by the effect of rain or wind. Given this scenario, grievance due to inequality and 
frustration may have played an important role in fostering the conflict in the case study. 
While the impact of the destruction negatively affects the physical and socio-economic 
wellbeing of residents, the grievance from the unequal pattern of livelihood may 
continue, thereby cause conflict relapse.  
7.2 Change in Business and Commercial Buildings 
The physical surveys reveal that private businesses and commercial properties may have 
been targeted and destroyed during the conflict. These destroyed properties include 
shops, banks, filling stations, and so forth (Figure 7.2) and they are mostly within the 
major activity area (community centre) of the town (Figure 7.1). A significant 
proportion of these properties have been destroyed often by fire or other means. The 
degree of the destructions differs from property to property as some are destroyed 
beyond repairs and others had significant damages which could be rehabilitated. A great 
deal of these properties has remained non-functional while few have been renovated 
somewhat and put to use again. 
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Figure 7.2: Post-conflict condition of shops and stores in Buni Yadi 
7.3 Change in Education Infrastructure 
Like other social infrastructures in Buni Yadi conflict, education facilities are not spared 
given that all categories of schools – primary, secondary and post-secondary, in the case 
study, are destroyed. Virtually all the teaching and learning and extra-curricular 
facilities such as classrooms, libraries and games equipment in the schools are 
destroyed, and figure 7.3 shows the remains of the school structures. The physical 
observation indicates that the schools are damaged by fire and other physical means. 
The destruction of schools may not be a surprise given the open hostility of the 
insurgents (and what they represent) towards western education and anything that 
comes from it. It is worth mentioning that it is difficult to ascertain in specific terms if 
Quranic schools were targeted and destroyed. This difficulty stems from the fact that 
Quranic education is highly informal and is not taught in an elaborate or formalised 
space. The students of the Quranic schools often receive lessons from the homes of the 
tutor or any other space in the community. If Quranic schools have been destroyed, it 
may have been because the house in which the student receives lessons are damaged or 
in the case where the teacher (Islamic cleric) is a target for having contrary opinions to 
those of the insurgents.  
Figure 7.3: Post-conflict condition of schools in Buni Yadi 
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7.4 Change in Healthcare Infrastructure 
The healthcare facilities in Buni Yadi have suffered similar ill-fate like other 
infrastructure as observed. This observation confirms the quantitative survey results 
(section 6.7.4) which suggest that conflict caused the change in access to healthcare. 
The physical surveys reveal that all private and public healthcare facilities are destroyed 
in the case study (Figure 7.4), suggesting that these facilities were deliberately targeted 
and destroyed. The destructions are caused by fire as the health facilities are currently 
non-functional and abandoned. Valuable time, energy and resources are spent by a large 
section of the residents to access healthcare services while they travel as far as to other 
cities and states. Healthcare infrastructure plays a significant role in supporting and 
sustaining quality human capital. The quantitative results and observations for this 
component of livelihoods is further discussed in the subsequent chapter through focus 
group discussions with residents concerning their experiences, coping and implications 
of the deplorable condition of the healthcare service delivery.  
Figure 7.4: Post-conflict condition of hospitals in Buni Yadi 
7.5 Change in Road Infrastructure 
The physical surveys confirm the state of disrepair of many roads infrastructure due to 
conflict as identified in the quantitative survey (section 6.7.2) in the case study. A 
bridge on a major road that links Buni Yadi and Damaturu is destroyed by the 
insurgents (Figure 7.5a), perhaps to truncate movement. It could not be established, 
however, through observation that the severe state of other roads infrastructure within 
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the case study are caused by direct physical destruction. It is easily identifiable that the 
current conditions of the roads are a result of lack of maintenance, which has caused the 
visible damage possibly by erosion. The current state of the road infrastructure may 
have been aided by the lack of supporting facilities such as drainages and water 
channels (Figure 7.5b). This change in road condition affects access and efficiency of 
utilising other assets, e.g. farm. Road infrastructure is an important livelihood public 
asset that supports both access and utilisation of other livelihoods assets. Chapter eight 
and nine provides further insight into the residents’ coping mechanism and the 
implications of the roads conditions on post-conflict development.   
Figure 7.5a: Damaged bridge in Buni Yadi after conflict.
Figure 7.5b: Damaged road in Buni Yadi after conflict. 
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7.6 Change in Water Supply Infrastructure 
The physical surveys reveal that access to the water supply is a significant problem in 
Buni Yadi, confirming the quantitative survey findings (section 6.7.3) which attribute 
the change in access to the water supply to the adverse effect of conflict. As noted, a 
variety of coping strategies employed for accessing water includes queuing up for a 
long duration to obtain water from a few available taps in the community (Figure 7.6a 
and c). The alternative to waiting for a long time is the purchase from the water vendors 
who hawk the water around in carts (Figure 7.6b). Those who cannot afford any of the 
above options travel to the nearest villages where they can access water often using a 
bicycle to journey from Buni Yadi to the villages to collect water with kegs (Figure 
7.6d). Water is an essential commodity both for quality human capital and the 
environment.  
Figure 7.6a: Residents queuing to fetch water in Buni Yadi   Figure 7.6b: Water vendor hawking water in Buni Yadi 
Figure 7.6c: Public tap water source in Buni Yadi   Figure 7.6d: Resident travelling to a neighbouring village to fetch 
water 
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7.7 Change in Electricity and Telecommunications 
The physical survey results show the visibly vandalised electricity facilities such as 
electricity poles, cables and transformers consequent to the conflict in the case study 
(Figure 7.7a) thereby leaving the entire settlement in a total blackout as at the time of 
this fieldwork. Similarly, the observations reveal the vandalisation of the 
telecommunication facilities, such as the communication mast of the service providers 
(Figure 7.7b). The deplorable conditions of the telecommunication facilities explain the 
current difficulties of accessing telecommunication services in the case study. 
Figure 7.7a: Vandalised electricity infrastructure after the conflict in Buni Yadi 
Figure 7.7b: Vandalised telecommunication infrastructure after the conflict in Buni Yadi 
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7.8 Change in Public and Administrative Buildings 
Virtually all the public infrastructures are observed to have been affected by the conflict 
in the case study in which buildings such as local government offices, police station, 
courtrooms and traditional authority buildings are mainly targeted and torched (Figure 
7.8a, b,c). 
Figure 7.8a: Destroyed local government offices after the conflict in Buni Yadi 
Figure 7.8b: Vandalised police station in Buni Yadi
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Figure 7.8c: The destroyed palace of the Emir of Buni Yadi after conflict. 
7.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has presented the physical survey results in which pictographic evidence 
and spatial map are used. The analysis of the physical destruction shed more light on the 
results of the quantitative survey. The pattern of the damage is noted to correlate with 
the livelihoods distribution in the community, thereby suggesting a possible impact of 
grievance due to inequality and frustration on the conflict. However, the following 
chapter discusses further details of the livelihoods changes in focus group discussions to 
have an improved understanding of the possible implications of the post-conflict 
livelihoods conditions in Buni Yadi.    
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Results of the Qualitative Study: Focus Group and Individual Interviews 
The last two chapters present the study results base on the application of surveys - 
quantitative and observations, for the livelihood conditions in the case study. The 
preliminary results, which are presented in statistical, pictorial and spatial forms, 
suggest livelihood changes range from the distortion of the means of livelihoods and 
access to infrastructures and services. However, these preliminary outcomes require 
further investigation with a view to engaging the residents for in-depth discussions on 
those livelihoods changes and the implications for possible conflict recurrence. The 
corroborative evidence from the process of the discussions enhances the quality of the 
final results of the focus group and individual interviews that are presented in this 
chapter. The chapter covers discussions on the impacts and implications of changes in 
the aspects of livelihoods, such as access to income, roads, farmland, hospitals, schools, 
telecommunications, and so forth.  
8.1 Focus Group Discussion on Post-conflict Economic Resilience in Buni Yadi 
8.1.1 Change in means of livelihood and income: 
The focus group discussions and individual interviews confirm the severe decline in the 
income level of residents of the case study area as identified in chapter six and seven. 
Participants note that although a high rate of poverty and joblessness existed before the 
conflict, they attribute their current deteriorated income level to the sudden loss or lack 
of access to means of livelihoods and assets during and after the conflict. The conflict-
induced displacement forced the residents to abandon their means of livelihoods such as 
shops, sewing machine, animals, which were eventually destroyed or looted. Their 
inability to flee with enough resources subjected them to the condition of hardship in 
their various places of refuge. The hardship conditions are noted in their narratives, 
which suggest the inability to afford the basic needs of living such as food, housing and 
clothing during displacement and beyond.  
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The miserable income decline was caused by the [conflict] displacement, which forced 
people to abandon their means of livelihoods. Many of these are looted, and others are burnt 
and destroyed. Some of us used to have sewing machines. Some of us had a grinding 
machine. We used them to get some income to help ourselves. …Upon migration, rent 
payment was a major hustle. Many times [landlords] threaten to evict you when you cannot 
pay [rent]. Some went to the extent of removing the [house] roofing [to evict migrant 
tenants forcefully]. In that hard condition, we struggle to pay rent and food was also 
expensive. …When Buni Yadi was reopened, people returned, but many had developed and 
suffered trauma and high blood pressure and other heart-related diseases. We lost practically 
all that we had (Women focus group 2018). 
Upon return from the displacement, the lack of access to farmland for agriculture 
due to fear of attack compounds the income challenge for the mostly agrarian 
community. The residents note that the eastern farm areas of Buni Yadi which is 
more productive is inaccessible and the other sections are too expensive to manage 
given their current economic condition. The few available ones that are close to 
the town are only used for subsistence.   
I have a farm in the eastern skirt of the town. [Stressing the fear] If it [the farm] is cultivated 
and the product is prepared, you would not go there to pick it. Everyone is afraid. The 
eastern region which happens to be the most fertile is not safe at the moment. . . . Other 
areas are less fertility, and we do not have enough capacity and money to farm them.  
We are afraid less the insurgents attack you while you are working on the farm. . . . No one 
would have rest of mind to want to farm there [eastern region of the town]. But if that area 
would be accessible, we would be able to get some produce (Farmers focus group 
2018). 
However, this reduced access to farmlands has particularly affected migrants’ access 
due to scarcity. The conflict migrants noted that their peculiar lack of access to the farm 
is the result of the shortage as the historical residents have no enough themselves. 
Farmlands that were offered to them are inaccessible for the same (fear) reason the 
original owners could not use them.  
We cannot farm because the farms that were offered to us are too far from the town. 
Everyone is afraid to go farm in a far place from the town for the fear of possible attack [by 
insurgents].   
We were not denied access to farmlands except that the ones we were offered are far from 
town. The farmlands that are close to the town have been put to use by their owners. So 
accessible farms are scarce. All the ones that were shown to us were too far (Conflict 
migrant focus group 2018) 
The discussions also confirmed earlier consideration (chapters six and seven) that 
precarious livelihoods conditions due to unemployment and poverty played a significant 
role in instigating the conflict. The interplay of chronic poverty, inequality and 
pervasive poor educations – especially among youths, apparently provided the 
conducive condition that was exploited by the insurgents to cause the conflict. The 
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resultant impact such as displacement has continued to threaten the economic resilience 
in the community. Increased poverty, for instance, during the displacement has 
adversely affected the current economic conditions of the residents, and has snowballed 
and persisted after they have returned to their community upon reopening.    
To begin with, I want to state that the involvement of the youths from the inception 
sustained the insurgency. This is mainly because of the youths' joblessness. That is why they 
were an easy target for recruitment. They were financially induced [to take part]. But if they 
had had a means of earning a regular income, they would not have had the interest in joining 
the insurgency. So one of the major causes of the insurgency is the lack of skills and 
resource [among youths] leading to joblessness [and poverty]. …Honestly, what they have 
said regarding youths’ joblessness is true. The condition has worsened upon our return 
[from displacement (Youth focus group 2018). 
 Surely all the things that happened and their impact on us are destined to happen. But they 
are rooted in the lack of education. Lack of education is rampant because the government 
has not provided its citizens with a quality education that would prevent them from this 
menace. This is particularly so for western and religious education. People are not 
empowered with these two forms of education.  
Money was used to take advantage of people vulnerability to the extent that persons [from 
this community] you hardly expect they would join this group had done so. These are all the 
causes of the conflict (Farmers focus group 2018). 
Furthermore, the impoverishment caused by loss of means of income has forced some 
of the residents to adopt other means of getting income. For instance, some people who 
used to have a stable income from their businesses have resorted to daily labourer work 
to survive. The conflict migrants and business people seem to be worst affected by this 
condition, although there is pervasive impoverishment in the community. This condition 
confirms the weakened economic resilience, which is attributable to the crude 
informality of the economy.  
The conflict has negatively affected our means of income and the income level. This 
[condition] is particularly so for those of us who were into crop farming, animal farming, 
and agro-related businesses. But now none of us is into all these. No crops farming, no 
animal farming and no means for [doing] business. We have stopped all of these [economic 
activities] because of change in the environment [due to displacement]. The high cost of 
living due to the high cost of rent and food and other needs have taken the limited resources 
[we manage to escape with] (Conflict migrant focus group 2018). 
Change [negative] in income is a known and obvious phenomenon, especially in this region. 
This is because you see people who had no fewer than 100 dependants before [the conflict] 
cannot survive on their own now, in this town. There were people who have stable capital 
[for businesses] before the conflict and forced displacement but only depend on labourer 
work to buy food upon return. Almost everything that you have before the forced 
displacement has been looted and destroyed. The little you are [able to] escape with has 
been finished on house rent, food and so forth during migration. Everything you have has 
been finished. (Businessmen focus group 2018) 
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8.1.2 Impact of Change in Income Level: 
The change in the income level of the residents of the case study area is confirmed to 
have had adverse effects on various aspects of their welfare. These impacts are noted in 
the focus groups participants’ narratives of how the change has affected their health and 
nourishment and general wellbeing. It has also affected their ability to access and afford 
services and basic needs such as education, farm inputs, and so forth. The following 
quotes from the discussions are evidence of the impacts of declined income in the case 
study: 
There are people whose children used to attend private [schools] but could no longer afford 
it. This is because they no longer have the means. At the moment, a private school would 
hardly have more than 30 pupils in it, and the public schools do not have qualified teachers, 
so they do not deliver quality education. Poor education is inevitable in our current 
condition. We send our kids to those schools [public] because we do not have a choice. 
There are some [people] whose children's educations are truncated as the parents do not 
have the means to send them to school. Even in the public schools [where you do not pay 
tuition fee], there are other expenses that pupils would be required [to pay]. Books, uniform 
and so forth would be required from time to time (Women focus group 2018). 
The problem had affected farming negatively. Firstly, before the conflict and eventual 
displacement, we could afford to pay for renting tractors to plow our farmlands. We could 
buy fertiliser and also pay for labourers [who work for us on the farm] (Farmers focus 
group 2018) 
It is never like when you are in your original place where you used to render assistance to 
others, and now you are the one looking for help from others [to survive]. You are literally 
begging to survive. There is no rest of mind except that you just accept fate and pray to God 
for relief. . . .  
Our predicament and challenges, as mentioned, are many. The challenges include lack of 
houses [to live]; the condition is worsening as we have lost all our means of survival and 
exhausted the little that we manage to escape.  We are really struggling to pay rent here and 
many other challenges (Conflict migrant’s focus group 2018). 
8.1.3 The Implication of Change in Income: 
It is evident from the focus group discussions that the change in income of the residents 
has a significant negative implication on their human capital accumulation due to 
deteriorated wellbeing. The participants identify some consequences including the 
decline of food production, increase poverty, decreasing quality of education and 
declining quality of human capital.  
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I was a witness when my neighbour used the proceeds of farming to build his house and 
gave out his daughter for marriage. But this year he struggled to farm half a bag of grain. 
His wife had to sell their remaining mattress in order to buy food and some farm inputs. He 
used to hire a tractor to do his farm, but he cannot now. 
The most significant impact of this conflict on people, in summary, is hardship wherein 
some people do not have a dime to live on (Farmers focus group 2018). 
Majority of us depend on humanitarian supplies. In fact, many of us could not have been 
able to survive in the town if not for the food aid that we get (Women focus group 
2018). 
Similarly, declined income has a negative implication on societal social fabric, such as 
increase divorce and broken homes. The discussions also revealed that the reduced 
income in the case study has a high chance of undermining general safety conditions.  
The condition has caused many divorces as a result of lack of food. . . . Women no longer 
have access to what they use to have and [this] results in discord [between spouses due to 
the overburden of husband], and consequently, this causes many divorces. 
Women no longer have enough resources and husbands do not have enough either as family 
responsibilities especially children up-keep are enormous (Women focus group 2018). 
Ah! Ah! Ah! It [declined income] would cause terrible condition [that is worse than what 
we have experienced]. The unexpected [worst situation] could happen.  We do not wish for 
it! 
This [negative implication of decline income], you do not need to mention it as it is a 
trending phenomenon everywhere. [The conflict situation] may have subsided or is 
subsiding [here] but other places like Zamfara, Kaduna are still battling with them. Also, 
wherever you go, youths are involved [in the violence]. The youths’ involvement can be 
seen both from the leadership and followership strata of the insurgent groups. If no 
concerted and problem-specific effort is made to change this trend, the worst can happen 
(Youths focus group 2018). 
8.2 Focus Group Discussion on Post-conflict Infrastructure in Buni Yadi 
8.2.1 Change in Housing Conditions 
Change in housing and building condition is one of the visible and evident 
consequences of conflict in the case study area. The destructions of buildings have been 
confirmed by quantitative and the physical survey (chapters 6 and 7), while further 
details are explored from the focus group discussions. The discussions corroborate 
previous findings (see sections 6.7.1 and 7.1) that a significant proportion of residential 
and non-residential buildings suffered various degrees of destruction. Some are 
destroyed by fire and some - especially the mud buildings, by rain due to long-term 




Some houses were razed by fire, and some were destroyed by rain. It would be unfair to say 
this is the person that destroys my house. My house was built with mud, and it was 
destroyed. Some houses got burnt because of the presence of grasses which caught fire 
around them. Some houses that do not have grasses around them were intact. However, you 
never can say who did what. 
My house was completely destroyed. It was a five-room house, but not even a pin was 
spared in the house. We had to look for a home and rented when we returned (Women 
focus group discussion 2018). 
There are many [people] that could not access their houses up till now as a result of the 
conflict. People have lost their houses to fire or were destroyed by rains after they flee 
[during the forced displacement]. Some were deliberately burnt and destroyed. Now many 
people do not have houses. The houses have been destroyed, and they do not have the 
means of rebuilding them (Farmers focus group 2018).  
The change in housing condition has subjected residents to the differing state of 
hardship and further impoverishment as noted in section 6.7.1. 
Whenever you lose your abode, the devastating thought of where to live takes a toll on you. 
Because we had a lot of houses and buildings destroyed. . . . I live in a rented house, and I 
was there temporary and no rest of mind. Because the house owner could ask you to move 
out any time he wishes to use his house (Youths focus group 2018). 
Some people rent houses to live while some just used make-shift materials to make 
temporary spaces in the house to live. Some people use large plastic materials to cover the 
house and live in it because they could not get another place. Some people could not return 
due to the lack of accommodation. They have no means of rebuilding their destroyed houses 
(Farmers focus group 2018).  
8.2.2 Selective Destruction of Buildings 
The physical surveys (section 7.1) has revealed the suspicious pattern of destructions 
that have taken place in the case study. It is confirmed that public buildings, including 
government offices, schools, hospitals, banks, public water were targeted and destroyed.  
 When you talk about destruction, I will lay more emphasis on education infrastructure. In 
this town we had six primary schools – Kasakchiya Primary, we have Shuwari Primary, and 
there is Islamiyya Primary. We also have Central Primary, we have Nur-deen, and we have 
Nurul Huda. Now all of them have been destroyed (Youths focus group 2018).  
Particular types of residential buildings such as houses made of cement blocks were 
selectively destroyed. There is no evidence to suggest that the effect of fire caused the 
destruction of mud houses that were destroyed.  
 Majority of the houses that were destroyed by fire were deliberately torched [by the 
insurgents] like the house I told you about earlier [refering to an earlier discussed house 
with the researcher], it was torched. In my friend's house, we found the car tyre that was 
used to start the fire. The car tyre did not burn completely, and the house was not 




 A lot of the houses were not destroyed by accidental fire; they were razed on purpose as you 
would see a burnt house and the one next to it is intact. This happened to my neighbour. His 
two houses, just opposite ours were burnt but ours was not touched. If it was the accidental 
fire, it would have consumed or destroyed everything within [its] area of effect. But you see 
selection where some are destroyed and some are not. 
 One of the women among the last set of people who fled the town narrated that she says it 
when the insurgents torched and destroyed the houses [one of the participants narrating her 
discussion with other conflict victims]. There are some that were damaged by either wind or 
rain afterwards (Women focus group 2018). 
Similarly, shops, banks, filling stations and other commercial stores were selectively 
destroyed in the case study.  
 The major street [Babban layi] is the centre of commerce in Buni Yadi town. Almost all the 
shops were [already] burnt and destroyed upon our return (Youths focus group 2018).  
However, further discussions confirm factors the respondents believed had influenced 
the particular pattern of destruction observed in the community. Some of these include 
hate, jealousy, intolerance, frustration and outright criminality. These factors are some 
of the symptoms and consequences of the livelihoods inequalities that are noted in the 
previous chapters, hence its significance on the conflict.   
 There could be an element of hate and jealousy in the mind of the people [insurgents]. This 
is because there were cases of selective destruction of houses [even] before we were 
eventually displaced from the town. They targeted and destroyed houses of people that have 
a link or relationship with the government. They targeted and destroyed houses of people 
that have a link with the royalty in the town. . . . We feel these [hate and jealousy] are the 
things that influenced [their] mindset. We cannot think of something else (Farmers focus 
group 2018). 
 These [jealous and hate] are the major driver of their actions. This is because there were 
cases where houses of wealthy people who have links with government or royalty were 
burnt even before we were displaced. Successful people in business were not spared. They 
could just come and destroy your house once they noticed a sign of success in you . . . . 
When they noticed you are doing well and progressing they start hating you. 
 Frustration played an important role as well in the process . . . . Some times when you have 
argument [and you express a contrary opinion to their ideology] they just hate you. They 
explore all opportunities to identify your house irrespective of its condition, purposely to 
destroy it (Individual interview 2018). 
 The destruction of shops can be related to achieving the looting goal [by the insurgents]. 
This is because many people run away and left their stocks in the shops [when the conflict 
broke out] while the insurgents looted and burnt the shops [to cover up] (Youths focus 
group 2018). 
8.2.3 Impact and Implications of Change in Housing 
It can be inferred that the destruction of buildings and other valuable properties have 
had a significant effect on the residents of Buni Yadi. This is evident from the narratives 
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of the focus groups participants who identified the loss of their residential and 
commercial buildings. The destructions had impacts on the residents’ access to private 
and public infrastructure and services such as schools, hospitals, banks and so forth. The 
participants of the discussions also identified the negative implications of the housing 
change. These implications include increased poverty due to a general increase in the 
cost of housing following scarcity and the deterioration and the declined quality of 
health and wellbeing of the residents. The continued impoverishment that may emanate 
from these conditions as a result of decline in the quality of human capital, coupled with 
the existing livelihoods inequality and its evident consequences have the potential of 
plunging the case study into another round of conflict.  
The impacts are pronounced as people are living in temporary make-shift houses which we 
had to use plastic materials [to cover it] to be able to sleep [in the houses]. Some of the early 
returnees whose houses were destroyed moved from one house to another as the owners of 
the houses return. Today you are in this house, tomorrow you are in another and you have to 
move out when the owner comes since it is not yours (Women focus group 2018). 
This [poor conditions of houses] has brought a sudden increase in the cases of [life 
threatening health conditions like] heart attack, hypertension and trauma and chronic 
depression in the town. These are the resultant effect of destructions of houses and 
properties and the challenges it brought. 
My wife had suffered a similar condition [heart attack] as a result of all these problems 
[poor conditions of houses]. She collapsed upon realising [that our house was destroyed]. 
The impact of the change in housing brings problems.  . . . People have different capacity to 
absorb shocks. This has triggered many cases of trauma, hypertension, depression, and 
deaths. It is more so for the elderly who mostly are in retirement and do not have 
alternatives for survival (Youths focus group 2018).  
The implication of housing destruction in Buni Yadi is not limited to economic 
and health vulnerabilities. The consequences of the change in housing and the 
support that followed are capable of degenerating into a more significant social 
challenge. For example, Red Cross has assisted a few households in rebuilding 
their houses following the return from displacement. However, the process and 
criteria they adopted for selecting eligible houses for the support have been 
causing significant social tension in the community. The residents expressed 
concern over the arbitral selection, which does not reflect prioritising 
beneficiaries. Some respondents direct their dissatisfaction towards the elites who 
they alleged influenced the officials of the organisation in the process, thereby 
truncating fairer selection procedure and outcome.   
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Here is what happened. When Red Cross came [to support us for housing], they looked for 
houses that were physically destroyed or burnt. From that, they selected the houses that 
were built with mud for eligibility for assistance. And when they come for the selection they 
do it based on their own criteria. Cement-block houses were not included in the selection. 
But these people also needed assistance.  
Again even after the selection, their final list of beneficiaries indicated many houses [that 
are eligible based on the observed selection criteria] that were omitted. You see this one 
benefits. That one does not benefit even when he has nowhere to live.  
It has been causing [resentment]. There is an example of someone who lives in a rented 
house of another person [because his house was destroyed]. The house he was renting was 
selected for an assistant for reconstruction while his house was not selected [despite its 
unliveable condition]. He made an effort to see that the allocation to the house he is renting 
is changed to his house. So when the owner of the house hears about it [trouble started]. He 
was asked to vacate his house (Youths focus group 2018)    
8.2.4  Change in Road Conditions 
Conditions of many roads in the case study are bad except for the inter-city road 
(Damaturu-Biu road) which is reconstructed recently as earlier noted in the quantitative 
and physical surveys results (chapters 6 and 7). Participants in the discussions highlight 
that although the conditions of roads were bad before the conflict; this has worsened 
them. The conditions of the township roads, in particular, are exacerbated by the 
indirect impact of the conflict consequent to the displacement and long-term 
abandonment and lack of maintenance. 
 The conflict negatively affected the roads by making them worse than their condition before 
the conflict. Before conflict people do repair work [through community service] on roads 
such that broken portions were refilled and drainages were cleared where there was a 
blockage. But when we were displaced, and the town was deserted, this [practice] was 
stopped. The drainages became blocked, and water created ways for itself thereby destroyed 
the roads. 
 And when we returned, we could not continue the old practice as everyone was struggling 
for survival. Road condition is the least among the problems people think about at this time 
when survival [due to hunger] is at risk. 
 It is apparent that it was not the direct physical destruction of roads that caused the 
deplorable condition of the roads; it was the displacement and the resultant lack of 
maintenance. In all fairness that was what happened (Farmers focus group 2018). 
 Our roads have never been in good condition even before the conflict. We may say we have 
it a little better after the conflict. This is because at least it takes a shorter time to travel to 
Damaturu [from this town] and from here to Biu [referring to recently reconstructed 
Damaturu-Biu road]. You can now travel with rest of mind unlike before that people panic 
whenever they are travelling for fear of attack as well as bushy and dangerous road 
condition. Everything has been cleared now. 
 However, the township roads are bad; we do not have good roads. There are no drainages 
except the ones that community members construct through community service (Women 
focus group 2018). 
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 But we spent two complete years away from the town. We used to do maintenance of the 
roads [through community volunteering] when we noticed the need for it. So when we fled 
the town, there was no one that could do the maintenance. The rain has destroyed most parts 
of the roads. 
 But even before the conflict when we were here, our roads have been in bad conditions, no 
drainages. When it rains, the water from as far as 3km to the west [of the town] runs through 
this town. Leaders in the community have appealed severally for the construction of a 
diversion channel to no avail (Youths focus group 2018).   
8.2.5 Impact and Implications of Change in Road Condition: 
The change in the conditions of roads is confirmed to have had a negative impact and 
implications for the residents of the case study, as noted in the discussions. The visible 
expression of difficulty to commute within the case study is noted as participants 
identified other challenges such as the reduced access to or inability to access economic 
assets and damage to the environment such as farmlands. The poor conditions of roads 
caused the destruction or depletion of farmlands, and the adverse implications of the 
roads condition include the inefficiency of commuting within and about the case study 
leading to the high cost of doing business as a result of the high cost of transportation.  
Now there are places in the outskirt [farms] that are not accessible by car during the rainy 
season given that the roads are so bad that a vehicle would not be able to move on them. 
When you want to bring out farm produce, you have to create a path for the vehicle to be 
able to manage to pass the roads (Conflict migrant’s focus group 2018).   
Severe conditions of roads also have a direct negative implication on food production as 
farmer struggle to access their farms or move out their farm produce from the farm to 
the markets. Similarly, the continuous reduction in the size of farmland area due to 
erosion and flood has both short-term and long-term negative implication on food 
production. Participants have also highlighted a possible threat to personal safety 
regarding the access to roads given that certain sections of roads are barricaded for fear 
of potential landmines.  
Undoubtedly, some of the roads are cut-off; especially the roads that you would follow to go 
to the farm have been turned to waterways. You see, there is a problem. The bad roads [with 
poor drainage] in the town caused the water to flow into farms thereby flooding and wash 
away portions [of farms]. There are many places [farm lands] that we know that were not 
waterways but have been so made and it has washed away the land thereby reducing the 
farm areas. There are many instances of this sort (Farmers focus group 2018). 
There are effects because there are roads that are cordoned off and blocked from access for 
fear of possible landmines or the likes (Youths focus group 2018).   
The prevailing conditions of roads in Buni Yadi may also be linked to social capital 
deterioration as the condition of roads are worse than what the residents can repair as 
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they used to. This condition, coupled with the level impoverishment, may limit the level 
of social interaction through road community services that were practice previously.  
8.2.6  Change in Power Infrastructure and Electricity Supply: 
Discussions with participants of the focus groups confirm the dire state of power 
infrastructure and supply of electricity in the case study area. The dismal state of power 
due to the change that is caused by the conflict is noted in the power infrastructure 
vandalised and stolen, leading to a total power outage in the community. It is evident 
from the discussions that long-term displacement also affected the power infrastructure 
as some of the vandalised facilities could have been salvaged if residents were around 
immediately after the conflict. Most of the distribution wires were stolen during the 
long period of displacement. 
Electricity facilities were destroyed during the conflict. We do not have power at the 
moment, and nothing has been done about it. The electric wires have been stolen and 
transformers are vandalised. In this town now, the only means of getting power is through 
the use of the individual domestic generating set. That is the only option for those who can 
afford it. However, there was power from the national grid and solar before the conflict 
(Women focus group 2018). 
The conflict has had an adverse effect on the power [in the town]. There was electricity 
before our forced displacement, but there was none upon our return after two years. After 
we left, you know, for instance, when you notice that [electric] pole has [problem or] fallen 
in your neighbourhood, you report it for possible replacement [or repairs]. But when there is 
no one in the town, when one pole falls another would fall tomorrow, and another would fall 
the day after. In the end, you would find that the entire poles would fall. There would be 
none (Youths focus group 2018). 
The conflict is the cause of power outage in this town, and up till this moment, we do not 
have electricity. Electricity was useful for people in many ways (Farmers focus group 
2018).  
8.2.7 Impact and Implications of Change in Power Supply: 
Participants of the group discussion have confirmed the effects of the deplorable state of 
power infrastructure and supply of electricity in the case study where they expressed a 
lack of access to the power supply. The power outage in the case study increases the 
difficulty with which the residents undertake their day-to-day activities. Implications of 
power outage include deprivation of residents’ means of income and increase the burden 
and cost of accessing other utilities such as water thereby increases poverty. The 
participants also expressed the concern that the lack of electricity has negatively 
affected the well-being of the residents, given the climate condition in the area. This hot 
weather condition adversely affects the health of residents and their general 
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productivity. It is evident, therefore, that the post-conflict situation of power in Buni 
Yadi has a direct negative impact on income and wellbeing of the residents. Apart from 
the increased economic vulnerability that this condition may cause, it undermines the 
quality of human capital, since lack of electricity negatively affects wellbeing and 
health in the community.  
 When there is power, there are people who use it to power refrigerator which they use for 
cold drinks and ice water, and they make a living out of it. Now there is no power; you can 
see it has a negative effect on people. The lack of power has negatively affected the means 
of income of many people. It enables people to do a lot of things with ease, but we do not 
have the power supply at the moment. It also provides a means of livelihood to many 
people. You can see that it has an effect on people (Farmers focus group 2018). 
 You see the weather is hot now. If there is electricity people would make cold water [and 
sell]. At homes, people could use the electricity to power fans and make cold water [to 
drink], now one has to use generating set to do all that, but it is very expensive. You have to 
buy fuel and maintain the generating set regularly. This problem [lack of power] is beyond 
what we can handle, and there is nothing we can do (Women focus group 2018). 
 The lack of electricity has an impact on [local] businesses and general wellbeing of people. 
We have to contribute money [every now and then] to buy diesel to power the generator that 
would pump water from the borehole. However, if there were power from the national grid 
we would be relieved (Conflict migrant’s focus group 2018).   
8.2.8 Change in Telecommunication Services 
Individual and focus group discussions confirmed the adverse effect of conflict on 
access to telecommunication services as identified in the quantitative and observations 
methods in the case study. There were at least four major mobile telecommunication 
companies - MTN, GLO, Etisalat, and Airtel, that provided services and established 
their transmission facilities in the case study before the conflict. The conflict situation 
and the subsequent vandalising of the telecommunication infrastructure and 
displacement forced the operators to stop their services and leave the case study site. 
However, one of the companies (Airtel) has returned to the site and is currently 
providing services. The functions of Airtel is, however, widely considered to be 
inefficient and has less coverage area.  
At the moment we have [only] Airtel communication. There are no other telecommunication 
service providers in the town, but even the one we currently have access to has limited 
coverage area.   
There are other telecommunication services providers before the conflict. These include 





We have problems with telecommunication. When problems are too many, they defy 
solutions. Telecommunications at the moment we have only Airtel and the Airtel, once there 
is a signal problem, everything stops. However, before the conflict, we had MTN, GLO, 
Etisalat and Airtel services. Only Airtel is accessible at the moment (Youths focus 
group 2018). 
8.2.9 Impacts and Implications of Change in Telecommunication 
The impact of vandalising the mobile telecommunication infrastructure and the eventual 
loss of the services from most of the service providers is evident. This condition reduces 
access to the service as a result of the reduction in the number of service providers and 
the inefficiency of the only company that is available. The remarks from the participants 
confirm the negative implications of this change on the social, economic and personal 
security of the residents. The inability to communicate with friends and relations worry 
the residents as it truncates social communications and eventual loss of social assets. 
This condition may further limit an already weakened social environment as 
communication is difficult. More so, the poor telecommunication services imply 
reduced access to the social contemporary networking platforms, e.g. Facebook, 
Twitter, thereby preventing the social capital from breaking from the mostly horizontal 
to create vertical networking. The adverse consequence of this is already evident in the 
condition of helplessness for some of the residents regarding the accruing benefits of 
social capital.      
 This [lack of access to telecommunication services] has impacts on us because we are 
usually unable to communicate with other people [family or social networks].  We hardly 
can communicate to get certain things from somewhere else without going there physically. 
It generally truncates social interaction as you cannot contact your relations when you 
needed to. Whenever communication is impossible, there is a problem (Individual 
interview 2018). 
 The problem with the telecommunication is the inefficiency whereby you call, and you don't 
hear the voice of whom you are calling up until you exhaust the airtime [and there is] no 
communication is made. Sometime you would be charged for making calls even when you 
could not connect to the person you wish to call (Conflict migrants focus group 
2018). 
The absence of alternatives to the existing inefficient mobile telecommunication service 
provider increases the cost of doing business, and the condition denies many residents 
access to their means of livelihoods and income, especially businesses. This condition 
increases joblessness and poverty in the case study area.  




 Lack of telecommunication is also affecting businesses. It is difficult to communicate with 
people from other places to order certain goods that you need for your customers. For 
example, if a customer comes to order some goods that are not readily available in his store, 
he can place the order with his supplier through [mobile] phone and the goods would be 
delivered. But the absence of that has caused many businesses to lose customers. Businesses 
are practically handicapped due to lack of adequate telecommunication services (Women 
focus group 2018). 
 Eeh, it has affected us negatively economically, socially, all of it. At the moment if the 
signal goes, it is a big problem. That is the means of earning a living [income] for some 
people. It is only when there is a signal that they make sell.  
 This telecommunication was useful in many ways. When the [mobile] telecommunication 
networks were all accessible, people sell recharge card [call-cards] of not less than ten to 
twenty thousand Naira daily. Some other people do commercial [mobile] phone charging for 
fifty phones or more daily. When the networks for the other platforms are no longer 
available, it has negatively affected their means of income (Youths focus group 2018). 
 Access to the telecommunication had helped businesses before the conflict. Calls or mobile 
banking transactions were made to order goods from Kano [A major commercial city]. The 
goods were sent upon receipt of payments. This made business easy and more profitable. 
These services are no longer accessible (Businessmen focus group 2018). 
 There was a telecommunication signal shutdown last Friday up till Saturday. I received 
complaints from between twenty to thirty people [about the difficulties this caused]. Some 
were at the bus station on their way [to the city to make orders for goods] as a result of the 
signal short down. [They said] they spent a thousand Naira [Nigerian currency] for a 
transaction they could have used a hundred Naira to do. The challenges are many in this 
regards (Individual interview 2018). 
Change in the access to telecommunication services also threatened personal safety as 
residents are subjected to panic condition whenever the mobile signal is off due to 
inefficiency. The threat to personal safety relates to their inability to access real-time 
safety information in their post-conflict transition situation.  
 It [telecommunication services] is useful for safety and security. Lack of it is [a] significant 
deficiency in the town. We are always worried when the available telecommunication signal 
goes off. We are very disturbed because nobody knows what was happening [safety and 
security wise]. Information sharing and updates about safety tips and alert are 
communicated through the mobile telecommunication as well as information from residents 
to security operatives are communicated through mobile telecommunication for identity 
protection. 
8.3 Post-conflict Human Capital Accumulation  
8.3.1 Change in Access to Education and Education facilities 
The evidences from chapters six and seven confirmed that education facilities and 
infrastructures had suffered significant destruction as a result of the conflict in the case 
study area. This condition is corroborated in the focus group discussions and individual 
interviews, where participants acknowledged that school buildings and facilities were 
primarily targeted and destroyed. The changes in education infrastructure include the 
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destruction of the primary, secondary and tertiary education buildings and facilities 
thereby truncating access to education in the community.  
 Schools do not have adequate classes anymore [because they are destroyed] (Women 
focus group 2018). 
 If you go to Kasakchiya Primary School, no single block of the classrooms is good, no! It is 
only one tent [that is being used]. The condition is the same when you go to Shuwari 
Primary School, except that just recently a senator donated two classrooms and a store in the 
school. If you go to Islamiyya Primary the story is the same, no classes. If you go to Central 
Primary, the inside was partly renovated recently by the Victim Support Fund. The only 
thing you see at Nur-deen is the one classroom that was rebuilt by UNICEF. There are no 
classes except temporary ones that are made from makeshift materials (Individual 
interview 2018). 
 As it is now, I can say there is no single education facility which youths can access to 
acquire quality education. There are one or two primary and junior secondary schools that 
are working [sub-optimally]. [We used to have] the senior secondary, and diploma awarding 
institutions which includes the college of agriculture and an annexe of a privately owned 
college of Professional College of Science and Technology. However, we do not have them 
any longer, because they have all been relocated to Damaturu; consequent to the destruction 
of the facilities during the conflict (Youths focus group 2018). 
8.3.2 Impact and Implication of Change in Education 
One of the visible effects of the change in education in the case study is the reduced 
access. The inadequacy of the limited educational facilities - e.g. classrooms, can hardly 
guarantee access to quality education. While the lack of facility prevents many students 
from accessing education, the terrible conflict experiences caused trauma and panic for 
other school-going children who are now afraid of going to school. The poor physical 
state of the facilities posed threats to the safety and health of students who have to study 
in broken classes, makeshifts, under the tree or open fields. There are no enough 
qualified teachers, given the unsustainable student-teacher ratio in the schools. This 
shortage in the number of qualified teachers may relate to the teachers’ conflict 
experiences and the fear of being targeted.   
Fear has been instilled in the mind of [school going] children.  
You would see schools where about 200 pupils are put in one class. There can hardly be any 
learning with 200 pupils in one class (Women focus group 2018). 
The school closes [because of poor condition], and children are sent home once the rain 
starts, even if it is in the morning. There are no [good] schools. Anything can happen to a 
child that is send-off in the rain before he gets home (Individual interview 2018). 
Our children cannot go to school. You lose many things in life whenever you are displaced 
from your original home (Conflict migrant’s focus group 2018). 
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It is also noted that chronic post-conflict poverty is preventing many residents from 
enrolling or advance their education following the deficiency in Buni Yadi. This 
poverty condition prevents them not only because their parents could not afford their 
education in another city, but they have become contributors to the family economy. 
The circumstance leading to the reduced access to school for the youths also reflects the 
impact of conflict and poverty, on the community’s social fabric in which injuries, 
deaths and poverty-induced divorces distort households’ configurations and economy. 
The oldest siblings are often the victims of this scenario where they suddenly share in 
the pastoral (for the younger siblings) and economic responsibilities of the family to 
support or replace breadwinners. This changing circumstance increases out of school 
children and youths and potentially threaten the quality of human capital further, in a 
community where poor education is pervasive.  
There are many youths who have completed their junior secondary education and desire to 
proceed for senior secondary education but they could not. This is because many of them do 
not have parents who have the financial capacity to sponsor them to go to Damaturu to 
further their education. [The parent] cannot afford the regular financial needs for their food, 
and other things. This condition has prevented many youths that have the desire to advance 
their education from doing so. They can't because some of them are the oldest children of 
the family and once he decided to go away to Damaturu [for education] – despite its 
proximity to our town, he would hardly have the rest of mind and the needed concentration 
[to study]. This is as a result of the [precarious] conditions of his parents and younger 
siblings (Youths focus group 2018).  
When we came newly, we were able to enrol our children in the school, but the difficulties 
of life have forced us to withdraw them. We are basically looking for how to get food and 
survive first (Conflict migrant focus group 2018) 
Many people cannot enrol their children to school because they cannot afford it when they 
are asked to pay for this and to pay for that; when food is still a major challenge. Yet you 
know well that education is important. Without it, people would not have value, and this 
creates a problem in the future [as we have seen]. This is the change in livelihood that we 
have experienced.  
There are many people who wish to do better but that they cannot, and the government is 
not supporting us here. You are forced to be looking while your children are wasting off. 
We are helpless! (Farmers focus group 2018) 
8.3.3 Change in the Access to Healthcare 
The physical destruction, changes and the challenges of the healthcare facilities 
highlighted in the quantitative and physical surveys (section 6.7.4 and 7.4) are 
confirmed in the focus group discussions. The hospital buildings and other healthcare 
facilities are destroyed during the conflict. Like other workers in the formal sector, 
health workers have been targeted and maimed by the insurgents and as a result, fled 
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during the conflict. These conflict experiences have prevented the return of health 
officers since the town was reopened.  
All the hospitals [in the community] have been destroyed. The health workers have been 
scared away by the activities of the insurgents. They could no longer live in the town. We 
need help so that the health workers can return and reside close to the hospitals. We want 
hospitals in the town to have the capacity to handle all health challenges for our patients, 
except where it is absolutely necessary for a referral (Women focus group 2018). 
This [change in access to healthcare] is one of the areas we have a big problem as a result of 
the conflict. This is because the health facilities in Buni Yadi are just by name [at the 
moment]. There is no [hospital] equipment, and there are no health officers for sick people 
to consult. Whenever anything happens, you have to go to Damaturu [to seek medical 
attention], or if you are financially buoyant, you go to private hospitals.  Whether or not you 
are financially buoyant you have to go to Damaturu for medical attention (Conflict 
migrant’s focus group 2018). 
This [change in access to healthcare] is the biggest [challenge] one. This problem is a big 
issue here. There was significant destruction to our hospitals as a result of the conflict. It 
was only recently- about two months ago, we had little relief that we don't have to go to 
Damaturu for every healthcare need. The deterioration of healthcare services got to the 
extent that whenever someone is sick, you have to take him to Damaturu or risk his life to 
the hand of the local quack pharmacist in the town (Farmers focus group 2018). 
8.3.4 Impact and Implication of Change in Healthcare 
The change in healthcare in the case study area impacts negatively on the residents from 
the narratives of the participant’s discussions who revealed increase exposure to health 
challenges. The vulnerabilities are in the forms of residents’ lack of easy access to 
healthcare and the increased cost of healthcare despite the harsh economic realities. The 
increased cost and the residents’ direct out-of-pocket payments for healthcare imply the 
absence of the existing health insurance system. The implication of these includes the 
loss of lives of residents due to increased poverty and lack of access to the services. 
Deaths due to lack of easy access to healthcare services are more so for women, 
especially during childbirth due partly to the possible preferential treatments for 
residents of the city they have to travel to for healthcare. These difficulties and panic 
that come with seeking healthcare services have a negative implication on the quality of 
health of the residents. All of these challenges have a direct negative impact on the 






We no longer have rest of mind whenever a person is sick. It is always a hustle for us to get 
attention as and when needed each time we take our sick people to other towns for 
healthcare services. This [difficulty] happens only because we do not have hospitals any 
longer. To be honest we are in a difficult situation in this regard. The health workers do not 
live in this town because of the conflict experience. 
In my presence, a woman delivers [a baby] in a tricycle in this town [on her way to the 
hospital . . . (Women focus group 2018). 
This [healthcare challenge] is mainly for the healthcare concern of women where many 
women have lost their lives as a result of lack of access to hospitals in this town. It is always 
a big problem for women during childbirth when she is in labour; before getting to 
Damaturu, especially during the night.  
There is movement restriction in the night, and you won’t be allowed to go anywhere until 
day breaks. When there are complications, women labour till death, and this has happened 
not once, not twice. Patients who are in critical condition and needed emergency treatment 
died before reaching Damaturu. All these happen up till this time (Farmers focus group 
2018). 
Before now when you take your wife to the hospital for childbirth, you spent between 1000 
and 1500 Naira, but now any medical concern that involves taking your wife to the hospital 
for delivery would cost you at least 7000 Naira (Conflict migrant’s focus group 
2018). 
8.4 Focus Group Discussion on Post-conflict Social Assets in Buni Yadi 
8.4.1 Change in Social Network: 
The residents of the case study have enjoyed both social and economic benefits that 
were derivable from their social groups and networks before the conflict. These 
benefits, however, have been negatively impacted as the social groups hardly exist 
anymore. The participants’ of the focus group discussions confirmed the change in the 
social assets in the case study. Their narratives indicate evidence that suggests the 
deterioration and collapse of many social groups and networks consequent to the 
conflict and the eventual displacement from the community thereby corroborate the 
earlier findings (section 6.6). 
We used to have women social groups that we [use to] assist one another whenever there 
was the need to do so. However, since the incidence of the conflict, we no longer have that 
kind of opportunity (Women focus group 2018). 
There was one social group that I know in this town before the conflict and our eventual 
displacement. I do not know if anyone knows any other one apart from it. It was called Yadi 
Development Association (YADA). Honestly, the association in collaboration with the state 
government and the World Bank was useful before the displacement (Youths focus 
group 2018). 
Before the conflict and our eventual displacement, we had social groups. Our attention was 
drawn to the need to have social groups and networks that would be useful for helping 
ourselves by ourselves. We started [the association], and it was not long after then [the 
conflict broke out] (Conflict migrants focus group 2018). 
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There was a time when every section [there are six sections] of the town had farmer 
associations. The members of these associations farmed for individual members of the 
associations in addition to ensuring that all members have access to fertiliser from the 
government. All of the group members would be mobilised to work the farm of a member at 
a given date, and the same process is followed until all members have their farms done. This 
[reciprocal farming practice] happened because there was peace (Farmers focus group 
2018). 
8.4.2 Impact and Implication of Change in Social Assets 
The change in social assets has resulted in the general breakdown of social cohesion, 
supportive coexistence and the economic benefits that come with it in the case study. 
The discussions confirm earlier findings that some of the reasons for the ineffectiveness 
or absence of the social groups and accruing benefits are traceable to the increased 
poverty, loss of trust, ill-health, and deaths of some group members.   
There is a high chance that if someone goes to work another person’s farm [in the name of 
association] today, he will come back without food or money to bring home [since he will 
not be paid for the service]. There are many people that cannot feed their families unless 
they do daily labourer jobs. You can see that the conflict has really affected this important 
asset negatively. 
Nobody wants to have time for any association as it is every man to his problem at the 
moment. No one even talks about it. Nobody! Social interaction and engagement have been 
shattered as everyone is struggling for his [own] survival. It is only in the atmosphere of 
peace and bounty that one could think about this kind of association. At the moment we do 
not have that atmosphere (Farmers focus group 2018). 
Seriously yes! The conflict has brought about a severe lack of trust among people, [this is 
worse] to the extent that, even your own son [you cannot trust him]. When people were 
displaced to different places, and you do not have a regular update about their whereabouts 
and what they do there. Any day that he comes back, you find it difficult to trust him. This 
is because you do not know where he had gone and who he has been associating with [while 
he was away] (Individual interview 2018). 
Increase in poverty has been a significant reason this kind of social groups are not attainable 
anymore, and there are some of our members who have died. Some are seriously battling 
with ill-health. There are some of our members that had a stroke and paralysed (Women 
focus group 2018). 
However, a contrasting narrative emerged in the youths’ and women social groups 
suggesting that the conflict has had a slightly positive impact on their social assets. 
Although the conflict had got them displaced, the youths’ experiences during this period 
have influenced the resolve for strengthening the previously ineffective social group. In 
addition to stimulating the existed youths’ social group; they have established new ones 
in the case study. The discussion with participants of the youths’ focus group confirmed 
the post-conflict resilience leading to positive impacts of the new associations. One of 
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the positive impacts of change in the social assets of youths includes empowerment 
programmes.  
The association has been revived and I dare say it is better than before.  . . . After our return, 
we are able to call ourselves . . . all of us in Buni Yadi and [we] reminded ourselves of the 
need to set up a self-help association. We highlighted the danger facing us given the 
younger ones that would be faced with the joblessness and our age mate and those above 
our age who used to have means of living but lost everything to the insurgency.     
It would reach a stage where those that have never consider terrorism start considering it as 
a survival means when money is offered to them. . . . These thoughts influenced our 
decisions, and some youths from other neighbourhoods have set up an association called 
‘Youth for Education and Development’. This association has been able to secure 
scholarships for some students in the town (Youths focus group 2018). 
Our association called ‘Help Yourself Buni Yadi Youths Development Association’; in 
collaboration with sister associations was able to train [in vocation] not fewer than 150 
youths with the support of the North-east Initiative Forum. Under sport and education, we 
have supported students with text and exercise books and pens (Youths focus group 
2018). 
A similar resilience capacity is also identified in women of Buni Yadi. In spite of the 
current conflict-induced hardship in the community, women now take up 
responsibilities that are hitherto alien to their culture to support their families. In Buni 
Yadi, men are culturally responsible for the financial needs of the family while 
domestic and pastoral duties – e.g. childcare, cooking housekeeping, are women’s 
preserve. However, the increased poverty following the conflict has significantly 
reduced men’s capacity to fulfil this obligation; hence, women stepped in for support. 
In some instances, women assume this kind of role following the husbands’ death in 
the conflict when she has children to look after. While this resilience is critical, it is 
also a strategy for escaping divorce as men resort to doing this to relieve themselves of 
the financial responsibilities.   
Our current situation has made it mandatory for women to assist their husbands. For 
example, before now, there were men who could farm between 10 and 20 bags of farm 
produce. But now many don’t even have the farm. He depends wholly on humanitarian aid. 
Isn’t it? [As a woman] whatever little money you make from petty jobs around it become 
mandatory to assist on some of the family needs.  
And now the hardship is too much for men to carry alone. Some have up to three wives and 
many children. It is practically impossible to be able to discharge all his [husband] 
responsibilities on them [given the current situation]. It is in this hardship condition that he 
has to provide for food. It is, therefore, mandatory for women to lend a hand given the 
condition. And failure to assist would also put you [woman] in a difficult condition [to 




8.5 Process of Engagement in Post-conflict Buni Yadi 
8.5.1 Post-conflict Public participation 
Public participation is considered to be at its lowest in the post-conflict context of the 
case study area as evident in the absolute affirmation of the deficiency or lack of 
government commitment to engage communities on its activities (if any). The 
participants of the focus group discussions confirmed that government or non-
governmental organisation hardy carry them along or seek their opinions on any 
decision-making process that involves them or any government activities.  
As far as we know, we have never been involved in any decision-making process for the 
post-conflict development and redevelopment in this town or region [participants responded 
in unison] (Women focus group 2018). 
Apart from the aid card that National Emergency Management Agency [NEMA] gave to 
people for the past ten months [without anything to show for it], there has been no any 
support that has been brought to us [by the government]. There has never been any form of 
an opinion-seeking discussion between the government and us. There was none, to be 
honest! (Youths focus group 2018). 
To the best of my knowledge NGOs have once brought fertiliser and plant seeds to support 
[us]. They had a meeting about the distribution with the dry season farmers, but they did not 
engage us on our needs [before bringing the fertiliser], and they just brought the fertiliser for 
support (Farmers focus group 2018). 
8.5.2 Impact of Lack of Participation: 
The participants of the focus group discussions have highlighted the adverse effects of 
the lack of involvement in the decision-making process on their post-conflict 
predicament. This concern is evident in their narratives of the government inability to 
identify their problems, hence the lack of necessary support. It is understood from the 
discussions that the poor participatory practices of the government have made it 
impossible for the residents to obtain appropriate relief and support from the 
government to meet their immediate and long-term post-conflict needs. Although the 
residents are rarely consulted for any decision-making, the NGOs are noted to have 
been more supportive – at least on the short-term basis, than the government.  
 The only thing I can point to that has been done by the government, as at last two months 
 is the rehabilitation of two classrooms at Central Primary School Buni Yadi, but the work 
 is ongoing.  
 For me, the only thing I know is the renovation of the Federal Government College Buni 
 Yadi. The school was burnt and school children were murdered. . . . There was renovation 
 going on. That was the only obvious thing I know. [But] Even the renovation has been 
 stopped (Youths focus group 2018). 
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 If not for some of the aid that we get in the town, many of us would not be able to survive. 
 Humanitarian groups have really helped us. Some NGOs particularly focus on women 
 needs (Women focus group 2018). 
8.5.3 The Implication of Lack of Participation 
The participants of the discussions are explicit about their experiences of being denied 
the opportunity to be part of the decision-making processes on issues that concern them. 
This concern was particularly so for farmers who expressed displeasure over the losses 
the supposed support (e.g. seeds) has caused to them. The mismatch between the seeds 
variety that produced yield for the farmers and the one that was donated to them without 
consultation caused waste of time, money and other resources. On the political 
perspective, this lack of participation increases displeasure, and resentment towards 
government as participant expressed the feeling of being alienated by the government. 
This practice is a threat to the personal, community – especially for the lower social 
class, and overall security in the community as this has the potential to trigger another 
round violence due to collective grievance as noted by the participants.  
We have seen the clear negative implication of lack of consultation in the last cropping 
season. A seed of sorghum was donated to us [as a support for farmers], and a lot of us spent 
[our limited] resources to plant the seed. However, we were surprised as the seeds did not 
produce a yield even after the raining season has passed. But if they had engaged the 
farmers to discuss the kind of seed they use or want, we would have informed them of the 
one that is suitable for our lands. That was not done as they just brought the seed and 
distribute to people. People further shared the seeds among themselves to those who could 
not access from the donor organisation (Farmers focus group 2018). 
Yes, lack of so doing [participation] has a tremendous effect on the thoughts and perception 
of people [toward government]. For instance, as the conflict befell us, there has never been 
any Federal Government representative that came to find out about our predicaments or to 
find out what problems we have, what condition we are in and what needs do we have on an 
emergency. We have the feeling that we are not being cared for in the North-east of Nigeria, 
because if a similar thing happens in other parts of Nigeria; they are treated differently. 
This [lack of participation] is the kind of things that give rise to political thuggery and 
violence (Youths focus group 2018). 
Some group [NGOs] came and to assist women in the area of vocation training such as 
sewing and garment design. We hoped that could bring some succour, but few of us that had 
the training are still jobless. This is because you cannot do any design without the electricity 







Research Discussion and Theoretical Reflection 
The last three chapters have focused on presenting the results of the empirical findings 
of this research, covering the outcomes of the quantitative and physical surveys and 
qualitative methods. The results presented in the chapters corroborate one another to 
suggest that livelihoods changes have indeed occurred in the case study. Although the 
changes in livelihoods are predominantly negative, evidence of positive ones emerged 
regarding the youths and women social resilience. This chapter, however, presents 
discussions regarding the details of those findings as a reflection for the theoretical and 
empirical contribution of the research.  
9.1 Discussion and Theoretical Reflection 
9.1.1 People Centeredness: Access to Locally Available Resources 
The people-centeredness of the livelihood framework derives from the need to 
understand the complexity of challenges that can prevent people from accessing their 
locally available resources (DFID 2000). Partial or total lack of access to livelihoods 
assets and resources has been highlighted (chapter 3) to be commonplace in a post-
conflict context of a large-scale uprising. The results of this research do not suggest 
otherwise to this understanding except, however, the context-based variation due to 
peculiarity of dynamics that truncate the access to the assets. In Buni Yadi, farming is 
confirmed to be one of the significant livelihoods activities which depend on direct 
access to natural assets (farmland). Access to farm has been dramatically reduced due to 
conflict and forced displacement, as noted in the empirical results (section 8.1.1). This 
condition of a post-conflict lack of or reduced access to land takes precedence from 
existing research (e.g. Unruh 2004; Thu 2012; Matt 2016; Pritchard 2016) thereby 
confirms the theorising that post-conflict access to land - especially for agriculture in 
the rural setting, is often truncated by complex challenges. The existing knowledge 
concerning these challenges to land access relates to tenure security that emanates from 
the combination of mix-up, competitions, criminality and claims and counterclaim for 
the legality of lands ownership after conflict. Difficulties regarding access to land after 
conflict may also relate to gender-based deprivation in which women are often the 
victims due to certain cultural practices (Corbin and Hall 2019).   
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Levine (2016) and Corbin and Hall (2019) reports on the post-conflict context of the 
rural land disputes in Northern Uganda are positive examples to draw from regarding 
post-conflict land access challenges. Returnees from refugee camps experienced the 
stiff challenge of accessing croplands (for farming) given that residents attach lots of 
importance to accessing their agricultural lands as the first strategy for food security and 
economic recovery. The challenge of lack of access to the land stems from the inability 
of the legal system to adequately resolve the multiplicity of evidence (formal and 
informal) as a means to claim rights to land. This difficulty results in prolonged intra-
family land disputes and creates an opening for land grabbing, which prevents people 
from accessing their ancestral lands. Similarly, women experience a peculiar challenge 
regarding inheritance and access to lands of death husbands due to unfavourable cultural 
norms and difficulty of obtaining legal assistance to claim such lands (Corbin and Hall 
2019). Thu (2012) identifies a similar case of a post-conflict struggle for accessing land 
in the Timor-Leste. The post-conflict settler-landowner dichotomy of Mulai village 
(Timor-Leste) fuelled cases of land dispossessions.  ‘Settlers’ of the village who have a 
customary land title were denied access to their grazing lands upon return from forced 
displacement by ‘landowners’ who did not flee the conflict. The inconsistency of the 
land law at various districts further compounds the land ownership disputes which exist 
within the ‘settlers’ themselves and the landowners.  
Furthermore, post-conflict communities often struggle with harmonising what can or 
should typically be accepted as legitimate evidence for the right to claim lands. This 
challenge leads to a multiplicity of what is termed ‘legal pluralism of evidence’ for the 
rights to access and has negative consequences on access to lands in many post-conflict 
contexts such as Ethiopia, Uganda, Mozambique and Peru (Brown et al. 2011). 
Moreover, this difficulty negates the efforts for attaining food security in the post-
conflict situation, given the positive correlation between land tenure and food security 
(Unruh 2003). The research findings for this investigation, however, contrast above 
experiences for post-conflict lack of access to land as the evidence suggests challenges 
other than physical restriction, legal or gender-related challenges to claims a right to 
land. The lack of access to farmland in the post-conflict Buni Yadi emanates primarily 
from two conditions namely: fear and trauma the residents have developed from 
extremely violent experiences during the conflict and the adverse effect of bad roads 
and lack of stormwater channels (section 8.2.4). The farmlands at the eastern outskirt of 
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the town are known to the local farmers for their higher fertility for crop production, but 
coincidentally the area was the insurgents’ base during the conflict. Before dislodging 
the insurgents, this area was the launchpad from which they strategise and strike 
(section 8.2.4).   
This fear and trauma have remained in the minds of the residents - including farmers, 
despite the absence of any form of physical, legal or institutional restriction to access 
their farmlands. The farmers would never go to the eastern region of the town for 
whatever reason, not even farming. This condition has significantly reduced food 
production in the case study, hence the declined income and increased poverty and 
hunger. This is a confirmation of Jacobson (2002, 2005), Karf (2003) and 
Amirthalingam and Lakshman (2009, 2010) on the negative impact of conflict on the 
economic security in a post-conflict context. Nonetheless, Brown et al. (2011) report 
post-conflict experiences which relate to fear and lack of access to farmlands in 
Afghanistan, Cambodia and Mozambique. The prevalent land-mine of agricultural lands 
significantly reduced access to land for farming in those countries. But there is limited 
evidence to suggest that mines are significant cause to lack of access to farmlands in 
Buni Yadi after conflict. However, the supposedly less dangerous farming areas are 
known to be less fertile compared to the east (section 8.1.1) hence they are more 
expensive to cultivate and require more resources such as money and farm inputs which 
are scarce given the residents’ poverty conditions and lack of access to financial assets 
such as banks. The farmers, however, rely on subsistence practices on farmlands which 
are much closer to the town for safety reasons. Although the reduced access to 
croplands affects the entire community, the condition is particularly dire for the conflict 
migrants. The scarcity of cropland makes it challenging to parcel out a large area of land 
that could be enough for subsisting farming for the conflict migrants (section 8.1.1). 
They have to rely on other alternatives for food such as aid or purchasing despite the 
hike in prices of food and increased poverty.  This finding confirms the current 
understanding that forced displacement strips conflict migrants of rights to access 
resources to improve their livelihoods (Jacobsen 2002; Amirthalingam and Lakshman 
2009). In Buni Yadi, however, unlike in a restricted camp context, the lack of access to 
cropland by conflict migrants result from the apparent general lack of access and not 
from any form of legal, political or institutional denial. Not even the conflict migrants 
have indicated this possibility in Buni Yadi.  
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The possible explanation to the variations between the cause of lack of access to land in 
Buni Yadi and those examined in other research (e.g. Unruh 2003; Thu 2012; Levine 
2016) may be construed from the notable difference in nature, duration and return 
pattern after displacement. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (2016) 
notes that prolonged displacement (five years or above) is one of the obstacles to 
reclaiming land by returnees after conflicts. In other words, the chance of having land 
disputes is higher in long-term displacement which provides the avenue for disputes, 
speculation and grabbing of land while those who occupy it assume ownership (legally 
or illegally). In this regard, however, the displacement of Buni Yadi which lasted for 
two years may be a possible explanation to the absence of land access challenges that 
emanate from legal or administrative difficulties for the right to claim lands. The 
difference in the post-conflict land access challenges may also be explained from the 
pattern of displacement, for instance, in a context where only a section of the 
community is displaced or where some of the displaced return substantially long before 
others as exemplified in the cases of Timor-Leste and Northern Uganda respectively 
(Levine 2016; Thu 2012). Given these scenarios, the land dispute is often argued from 
the perspective of whether or not the persons who have lived and possibly improved the 
lands should be allowed to retain them or the original owners who ‘abandoned’ the 
lands and probably do not have the currently recognised legal evidence to claim the 
right to ownership. It is evident, however, that the lack of access to land is different in 
Buni Yadi because the entire community was displaced at about the same time during 
the conflict and a significant proportion returned within a similar period. Although the 
residents migrated to different places during displacement, the return was done at about 
similar time for many following military certification and facilitation of return. 
Similarly, the fact that everyone in the case study could not access their farmland due to 
fear prevents the kind of scenario in other contexts, as noted above.     
However, the inability of the residents to access and use their natural assets in spite of 
its availability raises the concern about the limitation in the sustainable livelihoods 
framework with regards to the role natural assets can play in improving livelihoods. The 
livelihoods framework posits natural assets - from a market economy perspective, as 
being a primary basis for income provision. This notion has been questioned by Sarkar 
and Sinha (2015) who argue that the sustainable livelihoods approach view is 
inconsistent with reality where human activities (mainly economic) are derived from 
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nature. Instead, the livelihoods framework considers natural assets as that ‘marketable’ 
product that has the ultimate value for providing income. This view may pose 
challenges to the utility of the livelihoods approach, especially in a post-conflict context 
like Buni Yadi, where factors that are external to the land prevent the residents from 
using it. This argument suffices to mean that productivity of the natural assets (farmland 
in this case) is determined by a combination of its availability, accessibility and other 
dynamics - such fear and trauma, which may be external to it.   
Infrastructure forms an essential platform upon which access to other assets is possible. 
The absence of infrastructure does not only truncate access to other assets (e.g. natural 
assets); it prevents economic activities and increases poverty and other vulnerabilities 
(Malual 2008). The current predicament in Buni Yadi confirms this consideration 
regarding post-conflict access to land as an economic asset. The deterioration of roads 
and associated infrastructure – drainage, in particular, has been another significant 
obstacle to accessing farmlands in post-conflict Buni Yadi. The two-year displacement 
and abandonment of the settlement prevented the residents from carrying out the routine 
maintenance of roads through community volunteering (section 9.2.4). The topographic 
setting of Buni Yadi - a depression, compounds this challenge whereby stormwater 
from many kilometres away from the upper regions flows through the case study and its 
farmlands and consequently cause the destruction of the drainages, roads and farmlands.  
Some roads leading to the farms are converted to waterways by erosion due to drainages 
blockage and poor water channels and consequently, truncate access to farmlands. The 
challenge has also caused flooding of some farms which become waterlogged, thereby 
reducing their productivity while portions of others are washed away.   
This effect of poor roads on farmlands confirms Levine (2016) assertion that not all 
post-conflict challenges may be a direct impact of physical attacks on communities or 
infrastructure during a conflict. In other words, the road-related (poor road drainages) 
reduction and lack of access to farmlands in Buni Yadi is an indirect consequence of 
conflict. Again this scenario brings to question the effectiveness of the sustainable 
livelihoods framework consideration that infrastructure is primarily a public or formal 
sector provision (Ali 2002). Governments in many contexts are known to have been 
unable to meet the infrastructure needs of their citizens, and the response to this 
challenge informs many informal and individual initiatives for providing infrastructure 
or maintaining existing ones in their communities as it was the case in Buni Yadi (Ali 
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2002). This concern and its implication for post-conflict recovery are examined in 
greater depth in the subsequent section (9.1.4) that discusses infrastructure as a means 
of reducing vulnerability and improve resilience. 
9.1.2 Sustainability: Post-conflict Resilience  
Livelihoods sustainability in a stable (non-conflict) context is primarily related to the 
ability of individuals and households to overcome shocks and survive with less reliance 
on external support - resilience (DFID 2000; Rakodi 2014). In a post-conflict context, 
however, resilience relates more to recovery from the effect of the impact of conflict 
while exploring strategies for communities to deal with the indirect consequences 
within the locally accessible resources (Jacobsen 2002). The first and perhaps most 
crucial step to post-conflict resilience is surviving the conflict alive (Amirthalingam and 
Lakshman 2009). Empirical evidence from this study suggests the attainment of this 
level of resilience in Buni Yadi given that a significant majority of the residents 
survived the conflict physically unharmed as they were able to escape following the 
information on the insurgents’ plan to attack and take over the settlement. However, 
Amirthalingam and Lakshman (2010) underline the deficiency of post-conflict 
livelihoods resilience when human capital lacks the complement of other livelihood 
assets. Analyses of research findings for this investigation affirms the livelihoods 
deficiency in Buni Yadi given the current survival challenges and dire living condition 
due to reduced access to economic, infrastructure, natural and other complementary 
assets despite the limited loss of human lives.  
Amirthalingam and Lakshman (2010) note that although economic resilience is vital for 
coping in a post-conflict context, achieving this depends mostly on the pre-conflict 
assets with which the individuals or households can escape the conflict. The volume, as 
well as the value of those resources the conflict victims can escape conflict, are essential 
for determining the effectiveness and duration they can finance the post-conflict 
livelihoods needs of the displaced persons. The Sri Lankan case is a relevant example of 
this understanding. Analysis of the Batticaloa eastern region, Sri Lanka, shows that sale 
or mortgaging pre-conflict savings of mobile assets such as jewellery is useful for 
financing post-conflict livelihoods of IDPs. However, there is no evidence to suggest 
that the strategy is helpful for more than a year because this kind of asset is easily 
exhaustible (Amirthalingam and Lakshman 2010). The research findings for this study 
confirm a similar scenario in Buni Yadi as the analysis of the results reveals the 
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weakened economic resilience of the residents and the inability to adequately finance 
their post-conflict conditions. Two patterns are discernible, however, in the case of Buni 
Yadi: firstly, a high rate of pre-conflict poverty which perhaps truncated the residents’ 
ability to save for worse days, and secondly, the residents could not escape the conflict 
with many valuable assets. Although they possessed some physical assets (e.g. sewing 
machine) which they used for earning incomes before the conflict, they could not flee 
with them as the conflict started abruptly (section 8.1.1). Similarly, there is no evidence 
to suggest that whatever the residents were able to escape with had lasted up to the two 
years of their displacement as evident in their inability to finance basic needs such as 
food and shelter during and after displacement. 
The refugee or IDP policy of the host community is also an essential element for the 
resilience of the displaced as refugee policy imposes certain restrictions such as 
movement and types of job an IDP or refugee can undertake (Jacobsen 2002). Werker 
(2007), reports the example of this kind of challenge in the Western Ugandan context, 
which is a case involving the displacement across international boundaries. The Buni 
Yadi displacement, however, differs given that it did not involve crossing an 
international border. This variance in Buni Yadi context lies in the inability of the 
residents to be able to work or engage in economic activities while in displacement is 
mainly due to stigmatisation. The psychological torture from the stigmatisation 
prevented many of the residents from engaging in productive activities during 
displacement. Similarly, participants of this study reported cases of rejection and 
stereotyping of the residents during their displacement by the members of the host 
communities due to the fear of being a mole for the insurgent groups. The above 
conditions denied many residents the opportunity to create new social assets or engage 
in business transactions or economic activities during displacement, thereby further 
weakened their economic resilience, hence increased poverty at displacement. The 
impoverishment persisted upon return to their original community given that income 
assets and means of livelihoods have been destroyed and looted thereby make survival a 
daily struggle. Although the investigation confirms Amirthalingam and Lakshman 
(2010) position on the significance of the pre-conflict savings for a post-conflict 
economic resilience - with contextual peculiarities, it further shows that poverty during 
displacement may extend beyond displacement period. This condition has severe 
adverse implications on the economic and social resilience of residents, thereby increase 
post-conflict vulnerability.  
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Declined economic resilience increases poverty and destroys social capital and benefits 
accruable from it as identified in this investigation. For example, conflict-induced 
increase in poverty prevents farmers from participating in the farmers’ social groups 
(section 8.4.2). The practice of community services for road repairs and women self-
help associations had suffered a similar fate. It may appear at first glance that poverty 
has limited impact on these social assets, but considering the link from the fact that 
people now live from hand-to-mouth makes it more apparent that they are unlikely to 
engage in activities that will not fetch those means of survival on the immediate. This 
condition denied farmers, for instance, access to the age-long self-organised reciprocity 
practices (locally called ‘gidauniya’) of farm labour provision for one another. The 
practice enables farmers to access labour and farm inputs such as fertiliser at a relatively 
cheaper cost thereby improve productivity. Watson (2001) identifies that this kind of 
self-organised associations has the potential of reducing post-conflict vulnerabilities 
when the benefit accruable from it is accessible, and the complex social capital 
challenges of rebuilding and creating more enablers are overcome. In the post-conflict 
Kono District of Sierra Leone, for instance, farming labour clubs (locally called ‘boma’) 
have been an essential tool for the post-conflict recovery process. The boma group 
members undertake a variety of demanding farm labour in a reciprocity manner while 
the beneficiaries provide resources such as food, water and logistics (Maconachie et al. 
2012). This practice is similar to that of Buni Yadi except that the farmer group 
members’ inability to provide the necessary resources such as food and transportation 
has truncated the practice after conflict as their poverty conditions have increased. 
Similarly, Maconachie et al. (2012) indicate that the Sierra Leone success is attributable 
to the deliberate revival and institutionalisation of the practice and its benefits among 
the members. The opportunity to institutionalise this reciprocal farming practice has not 
been explored in the context of Buni Yadi due to the weak vertical social network. This 
condition undermines access to appropriate support for revamping the practice after 
conflict. The challenge contributes to the farmers’ inability to afford necessary farming 
facilities and inputs leading to significant fall in food production and increase poverty, 
hence the dependence on humanitarian assistance for food, healthcare, education and so 
forth. The declined social resilience applies to many other social groups in the case 
study, except for the youths and women groups.  
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The resilience of the youths and women regarding social capital after conflict provides a 
different scenario to those of other social groups in the case study and may also present 
a limitation to livelihoods approach views regarding the outcome of sudden shocks such 
as conflict. The livelihoods framework tends to favour the consideration that the 
consequences of large scale conflicts come with livelihoods destructions, which may be 
homogenously negative (Rakodi 2014). However, while this consideration may be 
consistent regarding the negative consequence of livelihoods disruption for other social 
groups, the framework fails to envisage the possible exception in a post-conflict 
condition that may be positive. The case of farmers’ social groups in Sierra Leone, for 
instance, is a confirmation of this oversight; and the resilience of youths group in Buni 
Yadi leading to the ability to sustain their social assets after conflict further exposes this 
weakness.  
The Buni Yadi youths group realised the importance of rejuvenating their social asset 
upon return from displacement, decided to strengthen the pre-conflict social clubs and 
create new ones. The inter-group collaborations and assistance from other external 
stakeholders have aided the clubs to assist some youths to access education and 
vocational training. This positive change, however, has not made much impact because 
of lack adequate infrastructure as well as active vertical networking which may facilitate 
proper institutionalisation as noted in other contexts. The disadvantage of failing to 
acknowledge and explore the potentials of this positive change in a post-conflict 
analysis may undermine optimal intervention outcomes as the community (youths in 
particular) is denied access to capacities which may provide new opportunities. 
Similarly, this investigation notes the resilience of women despite the dire living 
conditions and the ensuing hardship. Having realised the declined ability (sometimes 
inability) of men who culturally are responsible for financing the family welfare, 
women now actively participate in making provision for the families. Changes in social 
responsibilities and other family dynamics are also responsible for the women resilience 
which is a coping strategy for sustaining the family. Women in Buni Yadi have, for 
instance, assumed the role of being the sole providers for the family following the death 
of husbands in the conflict or actively engaged in the household financial obligations to 
escape the threat of divorce as men use the declined income as an excuse to initiate 
divorce. Like the youths group in Buni Yadi, the resilience of women lacks 
complementary support to make it more useful for post-conflict recovery and 
development, given the continued reliance on humanitarian aid to survive.   
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The destruction of infrastructures is apparent in the case study of this research as a 
result of direct physical attacks as well as climate factors such as rain and flood after 
displacement. Although pre-conflict gross deficiency was reported, these infrastructures 
supported both the economic and social livelihoods of the residents irrespective of their 
ownership - public or private. The high costs of providing infrastructure prevent the 
residents from rebuilding their community infrastructures given the severe economic 
conditions, and government intervention is instead not forthcoming. Although aid 
agencies are not known to primarily undertake long-term projects such as community 
infrastructure redevelopment (Shah and Shahbaz 2015), the study examines evidence to 
this effect in post-conflict Buni Yadi. Red Cross, for instance, is reported to have 
assisted some residents with building materials and other logistics to rebuild their 
houses. However, the predetermined criteria used by the agency for considering 
eligibility for support marred the success of the programme. Many residents expressed 
dissatisfaction over the selection processes as they noted that many houses that truly 
deserved support are left out while undeserved houses make the support list. This 
condition is adversely affecting social cohesion, thereby weaken resilience in the 
community.   
Reconstruction of health and education amenities tops the priorities of infrastructure 
needs of the residents for redevelopment in Buni Yadi. These have received 
significantly less attention as at the time of fieldwork for this study. All categories of 
schools – including primary, secondary and post-secondary, were destroyed during the 
conflict, and only a few of the classrooms in primary and junior secondary schools are 
currently reconstructed. Similarly, both private and public healthcare facilities are in a 
state of disrepair as inadequate attention has prevented the redevelopment of these 
facilities while they lack adequate equipment and staffing. The condition of power 
supply and telecommunication are not any different. There seemed to be no indication 
of restoring the destroyed power infrastructure two years after the return of the residents 
while the only mobile telecommunication service in the case study is inefficient as 
residents complained regarding the difficulty to use it for social or economic benefit. 
The combined effect of these has adverse implication for post-conflict human capital 
resilience given that the dire state of infrastructure truncates access to education, health 
and other infrastructure that support social development.     
However, Shah and Shahbaz (2015) underscore that the criticism against relief 
organisations and sometimes government regarding post-conflict infrastructure stems 
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from the poor understanding of the negative implications of inadequate infrastructure on 
post-conflict resilience. Shah and Shahbaz exemplify this deficient understanding in the 
post-conflict infrastructure inadequacy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa district of Pakistan in 
which women are offered kitchen gardening seeds as a post-conflict support package 
but could not plant them due to lack of water supply. A similar scenario is reported in 
the post-conflict redevelopment programmes in Buni Yadi whereby women receive 
vocation training for sewing garments as post-conflict empowerment programme. 
However, the skill could not be put to use as there is no electricity to power the sewing 
machines in the community. Similarly, youths groups in collaboration with Victim 
Support Programme reported having trained some youths on vocation skills such as e-
commerce, but the skills have barely made an impact because of the lack of power and 
the poor condition of telecommunication and internet. The current state of disrepair of 
infrastructures and the ensuing livelihoods difficulties confirms the adverse implications 
of inadequate infrastructure on the resilience - social and economic, capacities of Buni 
Yadi residents hence increased vulnerability. Overral, the above resilience scenario is 
consistent with the understanding that resilience differ between indiduals and groups. It 
also confirms that defiency of any aspects of post-conflict resilience (e.g. institutional 
effectiveness, poverty and behavioural response) may undermine the overall livelihoods 
resilience in a context but contextual varience is inevitable (Jacobsen 2002; Bujones et 
al. 2013; Menkhaus 2013).    
9.1.3 Mismatching Post-conflict Needs and Available Support for Conflict 
Victims 
Rebuilding conflict-ridden communities to overcome the challenges of post-conflict 
livelihoods changes is by no means an easy task given the complex nature of 
impoverishment and their implications for conflict victims. The need to reduce 
individuals’ and households’ level of vulnerabilities often informs the necessary shoring 
up of livelihoods of conflict victims, but the abrupt nature of the programmes and 
processes of undertaking post-conflict interventions come with challenges. Lack of 
adequate analysis and understanding of the needs of conflict victims poses a significant 
challenge to achieving success in communities where chronic poverty, poor education, 
and limited skilled labours are widespread (Solomon and Ginifer 2008; Bangura 2016; 
Tollefsen 2017). A micro-level assessment of the conditions of conflict victims become 
an essential part of post-conflict livelihoods strategy to provide relevant supports. This 
171 
 
analysis and the availability of accessible resources may be a relevant determinant of a 
sustainable post-conflict intervention success through minimising the mismatch of 
needs that characterise many post-conflict interventions (Solomon and Ginifer 2008; 
Bangura 2016).  
The mismatch of needs of conflict victims and the support they get is commonly used to 
assess the success or failure of post-conflict interventions. For example, most of the 
post-conflict Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes (e.g. 
Sierra Leon and Liberia) are considered to be ineffective because they could not match 
the needs and resolve long-term local concerns of the participants. In Sierra Leone 
(post-2002) for instance, the programme is believed to have recorded success at the 
macro level, at least for the general disarmament programme, but there is limited 
evidence to suggest micro – individuals and households, long-term livelihoods success. 
According to Solomon and Ginifer (2008) and Bangura (2016), the demobilisation 
process fell short of expectations due to its inability to establish and resolve the peculiar 
needs of participants by their gender or demography (age). For instance, women were 
kept in the same place with men in camps which are managed by men, thereby exposing 
them to continued violence (by male ex-combatants), rape and unwanted pregnancies. 
Similarly, participants of the economic reintegration programmes could not establish a 
new lease of life - livelihoods. This failure is rationalised to the arbitral enrolment of 
participants into vocation training without profiling their socio-economic interests and 
aspiration and poor analysis of the local economic opportunities that can be accessed. 
Participants of the programme eventually sold the training toolkits due to lack of 
employment opportunities despite the skills acquisition training that could help them 
start up new lives. Furthermore, Bangura (2016) fears that the situation poses threat to 
peacebuilding given the growing youths’ (ex-combatants) grievance and frustration.     
Failure of governance, including process and people in the decision making concerning 
interventions, is a primary cause of post-conflict intervention failure. The condition of 
mismatching needs is confirmed in this investigation; although there is a contextual 
peculiarity given the non-camp setting of the study and the participants are not ex-
combatants (as noted above). The farmers’ narrative is a relevant example of the 
negative implication of mismatched needs and available supports in post-conflict Buni 
Yadi. Having identified the imminence of famine and the dire economic situation in the 
town; an NGO donated sorghum seed to farmers to grow their food. The seed failed to 
produce yield despite the time, energy and scarce resources (money) that was expended 
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in growing it (section 8.5.3). A kind gesture that could have helped the desperately 
needy turned out to be a misfortune as the farmers lamented that this happened because 
they were not consulted to know the kind of seeds that produce a yield in their 
community. Moreover, they had no choice than to accept the support given their 
precarious living condition. The incidents of mismatch of needs and available assistance 
in post-conflict context may also relate to the involvement of humanitarian groups 
during conflict or early post-conflict periods as is the case in Buni Yadi.  
Furthermore, mismatch of needs and available support may occur in a condition which 
favours non-inclusion, or a selective inclusion of participants in the process of analysing 
the local needs of conflict victims. According to Shilue and Fagen (2014), the inherent 
short-term nature of humanitarian assistance in Liberia could not provide the necessary 
long-term livelihoods support for displaced returnees and coupled with the government 
non-inclusive policy undermine the identification of the specific needs of certain 
displaced returnees. The condition results in a situation where the displaced are socially 
and economically isolated upon return to the community. However, although a case of 
general exclusion by the government is examined in Buni Yadi, there are few cases 
where conflict migrants have expressed concern over the possible bias in terms of their 
access to supports. The most probable explanation for the variation between these cases 
may relate to the nature of the conflict and the pattern of the displacement.  
The example of selective isolation in Liberian, for instance, occurs in a context where 
the conflict was between combatants of the warring factions within the same 
community leading to the displacement of a section of the community. The case is 
different regarding the Buni Yadi context, although some members of the population 
actively participated (as insurgent foot soldiers) in the conflict (section 8.1.1). The 
insurgents primarily attack the town leading to the displacement of the entire residence, 
and the return occurred about the same times. However, some strained social relations 
which may be considered as isolation occur at the beginning of the return, and the fear 
and lack of trust have continued to diminish with time. The lack of confidence and trust 
was primarily towards the returnees whose whereabout during displacement was 
unknown to many residents (section 8.4.2). In general, there is a limited concern 
regarding isolation, but non-inclusiveness which has caused resentment is widespread. 
The residents note, for instance, that the unilateral adoption of selection criteria for 
housing support programme by the Red Cross undermine the need to identify and 
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prioritise housing support and this is already causing a new dimension of social 
insecurity as some residents exhibit resentment against one another (section 8.2.3). 
Moreover, the non-inclusive process for post-conflict support programmes is generating 
dissatisfaction leading to resentment toward the government, which is allegedly not 
doing enough or undertake programmes without consulting the target beneficiaries. The 
Federal Government, for example, has announced plans to commence reconstruction of 
the conflict-ravaged North-east region of the country; the residents have nonetheless, 
express the imminent failure of the programme given the gross lack of residents’ 
participation in the planning process. It was almost universal in the case study that the 
residents are not aware of the government programmes (section 8.5.1), thereby 
confirming a top-down-only process of intervention. The top-down nature of the 
processes and decisions on issues that have direct implications on lives of conflict 
victims often result in programmes failure as seen in many post-conflict cases (Solomon 
and Ginnifer 2008; Shilue and Fagen 2014; Sserwanga et al. 2014). Residents expressed 
dissatisfaction over the inability of stakeholders to address or design a long-term plan 
on pressing concerns and their vulnerability implications regarding lack of education, 
vocational skills, and economic prosperity. Instead, food aid and other short-term 
programmes are prioritised. Furthermore, this kind of resentment, often towards 
government and elites, in the community appears to be a vital security threat given that 
it may relate a lot to the mind-set (Bangura 2016). As noted in the empirical chapters, 
the selective destruction in Buni Yadi which is the outcome of resentment may be 
understood as the effect of frustration due to government failure to meet people’s need 
and the negative perception about the elite due to significant inequality.    
While the sustainable livelihood framework recognises that the level of vulnerability 
determines the ability of people to access their resources (Rakodi 2014), the 
classification of conflict as short-term shock may be misleading. This consideration is 
not consistent with the reality in many conflicts and post-conflict scenarios which have 
lasted a decade or more while the post-conflict vulnerabilities that come with them last 
longer (Branch 2013; Stewart 2016; Tollefsen 2017). Perhaps this explains why short-
term post-conflict programmes in which needs-supports mismatch is prominent in the 
interventions of organisations (e.g. World Bank, Oxfam, and UN) that are pro-
livelihoods framework (May et al. 2009; UNDP 2017). This seeming limitation of the 
livelihoods framework regarding the conflict and post-conflict shocks and vulnerability 
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tends to encourage prioritising short-term measures in vulnerability contexts such as 
post-conflict where long-term intervention may be more appropriate. Post-conflict 
analysis and responses need to address both short and long-term concerns of the conflict 
victims. Short-term programmes and interventions potentially trap post-conflict 
communities and conflict victims into a poverty cycle as confirmed in this investigation 
and previous studies (e.g. Collier 2007). Sserwanga et al. (2014), narrate the post-
conflict experience in Gulu community, Uganda, where post-conflict impoverishment 
and the hand out from aid organisations creates an unending dependency thereby 
undermine the ability of the people to survive without external support. A similar 
scenario is examined in Buni Yadi regarding women and youths, in particular, who have 
stressed the need to be supported with relevant and sustainable vocation and 
entrepreneurial skills alongside supporting infrastructure to start up new lives instead of 
the food and non-food aid that characterised the existing support programmes.  
9.1.4 Interlinkages in Post-conflict Livelihoods Challenges: Highlighting the 
Significance of Infrastructure 
Post-conflict communities face a plethora of challenges in an attempt to access and use 
locally available resources after conflict. These challenges occur as the communities 
and stakeholders strive to restore peace and revive livelihoods amidst the complexity of 
the changes and the intricate interrelatedness of the different components. The 
livelihoods framework, however, advocates adequate analysis and understanding of 
those interrelations in livelihood features to determine the appropriate strategy for 
interventions as a panacea to resolving identified challenges holistically (DFID 2000). 
This feature is perhaps one of the significant strengths of the sustainable livelihoods 
approach given the benefits of the analysis of the mutually reinforcing tendencies of the 
components of the framework. For instance, Ali (2014) identifies that infrastructure 
(physical capital) has direct linkage with human capital, environmental protection and 
income sustainability. Nonetheless, large scale violent conflict such as the one in Buni 
Yadi distorts the physical, economic and social fabric of affected communities.  
Economic recovery often tops priorities in post-conflict interventions as essential 
aspects of peacebuilding. This strategy takes precedence from the understanding and 
recognition of the critical role of financial well-being and its multidimensional impacts 
on other aspects of livelihoods (Amirthalingam and Lakshman 2010). It is crucial, 
however, for the recovery programme to critically analyse the changes in economic 
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conditions of conflict victims to develop strategies for a robust post-conflict 
development that is inclusive to reduce vulnerabilities thereby minimise the risk of 
conflict relapse (Walter 2004; Collier 2007; Subedi 2012). This consideration is 
particularly crucial for the context in which the conflict predicates on precarious 
livelihoods due to pervasive deprivations and poverty. In Buni Yadi, however, the high 
rate of multidimensional poverty and poor education are widespread. While rebuilding 
economic prosperity is widely regarded as one of the viable strategies for post-conflict 
recovery, the role of infrastructure in achieving this cannot be overemphasised given the 
strong link between access to infrastructure and economic and other social capitals (Ali 
2014).  
Achieving post-conflict recovery, to a large extent, depends on the availability, 
accessibility and adequacy of the infrastructure to achieve immediate and short-term as 
well as long-term economic and social resilience. According to Subedi (2012), 
reconstruction of infrastructures and their accessibility must be prioritised to promote 
economic well-being and provide social services in post-conflict contexts. In his report, 
Subedi underlines that lack of adequate infrastructure truncates the desired economic 
recovery in the post-conflict Nepal where inadequate power supply, bad roads, poor 
telecommunications and lack of irrigation facilities increase the rate and severity of 
poverty of the agrarian communities. In Buni Yadi, the adverse implication of the dire 
state of infrastructures is apparent, given the declined income and increased poverty 
conditions. The deplorable conditions of roads, for instance, have had negative 
implications on food production and income as described in the previous sections. The 
residents narrated how the lack of power supply has forced increased use of fuels such 
as petrol, diesel, kerosene, and firewood for domestic and commercial purposes despite 
the economic burden and the environmental consequences. The hike in prices of these 
commodities increases the cost of living as well as production and market prices of 
goods and services, and consequently pushes the already impoverished residents into 
poverty further. However, poverty is not only an obstacle to accessing immediate 
human needs but truncates the ability to access services that have long-term social and 
economic impacts on post-conflict communities (Branch 2012; Buhaug et al. 2011; 
Tollefsen 2017). Typically, lack of access to education, water, healthcare, farming 
facilities and so forth characterises post-conflict Buni Yadi, and they have a long-term 
negative implication on the quality of human capital.   
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In an agrarian context such as Buni Yadi, infrastructure like farming facilities and 
implements are frequent targets for destruction in conflicts. This condition, coupled 
with other post-conflict challenges (including poverty) makes it difficult for farmers to 
return to farming. In Buni Yadi, apart from limited access to most of the productive 
farmlands, destruction of farm facilities and equipment affect agriculture. Food 
production and productivity have significantly reduced as farmers could not afford farm 
machinery and equipment such as tractors, plough, and other irrigation facilities. Lack 
of access to loan facilities to buy or rent equipment further compound the challenge as 
banks no longer render services in the case study following the conflict and the ensued 
destructions. The inadequate infrastructure not only undermines the economic wellbeing 
of individuals but truncates access to other social needs – e.g. healthcare and education, 
of the residents given the increasing poverty that it creates. This scenario is a 
confirmation of Justino (2011) and Ali (2014) consideration that infrastructure 
deficiency has a direct negative implication on human capital accumulation, especially 
in a post-conflict context.  
The revitalisation of pre-conflict economic opportunities and creating new ones is 
essential to the process of post-conflict recovery and development to reduce socio-
economic deprivation and engender inclusive economic development (Subedi 2012). 
Achieving this feat require not only start-up capital but the appropriate infrastructure 
that would support and hasten the realisation of set targets. Although the initial design 
of the livelihoods approach targets poverty reduction in poor rural communities, its 
applicability has extended to urban poverty analysis (DFID 2000). With regards to 
infrastructures, the extension of the livelihoods approach to urban context may relate to 
the traditional notion that infrastructure provision and the significance that is attached to 
it vary, depending on the context – rural or urban. As noted by Ali (2014), for instance, 
farming infrastructure such as irrigation facilities, roads and drainage are some of the 
priorities for rural agrarian communities while the provision of adequate housing, 
sanitation, waste management and other high-tech facilities form the demand in the 
urban setting. This notion may serve as a good starting point for understanding different 
needs of different contexts it, however, undermines the consideration for the role of 
innovations, particularly those in information and communication technology, regarding 
changes in infrastructural needs for different settings. The growing application of 
innovative technology in resolving perennial rural agricultural challenges may be an 
affirmation of the closing gap, for example, between the demand for technological 
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infrastructure in the rural and urban setting and poverty alleviation in the rural agrarian 
communities. A 2014 World Bank report, for example, shows the positive contribution 
of the information and communication technology (ICT) revolution for poverty 
reduction in post-conflict Afghanistan, Rwanda, Tunisia, and Timor-Leste (Kelly and 
Souter 2014).  
In Afghanistan, for instance, the post-conflict development and sophistication in the 
telephony and internet services correlate positively to some poverty reduction, 
especially in the countryside. Increase access to information, financial services as well 
as identification of new market has been reported to have a positive impact on the 
economy. In particular, the deliberate installation of telecommunication terminals at the 
villages improves the economy of rural communities by increasing access to services 
such as money transfer and agricultural market prices using mobile internet and devices. 
Similarly, Rwanda is taking advantage of the benefits of the global ICT revolution as 
one of its post-conflict recovery strategies embedded in the country’s strategic plan 
which places significant emphasis on the growth of ICT as a driver for post-conflict 
socio-economic recovery and development. The National Information and 
Communication Infrastructure plan have aided progress in the transformation of the 
most traditional subsistence agrarian economy into a knowledge-based. Tunisia and 
Timor-Leste are other positive cases where ICT is identified to have made positive 
impacts or at least has aided the identification of potentials that are important for rural 
post-conflict infrastructure and economy (Kelly and Souter 2014). 
Nonetheless, the revolution in ICT not only improves access to services by rural 
communities but provides means of income to individuals and households. The growth 
in ICT may be another point for the critique of the livelihoods approach regarding the 
responsibility for the provision of infrastructure and the beneficiaries in the face of the 
blurring distinction between the contextual needs of infrastructure for different contexts. 
While the livelihoods approach prioritises the provision of infrastructure for improving 
livelihoods, the framework has tended to represent infrastructure (e.g. education, 
healthcare, water, and telecommunication) provision as predominantly public and 
formal sector investment (Ali 2002). This view is capable of undermining the extent of 
the usefulness of infrastructure, thereby limiting it to improving social benefits, while 
infrastructure has been a direct source of income in many contexts – stable or post-
conflict. Before the conflict in Buni Yadi, for example, provision of water, education, 
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transportation and telecommunication services provided income for individuals or 
groups (often as informal services) as a response to government inability to provide 
those services. This effort enabled public access to those services as well as provides 
income to the individuals or groups service providers. Similarly, mobile 
telecommunication employed youths who engage in buying and selling of top-up 
vouchers, commercial mobile phone charging for a fee and buying and selling of mobile 
phones and accessories. The availability of these services aided businesses through the 
use of mobile phones for voice calls and other services (e.g. texting, WhatsApp, 
Facebook) to order and purchase goods and services and market prices inquiries. The 
services aided the transmission of information about available agricultural produce in 
the community as well as reduced cost of doing business which reflected on the market 
prices of goods and services before the conflict compared to current experiences. 
According to Kelly and Souter (2014), the deliberate policy that encourages the private 
sector-led provision of telecommunications services aids the post-conflict recovery 
successes recorded in Rwanda and Timor-Leste. Private and especially the informal 
sector provision of infrastructure is an indication that individuals or groups can both be 
infrastructure providers as well as the consumers. This notion, however, seems to be 
contrary to the consideration of the livelihoods approach on the provision of 
infrastructure. Holding on to this may create a condition of ‘communal poverty’ when 
the government is unable to fulfil its obligation on infrastructure provision, and the 
individual or groups are not empowered to be viable alternative providers. The 
impoverished condition of Buni Yadi residents is a classic testimony of this tendensy. 
Individual efforts augmented the government inability to meet the infrastructure needs 
of the residents before the conflict. The post-conflict poverty after return can be 
attributed to the residents’ failure to perform the complementary function of the 
infrastructure provider. This condition led to the widespread impoverishment as they 
could neither access income supporting infrastructure nor make income from providing 
it themselves. It is crucial, therefore, to fully incorporate the more comprehensive 
understanding of infrastructure into the livelihoods framework. The consideration for 
infrastructure improvement should comprehensively capture the need to protect human 
well-being, environment as well as provides income through employment. This would 
go a long way in reducing post-conflict vulnerability, thereby improve resilience which 




Conclusion and Recommendations: Livelihoods Change and the Risk of Conflict 
Recurrence  
While Buni Yadi has made a transition from being a conflict to a post-conflict 
community, the sustainability of this progress leading to stability and growth depends in 
no small extent on achieving increased resilience by overcoming post-conflict 
livelihoods changes and the ensuing vulnerabilities. This study has examined the 
conflict-induced livelihoods changes and analysed the resultant increased susceptibility 
due to multi-dimensional poverty and deprivations. The analyses of the empirical 
outcomes of this research provide a definitive response to the primary and sub-research 
questions for this investigation: 
To what extent is post-conflict livelihoods change a potential contributor to conflict 
recurrence and a threat to human security?     
 What is the nature of livelihoods change in a post-conflict transition non-camp
context?
 What is the implication of the post-conflict livelihoods changes on conflict
recurrence?
In response to the first sub-research question, this investigation identified the 
significance of precarious living conditions of the residents in Buni Yadi as a 
vulnerability condition that was exploited to foment the conflict. The conflict was 
brought to an end through state-led military victory and the eventual return of the 
community which had been displaced previously by the insurgency. Upon return, 
however, the precarious conditions of these returnees – historical and migrant residents, 
further deepened in the agrarian settlement. This condition prevails due to the 
destruction of the means of livelihoods of the residents leading to chronic poverty, 
inadequate human resources aided by weak state institutions and inequality and 
marginalisation. While political discourse was deliberately avoided (due to its 
sensitivity in the fragile post-conflict environment) in this study, participants have 
expressed bitterness over what they considered as political neglect given the residents’ 
lack of access to political appointments and the accruing benefits. Despite this concern, 
however, economic and social exclusion appears to be more significant. 
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Stewart (2008, 2016) notes that the effect of marginalisation and inequality regarding 
conflict are reinforcing among the different types – political, economic or social. 
Multilevel marginalisation leading to pervasive inequality and poverty is reported 
regarding the North-east region of Nigeria before the conflict, and the condition has 
continued to deteriorate after the conflict as noted in Buni Yadi. In what is primarily 
regarded (at least among the poor) as systemic marginalisation and structural inequality, 
the ostentatious consumption of the elite and the failure to meet the needs of the masses 
provides grounds for rebellion (UNDP 2018). In Buni Yadi, both micro interpersonal – 
vertical, and regional - horizontal inequalities; poverty and expression of neglect, 
dissatisfaction and abandonment are noted to have existed before the conflict, and this 
feeling is persisting after conflict. This resentment may have been the reflection and 
manifestation of the regional inequality and deprivation, which is captured in the World 
Bank (2016). The World Bank report covering 2003-2013 shows that the region is the 
most unequal and deprived in Nigeria. It is ranked with the highest rate of poverty and 
unemployment and had the lowest rate of income and access to other means of 
livelihoods, such as education and healthcare (UNDP 2018). 
Nevertheless, while the regional inequality remains a significant problem before and 
after the conflict, the sub-regional (state) and local level inequality is perhaps more 
critical. Oxford Poverty Human Development Initiative (OPHDI 2017), for example, 
reports that Yobe State, while being in the most impoverished North-east region had the 
highest rate of multi-dimensional chronic poverty due to inequality and deprivation in 
the area. Adetiloye (2014), with regards to the insurgency, also opines that the ever-
widening disparity between the rich and poor inevitably creates resentment and conflict 
that is social class-related. In Buni Yadi, absolute poverty and persistent inequalities at 
the local level are visible in the social class and elitist domination which deprives the 
majority of the masses access to the means of livelihoods leading to high rate of 
poverty. While mostly regarded as been illegally acquired, the arrogant flaunting of 
wealth (e.g. cars and houses) and ostentatious lifestyle by the elite promotes hatred. The 
decisive expression of the resentment toward the elite has been noted in the pattern of 
conflict destruction in which the houses and other properties of political elites and 
royalty are mainly targeted and destroyed. This frustration may have also influenced the 
disillusion and envy towards successful businessmen and businesswomen who the poor 
and unemployed – particularly youths, view as being accomplices to their predicaments. 
This resentment appears to be unabating in Buni Yadi even after the conflict as residents 
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relate their inability to access post-conflict relief support to the elites’ old practice of 
selective determination of who gets what and at what point. The residents’ expression of 
dissatisfaction and resentment toward the elite regarding the arbitral selection of 
beneficiary of the Red Cross support for post-conflict housing support in the community 
is a typical example. 
Regarding the second sub-research question, the arbitrary determination of access to 
post-conflict livelihoods as suggested by the expressions of Buni Yadi residents is an 
indication of a weak state which is typical of post-conflict environment and has fostered 
conflict recurrence in many contexts such as East Timor and Haiti. The effect of 
institutional weakness is visibly dominant in the post-conflict vulnerabilities of Buni 
Yadi, as seen in various aspects of the livelihoods of the residents. The weak public 
participation practice that characterises most of the government and non-governmental 
activities in the community has increased the sense of marginalisation and alienation. 
The apparent non-presence of government to provide both short-term and long-term 
social services is a suggestion of weakness, which is attracting growing resentment due 
to the feeling of neglect. Many respondents feel that government response would be 
different if their predicament were to happen in another region – mainly oil-producing. 
The residents have expressed worry, for instance, regarding their inability to access 
farmlands after the conflict, thereby hold the feeling that the seeming government 
inaction is because the affected people are from the low social class. 
Furthermore, institutional weakness and failure may be related to inadequate provision 
of social and economic infrastructure, leading to continued deficient human resources 
and widespread poverty before and after conflict. Like a typical post-conflict 
environment (Brown et al. 2011), Buni Yadi exhibits weak human resource with a 
population that has low-level education, poor health condition and psychological trauma 
and lack of technocrats. The poor state of, for example, schools, healthcare facilities, 
water and electricity, is exacerbating the situation, thereby constraining possible 
improvement. This condition points to a lack of government spending on the social and 
basic needs of the citizens when it is needed the most. The consequence of this 
continued low human capital is a perpetual susceptibility to poverty and further 
inequality, which may create a population that is an easy target for insurgents’ 
recruitment. Moreover, the Quranic education that is prevalent in the community and 
the region is not mainstreamed into the modern education system, thereby further 
truncate the chance of capacity development for the residents to improve access to 
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livelihoods opportunities. The health sector is not any different as access to healthcare is 
truncated by many factors including lack of health infrastructures, staff and insurance. 
Poor governance characterised with highly personalised and corrupt practices have 
truncated the development of economic and social infrastructure such as roads, 
electricity, telecommunication and farming and irrigation facilities. The combined 
effects of these are noticeable in the growing poverty and reduced resilience, which may 
be overstretched to increase vulnerabilities in the community. 
Similarly, failure of government at all levels to meet the economic and socio-political 
needs of people in Buni Yadi and beyond is manifest in the sense of disaffection 
towards the government. However, conflict and its possible recurrence in Buni Yadi are 
indirectly intertwined. Poor governance, combined with weak institutions that 
encourage endemic corruption and misuse of the public resource by public office 
holders creates precarious livelihoods for a large proportion of the population (UNDP 
2018). The indirect relations of conflict in Buni Yadi may be related to the government 
inability to deliver on the provision of public goods and services such as education, 
health, equal economic opportunities and development, peace and justice thereby 
creating grievances. The grievance and the ensuing vulnerabilities are then exploited to 
justify the recruitment and conflict by the insurgent groups who profiteer from it 
(UNDP 2004; 2018). It is, therefore, crucial to address these challenges, relating to the 
pre-conflict and post-conflict livelihoods changes to prevent conflict recurrent in Buni 
Yadi and beyond. This is necessary given the seeming difficulty in achieving post-
conflict economic prosperity in an environment where livelihoods are devastated amidst 
weak institution, without deliberate and decisive actions.  
The combined responses to the sub-research questions above suffice to answer the main 
research question for this investigation. The effects and the consequences of the post-
conflict conditions imply that livelihoods changes in no small measure may be 
instrumental in conflict recurrence given the deteriorating resilience and weak post-
conflict living conditions which expose individuals to human security threats. The 
study, therefore, concludes that the prevailing livelihoods pose significant threats which 
undermine human security. If not addressed adequately, the consequent grievance and 
frustration may be exploited by insurgents to stir conflict recurrence. This conclusion 
hinges not only on the theoretical underpinning of this study and the apparent post-
conflict deterioration of living conditions of residents in the case study but the traits 
which are the conditions that have formed the precipitating or supporting factors for 
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conflict recurrence in other post-conflict contexts. While being mindful of the 
contextual peculiarities of conflicts, the consideration draws on similar post-conflict 
experiences and conditions from settings such as East Timor, Haiti and Afghanistan. 
Some of the features which Buni Yadi shares with these post-conflict contexts include 
state-led military victory to achieving the end of hostility in a mostly agrarian setting, 
inadequate human resources, weak state institutions, chronic poverty and inequality and 
marginalisation (Simonsen 2006; United Nations Special Commision of Inquiry for East 
Timor 2006; Dupuy 2009; Call 2012). 
10.1 Recommendations: Way Forward to Prevent Conflict Recurrence 
It is often contended that every conflict is unique regarding the actors, dynamics and 
nature. The interplay of these features has significant implication on the conflict 
outcomes and post-conflict peculiarity which must be adequately analysed to propose 
recommendations to resolve challenges that are specific to a setting (Brown et al. 2011).  
While acknowledging the existence of other pertinent conditions, it has been contended 
from the outset of this study that precarious living condition is a significant conflict 
factor and that further deterioration of the livelihoods after the conflict has the potential 
of causing conflict recurrence. The analysis of the post-conflict livelihood change in the 
case study supports this argument hence the following recommendations which may be 
useful pointer toward resolving the identified challenges (See Figure 10.1) 
 Addressing Development and Livelihoods Change Challenges 
The conflict in the case study of this research is conceptually and empirically the 
consequences of underdevelopment – physical and human, in which poor 
standards of living create vulnerabilities for rebellion. These precarious 
livelihoods have further plummeted as a result of the conflict-induced 
challenges, hence, require specific policy toward sustainable recovery and 
development. Given this scenario, a good starting point may be to adequately 
analyse the development (livelihoods) challenges that may have played a role in 
causing the conflict and the changes that have occurred after conflict. Upon 
analysis and identification of relevant problems, prioritisation of policies and 
actions into short-term, medium-term and long-term is crucial. This process is 
necessary so that critical stakeholders – e.g. government and development 
partners, categorise problems base on the degree of urgency with which they are 
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to be resolved. While requiring collaborative efforts of the government (Federal, 
state and local), non-governmental, civil society and private organisations, 
analysis and prioritisation of the problems ensure that aspirations of 
beneficiaries are captured (UNDP 2018). Although it is arguable, that post-
conflict stability in Buni Yadi has (or should have) passed the stage of reliance 
on humanitarian support, life-threatening conditions still exist. Apparent hunger, 
poor health and lack of water and sanitation, for instance, require urgent 
attention to ameliorate the suffering of the poorest and most vulnerable – women 
and children.  
Figure 10.1: Proposed Framework for Post-conflict Intervention 
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The high rate of poor education and poor quality of health, leading to weak 
human resources are the consequences of the dire state of development in those 
sectors before and after conflict. Policies which are specific to improving the 
human resource capacity in the case study are therefore crucial. For instance, 
specific medium-term and long-term programmes to improving access to 
education and provide incentives for increasing school enrolment, teachers 
training and retraining, adult education, and so forth should be put in place. A 
specific policy should be targeted at encouraging children of school-going age 
who are scared of going back to school following the trauma from conflict 
experiences.  
Similarly, mainstreaming the Quranic education into the general education 
curricular and system would improve access to education and literacy for the 
poorest. It is critically essential to devise a strategy for taking care of the 
children that have been orphaned by the conflict to prevent them from becoming 
the potential future recruit of the insurgents due to neglect. Similarly, effort must 
be focussed on healthcare to support the training of local health workers as 
encouragement and provide incentives to those who may have fled due to 
conflict (Brown et al. 2011). A local health insurance scheme, education trust 
and similar programmes for other social services would improve access to 
healthcare, education and other social services. While designing these 
programmes, particular attention should be paid to the peculiar challenges of all 
categories of people and the most vulnerable such as women, children, aged, 
disabled and youths. 
The post-conflict health policies should be particular about the common conflict 
health challenges such as physical injuries, infectious diseases (e.g. HIV and 
TB), disabilities, malnutrition, trauma and hypertension (Pedersen 2002; Guha‐
Sapir and van Panhuis 2004; Degomme and Guha-Sapir 2010). Most 
importantly, however, is the need to prioritise spending on infrastructure to 
support the social and economic needs of the residents as a strategy to increase 
job creation and improve the level of income and general wellbeing. While 
acknowledging the difficulties regarding attracting private investment in a post-
conflict context (Matovu and Stewart 2001; Ra and Singh 2005), deliberate 
incremental (at all stages) government spending or incentivising private sector 
and foreign direct investment in infrastructure is crucial. Medium-term and long-
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term investment in the reconstruction of, for instance, roads, 
telecommunications, education, healthcare, water supply and electricity would 
improve human resource capacities, increase employment opportunity, improve 
income and reduce poverty in Buni Yadi. Skill acquisition programmes for the 
largely uneducated youths and women would improve the artisanal skill labour 
in the community, thereby increasing employment opportunities, increase 
income and reduce poverty. These artisanal skills would also help in quickening 
the post-conflict recovery when the residents can provide services that improve 
the economy of their community (Brown et al. 2011; UNDP 2018).  
 Poverty Reduction and Alleviation  
Chronic poverty is significantly rooted in the North-east - Buni Yadi, conflict 
and could potentially cause another round of conflict. As noted, the 
vulnerabilities created exposed the youths, in particular, to the scheming of the 
insurgents who use the precarious living conditions to justify their recruitment 
and the necessity of the conflict. Policies must, therefore, urgently target poverty 
reduction as a deliberate strategy to reducing the ensuing vulnerabilities.  
Given the mostly informal economy in Buni Yadi, policies that focus on 
agriculture and agro-related businesses and entrepreneur would be most 
effective. This consideration draws from Brown et al. (2011), who note that 
agriculture-related interventions make recovery easier and faster in low-income 
post-conflict settings with a large informal sector. This consideration also 
supports the importance of targeting the majority of the residents through 
agriculture which Buni Yadi has a comparative advantage. The first step and a 
short-term policy toward achieving this target should ensure improved access to 
farmlands by rebuilding the roads that lead to farms and the ones that are 
causing damage to the farmlands. Demining any possible mined area and 
improving personal safety should also be prioritised to eliminate the fear and 
boost confidence for accessing farmlands. Similarly, residents should be 
supported with appropriate farm inputs and facilities such as seeds, fertilisers, 
tractors, irrigation facilities, livestock, and so forth. Supports for businesses – 
especially the small scale, is essential at this stage to enable them to restart their 
businesses. Non-interest loan programmes such as the Federal Government’s 
‘TraderMoni’ which is ongoing in other parts of the country may be adopted to 
improve access to loan and encourage small-scale entrepreneurs. 
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Medium-term to long-term policies may focus, mainly, on youth training and 
empowerment in agricultural skills and services such as extension work, agro-
businesses, and agro-processing as well as modern applications of technologies 
in farming and agro-related businesses. Policies should also target supporting 
and encouraging farmers associations and networks to revive the pre-conflict 
unions and create new ones. This process may be achieved, as it has been done 
in Sierra Leon (Maconachie et al. 2012), for instance, by institutionalising the 
‘Gidauniya’ system of reciprocal farming labour for different groups in the 
community. Institutionalising social intervention (such as monthly stipends) to 
support unemployed would go a long way in reducing poverty and increase 
sense of belonging. The policy can potentially reduce susceptibility to being 
recruited into insurgents groups. It is also crucial to pay particular attention to 
the resilience of youths and women groups and their associations in the 
community. Exploring the positives of this resilience would help to sustain and 
harness their potentials and further improve the accruing benefit as a poverty 
alleviation strategy.  Particular attention must be paid to the poverty reduction of 
vulnerable groups, especially women and youths. Programmes should be 
designed to provide women and youths with artisanal and entrepreneurial skills 
that are relevant to their social and economic aspiration in relation to the 
economic opportunities in the community.     
However, achieving poverty alleviation depends significantly on the provision 
and accessibility to supporting infrastructure for agriculture and agro-related 
activities and as well creates employment in other sectors. Electricity, 
telecommunications and transportation, for example, would crucially support 
agriculture and can employ many people in a short period and long-term. 
However, infrastructure policy should be designed in such a way that it supports 
both the social and economic wellbeing of the beneficiaries. In the design of 
policy for improved access to information, for example, investment in the 
telecommunications must be targeted at social benefits as well as employment to 
individuals or households, e.g. as top-up voucher vendors. 
 Improvement of Personal Safety 
While physical attacks and other hostility have generally ceased in Buni Yadi, 
the sense of fear regarding personal safety is critical livelihoods problem. This 
condition reflects Annan (2005) consideration that absence of physical hostility 
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is not a guarantee of security. In other words, achieving peace requires securing 
both physical and emotional condition that guarantee access to means of 
livelihoods without fear (UNDP 2018). It is instructive to note, however, that the 
pace and degree of the effectiveness of post-conflict intervention or recovery 
(economic and social) depend significantly on the current safety concerns 
(Brown et al. 2011). These concerns may be attributable to a large extent, to the 
ongoing deficiency or absence of services such as banking, education, healthcare 
and market in the community.  This problem relates mainly to the destructions 
of the infrastructures, which truncate the activities, and inadequate human 
resource, most of whom may have fled as a result of trauma and fear of being 
targeted. Similarly, this trauma, as well as the concern of possible land mines, 
create a general sense of lack of personal safety thereby prevents farmers from 
accessing farmlands for agriculture and merchants who come to Buni Yadi to 
buy farm produce.  
It is apparent, therefore that there is the need to intensify effort toward ensuring 
that sources of these fears are eliminated. Priority should be on having 
adequately equipped security personnel, modern surveillance facilities, as well 
as routine surveillance of the community and its environs. Experts should be 
engaged to critically conduct post-conflict safety environmental survey, to 
identify possible mined areas, thereby demining them. Secured and effective 
means of communication and improved civil-military (or police) relation should 
be promoted to encourage residents to have confidence in the security personnel 
and to report unusual activities. Active local or community policing (such as 
community watch) may be a useful boost for personal safety as well as bridging 
the gap between the security forces and the civil society. There should also be 
regular update on the safety conditions, sensitisation and security tips to the 
residents by the security personnel as an approach to increasing confidence. The 
improvement in the security situation should also be promoted to encourage 
investment, businesses and the return of resourceful members of the community. 
Furthermore, a fair law institution must be available to ensure speedy 
dispensation of justice to forestall the tendency of increase poverty-related 





 Institutional Capacity Development and Inequality Reduction 
Poor governance, which manifests in weak public institutions and leading to 
persistent social and economic inequality, has played a significant role in stirring 
the insurgency and conflict. As noted, the disparity is multi-layered, identified in 
the regional, sub-regional and local levels. In Buni Yadi, horizontal inequality 
manifests in the social divisions – elite domination, and discriminatory access to 
social and economic opportunities. The effect of the horizontal disparity creates 
the vertical imbalance in which only people who have access to the elite can 
access opportunities, thereby creating impoverished majority who are 
susceptible to the influence of the few. The post-conflict policy should, 
therefore, address this challenge to prevent conflict recurrence. Strengthening 
the democratic institutions is an essential starting point toward ensuring 
equitable access to post-conflict resources (e.g. farmland) and opportunities (e.g. 
jobs). The policies should target reducing and discouraging individualised 
institutions and enforce the rule of law.   
However, while inequality is real, the feeling may have also been exacerbated by 
subjective perception (Bangura 2016) due to chronic poverty. Resolving the real 
and perceived challenge of inequality would depend in no small extent on the 
degree of the accruable benefits of good governance practices. Deliberate 
policies that target political, economic and social inclusive governance in a 
democratic environment would significantly reduce the chance of conflict 
recurrence (Walter 2004; Brown et al. 2011). Public participation which 
encourages adequate dialogue to allow residents to have voices on matters that 
concern their welfare should be institutionalised to promote inclusion and sense 
of belonging. To entrench good governance and discourage individualistic 
practices, policies must target locally possible institutionalisation of mechanisms 
for equitable access to social and economic opportunities. Similarly, the post-
conflict strategy must institutionalise a just and the equitable rule of law to 
enforce impartiality on matters relating to human rights. 
Furthermore, post-conflict policies must target sustainability by 
institutionalising effective and efficient processes that are result oriented based 
on the local needs and within the available resources. To achieve good 
governance, however, transparency and accountability are central to undertaking 
all activities at all levels. This is to ensure that relevant information is available 
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and accessible by the public, thereby ensure monitoring and probity of all 
stakeholders. 
10.2  Contribution to Knowledge 
This study primarily contends that post-conflict livelihoods change is an essential 
precursor for conflict recurrence, particularly in a non-camp setting; hence, the aim: 
To adapt then use the sustainable livelihoods framework for improved 
understanding and theorising of the nature of livelihoods changes and their 
implication on post-conflict human security and conflict recurrence in a non-camp 
context. 
The investigation contributes to the knowledge regarding security and conflict and 
specifically post-conflict recurrence in ways that it affirms existing ones, extend some 
and critique others. These contributions are theoretical, methodological and empirical, 
thereby presents a useful analytical framework for academics and policy decision-
making tool for intervention in a post-conflict setting. The thesis contributes to existing 
knowledge in the following core areas. 
The concept of human security stressed the need for balanced attention to all threats 
(military and non-military) to human wellbeing as a preventive strategy against conflict 
(CHS 2003). Despite the wide acceptance of this concept, lopsided deployment of the 
military has persisted even in contexts whose problems are caused by non-military 
challenges (Yoon 2005). This study confirms the unsustainable and devastating role of 
the military as a sole conflict and post-conflict intervention strategy. The thesis notes 
that while insecurity in the North-east relates primarily to precarious livelihoods and 
chronic deprivations, interventions have relied more on military solutions. The military 
handedness and gross abuses of human rights further compound the existing grievance 
leading to escalation of the conflict which continued for an extended period. However, a 
large scale violent conflict is often followed by its renewal with more devastating 
consequences than the previous one (Collier 2007). This concern influenced the analysis 
of conflict and post-conflict motivations to adapt and articulate a framework that is 
consistent with the conflict dynamics in the case study of this research. 
The thesis addresses the critical theoretical construct for analysing motivations that 
foster conflict or its recurrence. The resource curse concept advances that the presence, 
over-reliance and unbalanced utilisation of natural (e.g. oil and diamond) play a 
191 
 
significant role in the adverse consequence of poor living conditions which cause 
grievance leading to conflict (Ross 2003; Bannon and Collier 2003). It is argued in this 
study that the relevance of such a concept depends on context dynamics as to whether or 
not natural resource utilisation is the primary source of grievance. In a non-resource 
conflict context, however, the conflict has been theorised as being about economic gains 
or socio-political agenda in the greed and grievance thesis (Grossman 1991; 1999; 
Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Collier et al. 2009). In contrast, the recurrence of conflict is 
argued on the one hand as the function of the degree to which the previous conflict is 
resolved (Quinn et al. 2007; Kreutz 2010), and on the other hand on the effect of post-
conflict living conditions (Walter 2004). This study contends that while these 
considerations are valid; conflict recurrence is conceptually possible in a context in 
which pre-conflict greed-grievance exploits dominate the previous conflict regarding 
how it ended as well as the post-conflict livelihoods conditions. Given the scenario, the 
thesis posits that livelihoods conditions are a critical determinant of conflict recurrence; 
hence, the adoption of the livelihoods approach. 
The sustainable livelihoods approach is primarily designed as an analytical tool for 
evaluating individual and household wellbeing as a strategy to address poverty. The 
concept is developed to provoke appropriate thinking on lifting people out of precarious 
living, which is primarily the source of vulnerability. The flexibility of the concept 
allows for its utility to extend beyond the initial stable rural context it was designed for, 
to the urban (stable) and unstable (post-conflict) settings. However, the existing studies 
on the post-conflict application of livelihoods concept focus primarily on the direct 
impact of conflict destructions in a camp context. In line with Justino (2009; 2012), 
research on post-conflict intervention is insufficient, and this thesis contends that 
studies which investigate specific post-conflict livelihoods changes as a relevant 
precursor for conflict recurrence in a non-camp context are limited. This advancement is 
a significant theoretical contribution which provokes critical analytical depth and 
empirical ramifications to understand post-conflict livelihoods development better.  
This thesis employed a case study design using a mixed-methods approach to data 
gathering and processing. While this approach may not be new entirely, the contribution 
relates to the variation in a specific manner, its application is made for post-conflict 
livelihoods study in a non-camp context. Post-conflict livelihoods studies have either 
adopt the qualitative approach as a stand-alone method or combined in a mixture with 
the quantitative method. The quantitative aspect predominantly employed the 
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questionnaire for the individual respondent representative of a family or household. 
However, this thesis contends that individual questionnaire is inadequate as it tends to 
leave out a vital part of the household livelihoods condition for other members of the 
families who may be contributors to the family economy. A household questionnaire, in 
contrast, is employed to avoid this tendency. Similarly, the individual interview is 
commonly used in the qualitative method in post-conflict studies. By contrast, this 
research combined individual interviews with focus group discussions to leverage on 
the advantage this combination may achieve as against the individual interview alone. 
Furthermore, categorising the respondent into homogeneous groups for discussions 
provided the opportunity of understanding the peculiar experiences and challenges of 
the various groups. Additional physical observation method used in this study provides 
further corroborative evidence, patterns and empirical outcome that could not be 
identified with either interview or questionnaire. 
There are primarily four themes that emerge from the empirical findings for this 
research. These include reduced or lack of access to land resources (farmlands), 
declined resilience, mismatch of needs and post-conflict supports and the deficiency of 
infrastructure, which has an adverse implication on other aspects of livelihoods. While 
these findings may not be entirely peculiar to the case study, the contextual variations of 
the causes of these problems are unique. The uniqueness of the empirical findings 
contributes to the current understanding regarding more possible causes of post-conflict 
challenges. For example, existing literature regarding the reduction or lack of access to 
farmland is associated with problems which relate to physical, administrative or legal 
restriction and challenges in post-conflict settings such as Northern Uganda, Timor-
Leste and Sierra Leone. In Buni Yadi, however, this lack of access emanates mostly 
from the psychological trauma from the conflict experiences, and the adverse impact of 
failed road infrastructure. The findings also bring to the fore the peculiar post-conflict 
experience in Buni Yadi (non-camp) and its variation from the causes of lack of access 
to land compared to the camp contexts.  
Similarly, the empirical contribution of this study exposes certain limitations of the 
livelihoods framework. For example, the framework posits natural assets - from a 
market economy perspective, as being a primary basis for income provision. Given this 
notion, the livelihoods framework considers natural assets as that ‘marketable’ product 
that has the ultimate value for providing income (Sarkar and Sinha 2015). This view 
may pose challenges to the utility of the livelihoods approach, especially in a post-
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conflict context like Buni Yadi, where non-market factors that are external to the land 
prevent the residents from using it. This argument suffices to mean that productivity of 
the natural assets (farmland in this case) may be determined by a combination of its 
availability, accessibility and other dynamics - such fear and trauma, which may be 
external to it. Furthermore, the livelihoods framework tends to classify conflict as a 
short-term shock. This consideration may be misleading as it is not consistent with the 
reality in many conflicts and post-conflict scenarios (including Buni Yadi) which have 
lasted a decade or more while the post-conflict vulnerabilities that come with them last 
longer (Branch 2013; Stewart 2016; Tollefsen 2017). This seeming limitation of the 
livelihoods framework regarding the conflict and post-conflict shocks and vulnerability 
tends to encourage prioritising short-term measures in vulnerability contexts such as 
post-conflict where long-term intervention may be more appropriate. Moreover, short-
term programmes and interventions potentially trap post-conflict communities and 
conflict victims into a poverty cycle as confirmed in this investigation and previous 
studies (Collier 2007).  
It was unclear from existing literature if the post-conflict vulnerabilities are the same for 
camp and non-comp settings. However, this study found that post-conflict livelihoods 
challenges are similar for camp and non-camp contexts in that the livelihoods 
experiences in the non-camp are mostly the extension of the camp conditions. However, 
while the livelihoods vulnerabilities in the camp contexts relate to legal, administrative, 
movement and economic restrictions, the existence of these challenges for the non-camp 
setting are insignificant. Additionally, the outcomes of the empirical investigation of 
this research suggest heterogeneity in the livelihoods changes. Although they are mainly 
negative, evidence of positive resilience for the youths and women groups was 
observed. This outcome challenges the framework which tends to consider conflict 
(shock) outcome as negative only.  
10.3 Limitation 
This study has conceptually and empirically examined the effects of weak livelihoods 
on conflict onset in the case study. The adverse changes in these livelihoods after 
conflict pose a threat to human security and possible conflict recurrence. While 
upholding the weak human and physical development and the conflict vulnerabilities 
premise for this investigation, it does not discuss other pertinent complementary 
narratives to the challenge. Historical legacies of colonial rule, religious struggle and 
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geography, for instance, have been widely reported to have had deep-seated 
implications for the conflicts in North-east Nigeria. These interconnected narratives 
epitomise the recurring North-east religious and ethnic contestation and conflict even 
before Boko Haram (UNDP 2018). 
In the 19th century, for instance, the Muslim dominated North-east was embroiled in the 
famous Usman Dan Fodio Jihad and whose conquest results in the sudden (corrective) 
change in what was described as un-Islamic and corrupt administrative practices 
(Hickey 1984). Dan Fodio’s subsequent incorporation and institutionalisation of the 
territory into Sokoto Caliphate (now North-west region); resulted in misapprehension 
and distrust among the variety of the religions, ethnicities and cultures in the area (Joel 
2014). The process of colonisation by the British government further heightened the 
resistance as the region is administered through an indirectly rule, thereby suppressed 
the power of native authorities. Abubakar (2003) and Idahosa (2015), note that the 
ensued pursuit for ethnic assertion and domination and the emergence of a political 
class which became entangled in competition over resources have shaped conflicts in 
the North-east. The creation of Boko Haram insurgency and the subsequent conflict is, 
therefore, sometimes discussed from this lens of fear of religious, political and ethnic 
domination and supremacy. This research, nonetheless, avoided analysis of the North-
east conflict dynamics from these perspectives given the fragility of the context and the 
sensitivity of the subjects.    
Geographically, the North-east region shares international boundaries with the Republic 
of Niger, Republic of Chad and the Republic of Cameroon. Kashim (2012), underlines 
that the geographic location of the North-east predisposes it to conflicts given its 
proximity to those countries which are prone to political unrest and religious extremism. 
Similarly, given that some of the North-east states (Yobe, Borno and Adamawa) form 
the entry point to Nigeria from the North and Central Africa, the characteristic porosity 
of the international borders makes it easy for illegal cross-border activities - such as 
human trafficking and arms smuggling, to flourish (Nte 2011; Onuoha 2013; UNDP 
2018). The high presence of light weapons and ammunition (often believed to have 
found their way from Libya and Mali) in the region is widely considered to have aided 





10.4 Suggestions for Further Study 
This study has contributed to the ongoing discourse regarding conflict and its 
recurrence. The analysis of the specific implications of the post-conflict livelihoods 
changes adds to the pool of research on the potential precursor for conflict relapse. 
Consequently, conflict prevention recommendations - relating to the underlying 
developmental challenges, have been proposed to prevent recurrence of conflict. 
However, the investigation notes a possible few areas that may worth further research to 
improve the knowledge about this subject. 
The historical narratives of conflicts in the North-east suggest that pursuit of ethnic and 
religious dominance and supremacy have often played an essential role in instigating 
uprising (Abubakar 2003; Idahosa 2015). Stewart (2016), however, underlines that 
ethnic and religious identity is an essential motivation for conflict mobilisation in a low-
income setting that has a high rate of inequality. Although the case study of this 
research is predominantly Muslim, the diversity of ethnic groupings exists as reflected 
in geographic (ethnic) zoning in the town. This grouping is worth further research to 
analyse the possibility of conflict mobilisation, reflecting the identified inequality 
(Table 6.1) that may be ethnic-related. The analysis may throw more light on the 
selective destruction that has been noted, in addition to resentment that emanates from 
the general sense of inequality. 
Respondents in this investigation described the relative pre-conflict sustenance of Buni 
Yadi as a reflection of the micro-regional complementarity it shares with its 
neighbouring villages. Being the local council headquarters, Buni Yadi serves as a 
market for selling agricultural produce for the surrounding communities, and in return, 
the villages form an essential market for finished goods. This relation benefits both 
sides, but the businesses in Buni Yadi were particularly vibrant beneficiaries. However, 
these villages have since been displaced by the conflict in the region. A respondent 
(businessman) asserts that post-conflict recovery in Buni Yadi may, to a large extent, 
depend on the return and resettlement of the neighbouring villages. Research that 
focuses on this area may worth the while for understanding the effect of the relationship 
on post-conflict recovery and possible conflict relapse.  
While this research is based on conflict experiences in Buni Yadi North-east, Nigeria; 
its theoretical underpinning is global, hence the replicability in other contexts. 
Nonetheless, the replication of the investigation in another context may require 
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reflecting on the similarities and differences that exist between it and the case study to 
inform the appropriate methodological strategies and recommendations. 
10.5 Reflection  
The mixed-methods strategy employed for this research is considered to be robust, 
given that it leverages on the strength of combining quantitative surveys, observations 
and individual and focus group interviews. The empirical outcomes from the 
deployment of the method have helped in answering the research question of the study. 
However, the Hausa language was used primarily as a medium of communication 
during the fieldwork for data collection. While the author's understanding of the 
language used is sound, some richness and complexity of the participants' responses 
may have been inadvertently lost in the course of translation into the English language.  
While there was persistent assurance from the community members and leaders, the 
fragility and prevailing conditions in the case study were sources of safety concern 
during the fieldwork. The fear of the insurgents’ hostility towards western education 
and persons whose activities relates to it was real and could be seen from the nature of 
the destructions. This concern informed the researcher’s decision not to reside in Buni 
Yadi during the fieldwork but commuted from Damaturu (capital city) every day. Also, 
safety concern prevented the researcher from undertaking physical surveys on some 
livelihoods assets (closed roads, damaged roads, damaged farmlands etc.), which 
participants have mentioned that they were not accessible due to post-conflict 
conditions. Although the researcher could not find any reason to doubt the narratives of 
the research participants, it was believed, however, that visiting those sites could have 
added value to the empirical richness of this investigation. The research avoided those 
areas for safety concern. Similarly, the power relation in Buni Yadi is such that 
community leaders exert enormous influence on their subjects. This power play 
sometimes tends to make the leaders want to undermine the research ethics concerns 
(e.g. written consent) for the participants during the fieldwork. The researcher insisted – 
diplomatically though, that each participant needed to sign the consent form to 
participate. 
The role played by individuals or a group and peacebuilding spoilers, who may 
undermine the peace process and post-conflict recovery, is an essential aspect of post-
conflict context that cannot be overlooked. While spoilers’ saboteur role is often 
primarily located within the peace agreement which they form a part (Stedman 1997), 
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they may exist in many other forms and guise even in a non-negotiation peacebuilding 
setting (Menkhaus 2007). Peace agreement seemed not to be significantly pursuit in the 
North-east peace process and fight against the insurgency (Kantiok 2014); however, 
factionalisation of the insurgent group may be regarded as spoiling the tendency for 
securing effective peace talk. Similarly, accusations have been made about the possible 
involvement of vested interests that sabotage the counter-insurgency and peacebuilding 
process in the North-east. High ranking officers in the Nigeria Military, for instance, are 
said to have been court-martialled for aiding the insurgents with classified information 
and weapons (Aljazeera 2014). Furthermore, in 2018 the military suspended (the ban 
has been lifted) the operations of UNICEF in the North-east following an accusation of 
sabotage by the staffs of the aid organisation who were allegedly spying for the 
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
Questionnaire for households 
Human Security in a Post-conflict Livelihood Change Context: Case of Buni Yadi 
Principal Researchers: Lukman Lawal, PhD Research Student, 15121995@brookes.ac.uk 
School of Built Environment, Faculty of Technology, Design and Environment,  
Oxford Brookes University, United Kingdom.  
Supervisors:     
Dr Beacon Mbiba, bmbiba@brookes.ac.uk 
Dr Graham Wood, gjwood@brookes.ac.uk  
Invitation 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not to take part, it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time 
to read the following information carefully. 
What is the purpose of the study? 
This research is focused on understanding the nature and process of livelihood changes due of conflict 
and their implications on long term post conflict development and security. I intend to use Buni Yadi as a 
case study in an attempt to obtain residents’ personal experiences, perceptions and opinions regarding 
livelihood changes they might have noted and how those changes can/have impacted their long term post 
conflict livelihood development and security. This will be useful to develop framework for sustainable 
intervention for post conflict livelihoods. 
The pilot study of the field work is scheduled for between July and September 2017. The researcher will be 
at Buni Yadi during this period to administer questionnaire to households. The questionnaire contains 
questions that relates to income, employment, literacy, access to water, access to healthcare, access to 
electricity, housing etc. Data will be collected by asking an adult representative of each participating 
households to fill the questionnaire at their houses and return this to the researcher. The analysis and final 
results of this research will be a PhD thesis and summary reports for participants. It is also possible to 
publish findings from this research in academic journals and/or other relevant medium. However, the 
anonymity and confidentiality of participants’ personal information will surely be maintained.    
Why have I been invited to participate? 
You have been invited to participate in this study because of your experience of living and familiarity with 
Buni Yadi. Your opinions are extremely valuable for this research and therefore, I am inviting you to take 
part in the research study and please be clear that your participation is on a voluntary basis. The selection 
is based on a systematic random sampling which proposed to include one household from every ten in 
Buni Yadi.  
Do I have to take part? 
The decision on whether or not to take part as participant for this research study is yours, given that it is 
entirely voluntary. If you decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked 
to sign a consent form at the start of the session. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at 
any time and to withdraw any unprocessed data previously supplied without giving a reason.  
What will happen to me if I take part? 
The pilot study involves administering of questionnaire that you will be expected to fill. This will take 
approximately 30 minutes to be completed and express your opinion and experience about your place of 
living, and livelihoods before and after conflict in your community. The questionnaire is proposed to be 
administered at your house or other convenient location (preferably communal space) of your choice within 
the community provided it is safe for you and the researcher. In addition, the questionnaire contains 
questions about your income, access to food, literacy, access to water, access to healthcare, access to 
electricity, and other basic needs of live. It also contains questions about changes in those basic needs of 
living that you may have noticed or experience before and after conflict in your community and how these 
affect your livelihoods. If requested a summarised copy of the findings will be available to the community 
for you to access after the study is concluded.  
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
You will refine your experience in the process of livelihood improvement framework. You will also be given 
opportunity to present your aspiration about what and how you think things should be done to improve the 
living conditions of people in your community for a long term post conflict development.  
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Will what I say in this study be kept confidential? 
All data collected will be kept strictly confidential (subject to legal limitations). Your privacy and anonymity 
will be ensured in this data collection, storage and publication of the research material. For data storage, 
the data will be encrypted and only accessible to the researcher for transcription and storage purposes. 
Data generated through this study will be retained for 10 years in accordance with the University’s Policy 
on Academic Integrity. 
What should I do if I want to take part?     
If you like to take part and participate in this study you can indicate your interest to participate immediately 
and the researcher will confirm your eligibility. If you will like some time to think about your decision to 
participate, the researcher will be happy to contact you after two day to confirm your decision.  
What will happen to the results of the research study?     
The results of your information will be used in the researcher’s PhD thesis of which copies will be placed in 
the library of Oxford Brookes University, UK, and some journal articles without mentioning your name. In 
case you would like to have a copy of the summary Report and the journal articles at the end of the 
research, please inform the researcher. 
Who is organising and funding the research?     
The research is being organised and undertaken by Lukman Lawal, a PhD research student under Dr 
Beacon Mbiba, as the Director of studies and Dr Graham Wood as second supervisor. The researcher is 
carrying out this research as a doctoral study in School of Built Environment, Faculty of Technology, 
Design and Environment at Oxford Brookes University, UK. Funding for the program is being provided by 
the Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF) Nigeria. 
Who has reviewed the study?     
This research has been approved by the Oxford Brookes University’s Research Ethics Committee. 
Contact for Further Information     
For further information or queries please contact Lukman Lawal on 15121995@brookes.ac.uk or by 
phone through [number removed] (Nigeria)/[number removed] (UK). If you have any concerns about the 
way in which the study is being or has been conducted, you should contact the Chair of the University 
Research Ethics Committee on ethics@brookes.ac.uk. 






1. Invitation to Participate in Study: Quantitative Survey
Dear Sir/Madam, 
My name is Lukman Lawal. I am a PhD student from Nigeria conducting research on Human Security in 
a Post-conflict Livelihood Change Context: Case of Buni Yadi at Oxford Brookes University, United 
Kingdom. 
As part of my PhD research, I would like to meet a cross section of individuals and households to talk 
about their livelihoods with specific considerations to understand changes that may have occur before and 
after conflicts in their communities. The information will help to understand the implications of post conflict 
livelihood changes on the long term livelihoods of people in Buni Yadi, Gujba Local Government, Yobe 
State. The information from this research will be useful to develop appropriate and sustainable post conflict 
intervention strategy for the northeast and Nigeria at large.   
I would appreciate your participation in this research which will involve completing my questionnaire 
regarding your experience, impressions and perceptions of the changes you might have noticed and how it 
affects your livelihoods.  
I have attached an information sheet about my research and a consent form with this invitation. I would 
appreciate it if you could read both documents and get back to me with any questions you may have. If 
you would like to be part of this study, you may indicate your interest immediately or I can contact you 
through phone call or text message after two days to confirm your decision please. 
I will be in Nigeria from the 20th July, 2017 to 30th September, 2017. I hope to complete the pilot study of 
data collection during this period. 
Thank you for your time and consideration, your participation is highly appreciated. 
Best regards, 
Lukman Lawal 
PhD Research Student 
School of Built Environment, Faculty of Technology, Design and Environment 
Oxford Brookes University. 
Email: 15121995@brookes.ac.uk 
Mobile: [number removed] (Nigeria) /[number removed] (UK) 
(Attachments: Participant Information Sheet – Consent Form) 
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Appendix 3 
SURVEY SCHEDULE (QUESTIONNAIRE) 
RESPONDENT’S PROFILE 
1. Gender
Male (    )    Female (  ) 
2. Age
18-24yrs (   ) 25-34yrs (    ) 35-44yrs (    ) 45-54yrs (    )  55yrs and above (  ) 
3. Education Level
Tertiary education (    )    Secondary education (    )   Primary education (    )  Quranic 
education only (   )                  No education (    )
4. How long have you lived in Buni Yadi?
Less than 1 yr (    )    1-3 yrs (    )     4-6 yrs (    )    7-9 yrs (    )    More than 10 yrs (    )
5. Why did you leave your original community?
6. Where did you live before coming to Buni Yadi?
7. Why did you decide to live in Buni Yadi?
8. Do you currently live with your family at Buni Yadi?
Yes   (    )      No   (     )
9. If No, please explain why
ROADS INFRASTRUCTURE 
10. Describe the conditions and accessibility to roads in Buni Yadi.
11. How does conflict affected road accessibility in your community?
12. What effect does the changes in accessibility to roads has on your means of earning a
living?
13. What effect does the change in accessibility to roads has on the means of earning a living
of other members of your family?
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SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND EXPERIENCES 
14. Do you have access to water supply in your household?
Yes (     )     No (    )
15. If yes, how do you access the water?
Tap water (   )   Borehole (   )   Well (    )   Stream (    ) others specify…………….. 
16. How long does it take to walk to access water from your household?
0-15minutes (   )   15-30 minutes (    )   31-45 minutes (    )   46-60 minutes (    )
More than 1 hour specify………………………………………………………………………………. 
17. Please describe how conflict has affected water supply in your family.
Not affected (   )
Affected, explain….. 
18. How does your family cope with change in water supply after conflict?
19. Does your family have access to healthcare?
Yes (     )     No (    )
20. If yes, how do you access the healthcare?
In my community (   )    From a neighbouring community (   )   From the city (    )
From another state (    )   others specify……………………………………………………………. 
21. How long does it take you to access healthcare?
Less than 1 hour (   )   2 hours (    )   3 hours (    )   4 hours (    )   5 hours or more (   )
22. Please describe how conflict has affected access to healthcare in your family.
Not affected (   )
Affected, explain….. 
23. How does your family cope with change in access to healthcare after conflict?
24. How have your social networks useful to you before conflict?
25. How does conflict affect your social network benefits?
I don’t have social network (   )
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Affected, explain….. 
26. How does conflict affect the social networks of other members of your family?
27. How does your family cope with the change in your social network after conflict?
ECONOMIC PROFILE OF RESPONDENT 
28. What are your means of earning a living before conflict?
29. What are your means of earning a living after conflict?
30. How does conflict affect access to your livelihood assets?
31. Does conflict affect the access to livelihood asset of other members of your family?
Yes   (    )     No   (   )
32. If Yes, how does conflict affect the access to livelihood assets of your family members?
33. How does your family cope with livelihood assets change after conflict?
34. What is your employment status?
Employed (    )  Unemployed (    )    Retired (    )  Student (    )   Others (  ) 
35. If employed, what is your current job?
36. What is your job before coming to Buni Yadi?
37. Please describe how conflict has affected your employment.














40. Please describe how conflict has affected your income level. 




41. Does conflict affect your family income?                                                                                                                              
Yes   (    )      No   (     ) 
 
42. If Yes, Please explain... 
 
 





44. Do you own the house you live in? 
 Yes (     )    No (     ) 
 
45. How has conflict affected your housing? 




















Invitation to Participate in Study: Focus group and interviews 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
My name is Lukman Lawal. I am a PhD student from Nigeria conducting research on Human Security in 
a Post-conflict Livelihood Change Context: Case of Buni Yadi at Oxford Brookes University, United 
Kingdom. 
This is an extension of the previous study (questionnaire) I have conducted in this community as part of 
my PhD research. I would like to meet a cross section of groups of individuals to discuss about their 
livelihoods with specific considerations to understanding changes that may have occur before and after 
conflicts in their communities. The information will help to understand the implications of post conflict 
livelihood changes on the long term post conflict livelihoods development of people in Buni Yadi, Gujba 
Local Government, Yobe State. The information from this research will be useful to develop appropriate 
and sustainable post conflict intervention strategy for the northeast and Nigeria at large.    
I would appreciate it if you participate in this research by taking part in a focus group discussion.  The 
discussion will ask questions regarding your experience, impressions and perceptions of the changes you 
might have noticed and how it affects your livelihoods.  
I have attached an information sheet about my research and a consent form with this invitation. I would 
appreciate it if you could read both documents and get back to me with any questions you may have. If 
you would like to take part in the study, you may decide to declare your interest to participate immediately 
or you contact me through phone call or text message after two days to confirm your decision please. 
Thank you for your time and consideration, your participation is highly appreciated. 
Best regards, 
Lukman Lawal 
PhD Research Student 
School of Built Environment, Faculty of Technology, Design and Environment 
Oxford Brookes University. 
Email: 15121995@brookes.ac.uk 
Mobile: [number removed] (Nigeria) /[number removed] (UK) 
(Attachments: Participant Information Sheet – Consent Form) 
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Appendix 5 
CONSENT FORM (Main Study - Focus Group Discussion)  
Human Security in a Post-conflict Livelihood Change Context: Case of Buni Yadi 
The research will be submitted to Oxford Brookes University, and graded as part of a requirement for 
completion of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) degree.  
Principal Researchers: Lukman Lawal, PhD Research Student, 15121995@brookes.ac.uk 
School of Built Environment, Faculty of Technology, Design and Environment,  
Oxford Brookes University, United Kingdom.  
Supervisors:     
Dr Beacon Mbiba, bmbiba@brookes.ac.uk 
Dr Graham Wood, gjwood@brookes.ac.uk  
 Please initial box 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for
the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that
I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving reason
3. I understand that the focus group will be audio-recorded
4. I agree to take part in the above study
Please initial box 
Yes  No 
5. I’d like to receive a summary of this research findings when completed
6. I agree that my data gathered in this study may be stored
(after it has been anonymised) in a specialist data centre
and may be used for future research.
……………………………………..  …………………….. 
………………………….. 
 Name/Initials of Participant Date Signature 
…………………………………….  ...…………………… 
………………………….. 
Lukman Lawal  Date Signature 
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Appendix 6 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
Focus Group Discussion and interviews 
Human Security in a Post-conflict Livelihood Change Context: Case of Buni Yadi 
Principal Researchers: Lukman Lawal, PhD Research Student, 15121995@brookes.ac.uk 
School of Built Environment, Faculty of Technology, Design and Environment,  
Oxford Brookes University, United Kingdom.  
Supervisors:     
Dr Beacon Mbiba, bmbiba@brookes.ac.uk 
Dr Graham Wood, gjwood@brookes.ac.uk  
Invitation 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not to take part, it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time 
to read the following information carefully. 
What is the purpose of the study? 
This research is focused on understanding the nature and process of livelihood changes due to conflict 
and their implication on long term post conflict development and security. I intend to use Buni Yadi as a 
case study in attempt to obtain residents’ personal experiences, perceptions and opinions regarding 
livelihood changes they may have noted or experienced and how those changes can/have impacted their 
long term post conflict livelihood development and security. This will be useful to develop framework for 
sustainable intervention for post conflict livelihoods.  
This research is mainly an academic work whose aim is to improve understanding of post conflict 
livelihood changes and their implications on long term post conflict recovery and development. The study 
intends to contribute to the wider debate on post conflict livelihood intervention strategy which may inform 
future policy decision of Government and other stakeholders. The research is not being undertaking on 
behalf of any government, international organization or NGO, and therefore does not involve distribution of 
relieve materials or humanitarian aid.  
The focus group discussions are scheduled for between March 2018 and May 2018. The searcher will be 
at Buni Yadi during this period to coordinate the discussion proceedings. The transcript for the group 
discussion contain questions that relates to income, employment, education, access to water, access to 
healthcare, access to electricity and housing of people in Bini Yadi. Data will be collected during the focus 
group proceedings by way of note taking and voice recording by the researcher with the consent of 
participants. Consent for audio recording will be a condition for accepting potential participants’ 
participation in the study. All group discussions are proposed to take place at a communal space within the 
community or other agreed venue that is convenient and safe for all participants and the researcher. The 
analysis and final results of this research will be a PhD thesis and summary reports for participants. It is 
also possible to publish findings from this research in academic journals and/or other relevant medium. 
However, the anonymity and confidentiality of participants’ personal information will surely be maintained.    
Why have I been invited to participate? 
You have been invited to participate in this focus group discussion because of your experience of living 
and familiarity with Buni Yadi. You are also being invited because you are an adult and have met the 
inclusion criteria for one or more focus groups discussion for local farmers, local business persons, youths, 
women, conflict migrants in Buni Yani. Your opinions are extremely valuable for this research and 
therefore, I am inviting you to take part in the focus group discussion and please be clear that your 
participation is on a voluntary basis. Participants will be selected randomly based on set inclusion criteria 
for each group. Each group is proposed to consist between 5 and 7 adults who will participate in the focus 
group discussions. There are five groups that are proposed for this study and they include conflict 
migrants, market/business people, youths, women, and local farmers groups.   
Do I have to take part? 
The decision on whether or not to take part as participant for this research is yours, given that it is entirely 
voluntary. If you decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a 
consent form at the start of the session. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time 
and to withdraw any unprocessed data previously supplied without giving a reason.  
What will happen to me if I take part? 
Each focus group discussion session will last for approximately 60-90 minutes. In each case the 
researcher will introduce the discussion topics/sub-topics and will seek to get your opinions and 
experience about your place of living and livelihoods before and after conflict in your community. You will 
be requested to discuss about your income, access to food, education, access to water, access to 
healthcare, access to electricity, and other basic needs of live. The discussion will also involve asking you 
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about changes in those basic needs of living that you may have noticed or experience before and after 
conflict in your community and how these affect your livelihoods. During the discussion session, a voice-
recording will be taken with your consent. The discussions are proposed to take place within a communal 
space in the community (e.g. community hall) or other agreed location that are convenient and safe for all 
participants and the researcher. The researcher will be happy to make presentation of the result of findings 
for this research when it is completed. If requested a copy of transcripts and summarised copy of findings 
will be made available for access to the community after study is completed. 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
You will refine your experience in the process of livelihood improvement framework. You will also be given 
opportunity to present your aspiration about what and how you think things should be done to improve the 
living conditions of people in your community for a long term post conflict development.  
Will what I say in this study be kept confidential? 
All data collected will be kept strictly confidential (subject to legal limitations). Your privacy and anonymity 
will be ensured in this data collection, storage and publication of the research material. For data storage, 
the data will be encrypted and only accessible by researcher for transcription and storage purposes. Data 
generated through this study will be retained for 10 years in accordance with the University’s Policy on 
Academic Integrity. 
What should I do if I want to take part?     
If you like to take part and participate in this study you can indicate your interest to participate immediately 
and the researcher will confirm your eligibility. If you will like some time to think about your decision to 
participate, the researcher will be happy to contact you after two day to confirm your decision.  
What will happen to the results of the research study?     
The results of your information will be used in the researcher’s PhD thesis of which copies will be placed in 
the library of Oxford Brookes University, UK, and some journal articles without mentioning your name. In 
case you would like to have a copy of the summary report and the journal articles at the end of the 
research, a copy of the findings of the research will be made available in the community hall upon 
completion. 
Who is organising and funding the research?     
The research is being organised and undertaken by Lukman Lawal, a PhD research student under Dr 
Beacon Mbiba, as the Director of studies and Dr Graham Wood as second supervisor. The researcher is 
carrying out this research as a doctoral study in School of Built Environment, Faculty of Technology, 
Design and Environment at Oxford Brookes University, UK. Funding for the program is being provided by 
the Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF) Nigeria. 
Who has reviewed the study?     
This research has been approved by the Oxford Brookes University’s Research Ethics Committee. 
Contact for Further Information     
For further information or queries please contact Lukman Lawal on 15121995@brookes.ac.uk or by 
phone through [number removed] (Nigeria)/ [number removed] (UK). If you have any concerns about the 
way in which the study is being or has been conducted, you should contact the Chair of the University 
Research Ethics Committee on ethics@brookes.ac.uk. 






Focus Group Discussion (Local farmers) 
1. General Question
a. What in your opinion are the impacts of conflict in Buni Yadi?
b. What livelihood changes do you think these impacts have brought to people in Buni Yadi?
c. What in your opinion are the implications of the livelihood changes on long term post conflict
development of people?
2. Economic Changes
a. In what way do you think people in this community have experienced changes in their incomes?
What in your opinion are the implications of the changes in income of farmers on post conflict
development in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in income?
3. Housing Problem
a. In what way do you think people in this community have experienced changes in access to good
housing due to conflict? What in your opinion are the implications of the changes in access to
good housing on post conflict development in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in access to good
housing?
4. Access to Roads
a. How do you think the conflict in Buni Yadi changes access to roads in the community or its
environs? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in road access on post conflict
development in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in access to roads?
5. Electricity Availability
a. How do you think the conflict in Buni Yadi changes availability of electricity in the community?
What in your opinion are the implications of changes in electricity availability on post conflict
development in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in electricity
availability?
6. Healthcare
a. How do you think the conflict in Buni Yadi changes the availability and accessibility to healthcare
services in the community? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in access to
healthcare services on post conflict development in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in availability and
accessibility to healthcare services?
7. Social Network
a. In what way do you think people in this community have experienced changes in their social
network? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in social network on post conflict
development in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in social network?
8. Participation
a. To what extent do you think that farmers of Buni Yadi were involved in the decision making
process for the on-going post conflict reconstruction in the North East (and your community in
particular)?
c. To what extent was the views and aspirations of farmers considered and captured in the on-going
post conflict reconstruction?
d. What in your opinion are the implications of non-inclusion of farmers in decision making process
on post conflict development in Buni Yadi?
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Appendix 8 
Focus Group Discussion (Conflict Migrants) 
1. General Question
a. What in your opinion are the impacts of conflict on people?
b. What livelihood changes do you think these impacts have brought to people?
c. What in your opinion are the implications of the livelihood changes on long term post conflict
development of people?
2. Economic Changes
a. In what way do you think conflict changes the incomes of migrants? What in your opinion are the
implications of changes in income of migrants on their post conflict development?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in income?
3. Housing Problem
a. In what way do you think conflict changes the access to good housing for migrants? What in your
opinion are the implications of changes in access to good housing on post conflict development?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in access to good
housing?
4. Roads Access
a. In what way do you think conflict changes access to roads for migrants? What in your opinion are
the implications of changes in road access on post conflict development?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in access to roads?
5. Electricity Availability
a. In what way do you think conflict changes the availability of electricity for migrants? What in your
opinion are the implications of changes in electricity availability on post conflict development?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in electricity
availability?
6. Healthcare
a. In what way do you think conflict changes the availability and accessibility to healthcare services
for migrants? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in access to healthcare
services on post conflict development?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in availability and
accessibility to healthcare services?
7. Social Networks
a. In what way do you think conflict changes the social networks of migrants? What in your opinion
are the implications of changes in social network on post conflict development?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in social network?
8. Participation
a. To what extent do you think that conflict migrants in Buni Yadi were involved in the decision
making process for the on-        going post conflict reconstruction in the North East (and your
community in particular)?
c. To what extent was the views and aspirations of conflict migrants considered and captured in the
on-going post conflict reconstruction?
d. What in your opinion are the implications of non-inclusion of conflict migrants in decision making
process on post conflict development?
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Focus Group Discussion (Women) 
1. General Question
a. What in your opinion are the impacts of conflict on people in Buni Yadi?
b. What livelihood changes do you think these impacts have brought to people in Buni Yadi?
c. What in your opinion are the implications of the livelihood changes on long term post conflict
development of people?
2. Economic Changes
a. In what way do you think women in this community have experienced changes in their incomes?
What in your opinion are the implications of changes in income of women on their post conflict
development in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in income?
3. Housing Problem
a. In what way do you think women in this community have experienced changes in access to good
housing? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in access to good housing on post
conflict development in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in access to good
housing?
4. Roads Access
a. How do you think the conflict in Buni Yadi changes access to roads in the community or its
environs? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in road access on post conflict
development of women in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in access to roads?
5. Electricity Availability
a. How do you think the conflict in Buni Yadi changes availability of electricity in the community?
What in your opinion are the implications of changes in electricity availability on post conflict
development of women in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in electricity
availability?
6. Healthcare
a. How do you think the conflict in Buni Yadi changes the availability and accessibility to healthcare
services in the community? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in access to
healthcare services on post conflict development of women in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in availability and
accessibility to healthcare services?
7. Social Networks
a. In what way do you think women in this community have experienced changes in their social
network? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in social networks on post conflict
development of women in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in social networks?
8. Participation
a. To what extent do you think that women in Buni Yadi were involved in the decision making
process for the on-going post conflict reconstruction in the North East (and your community in
particular)?
b. To what extent was the views and aspirations of women considered and captured in the on-going
post conflict reconstruction?
c. What in your opinion are the implications of non-inclusion of women in decision making process
on post conflict development?
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Focus Group Discussion (Market/Business People) 
1. General Question
a. What in your opinion are the impacts of conflict on people in Buni Yadi?
b. What livelihood changes do you think these impacts have brought to people in Buni Yadi?
c. What in your opinion are the implications of the livelihood changes on long term post conflict
development of people?
2. Economic Changes
a. In what way do you think businessmen/businesswomen in this community have experienced
changes in their incomes? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in income of
business men/women on their post conflict development in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in income?
3. Housing Problem
a. In what way do you think people in this community have experienced changes in access to good
housing? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in access to good housing on post
conflict development in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in access to good
housing?
4. Roads Access
a. How do you think the conflict in Buni Yadi changes access to roads in the community or its
environs? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in road access on post conflict
development in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in access to roads?
5. Electricity Availability
a. How do you think the conflict in Buni Yadi changes availability of electricity in the community?
What in your opinion are the implications of changes in electricity availability on businesses in
post conflict development in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in electricity
availability?
6. Healthcare
a. How do you think the conflict in Buni Yadi changes the availability and accessibility to healthcare
services in the community? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in access to
healthcare services on post conflict development of in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in availability and
accessibility to healthcare services?
7. Social Networks
a. In what way do you think businessmen/businesswomen in this community have experienced
changes in their social networks? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in social
network on post conflict development in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in social networks?
8. Participation
a. To what extent do you think that business men/women in Buni Yadi were involved in the decision
making process for the on-going post conflict reconstruction in the North East (and your
community in particular)?
b. To what extent was the views and aspirations of business men/women considered and captured
in the on-going post conflict reconstruction?
c. What in your opinion are the implications of non-inclusion of business men/women in decision
making process on post conflict development?
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Appendix 11 
Focus Group Discussion (Youths) 
1. General Question
a. What in your opinion are the impacts of conflict on people in Buni Yadi?
b. What livelihood changes do you think these impacts have brought to people in Buni Yadi?
c. What in your opinion are the implications of the livelihood changes on long term post conflict
development of people?
2. Economic Changes
a. In what way do you think youths in this community have experienced changes in their incomes?
What in your opinion are the implications of changes in income of youths on their post conflict
development in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in income?
3. Housing Problem
a. In what way do you think people in this community have experienced changes in access to good
housing? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in access to good housing on post
conflict development of youths in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in access to good
housing?
4. Roads Access
a. How do you think the conflict in Buni Yadi changes access to roads in the community or its
environs? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in road access on post conflict
development of youths in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in access to roads?
5. Electricity Availability
a. How do you think the conflict in Buni Yadi changes availability of electricity in the community?
What in your opinion are the implications of changes in electricity availability on post conflict
development for youths in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in electricity
availability?
6. Healthcare
a. How do you think the conflict in Buni Yadi changes the availability and accessibility to healthcare
services in the community? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in access to
healthcare services on post conflict development of youths in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in availability and
accessibility to healthcare services?
7. Social Networks
a. In what way do you think businessmen/businesswomen in this community have experienced
changes in their social networks? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in social
networks on post conflict development for youths in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in social networks?
8. Participation
a. To what extent do you think that youths in Buni Yadi were involved in the decision making
process for the on-going post conflict reconstruction in the North East (and your community in
particular)?
b. To what extent was the views and aspirations of youths considered and captured in the on-going
post conflict reconstruction?
c. What in your opinion are the implications of non-inclusion of youths in decision making process





Translation Services /Transcription of Interviews / Moderation of focus groups (amend /delete as 
applicable) 
In order for the University to utilize the Services, [Name, organisation] may need to have access to some 
personal data (“Data”) which data is protected under the Data Protection Act 1998 (“the Act”). 
These Data will include, but not necessarily be limited to: Transcription of interviews as directed by the 
Principal Investigator of the project, or moderator and note taker of group interviews or focus groups. 
The parties agree that in respect of the Data, the University is the Data Controller and [Name, 
Organisation] is the Data Processor. [Name, Organisation] warrants to the University that it shall: 
(i) process the Data at all times in accordance with the Act and solely for the purposes of providing
the Services to the University and for no other purpose or in any manner except with the express
prior written consent of the Data Controller; and
(ii) comply with the seventh Data Protection Principle by implementing appropriate technical and
organisational measures to prevent unauthorised and unlawful processing of the Data and to
prevent accidental loss, or destruction of, or damage to the Data; and
(iii) ensure that each of its employees, agents and subcontractors are made aware of its obligations
with regard to the security and protection of the Data and require that they enter into binding
obligations with the Data Processor to maintain the appropriate levels of security and protection of
the Data; and
(iv) not divulge the Data whether directly or indirectly to any person, firm or company or otherwise
without the express prior written consent of the Data Controller except to those of its employees,
agents and subcontractors who are subject to (iii) above or except as may be required by any law
or regulation; and
(v) not process the Data outside of the European Economic Area except with the express prior
written authority of the Data Controller; and
(vi) to comply with any request from the Data Controller to amend, transfer or delete data and on
completion of the Services to deliver to the Data Controller or destroy, at the Data Controller’s
sole option, all the Data Controller’s Data in its possession or under its control
[Name, Organisation] agrees to indemnify the University for any fine it may receive from the Information 
Commissioner and/or pursuant to sections 13 and 14 of the Act arising from any breach by [Name, 
Organisation] of the above warranties; provided: (a) [Name, Organisation] has sole control of the defence 
and/or settlement of such claim to the extent possible; and (b) the University notifies [Name, Organisation] 
promptly in writing of each such claim and gives [Name, Organisation] all information known to the 
University relating thereto and (c) the University cooperates with [Name, Organisation] in the settlement 
and/or defence of such claim and (d) the University mitigates its loss to the fullest extent possible and (e) 
the University makes no admission in respect of such claim. 
The parties agree that any commercially sensitive information disclosed during the provision of the 
Services shall be treated with confidence and used only to the extent necessary to perform the Services. 
For the avoidance of doubt these terms and conditions replace and supersede any other terms and 
conditions between the parties relating to their respective obligations under the Act. 
Please counter-sign a copy of this letter if you are happy to provide the Services on these terms. 
Name of researcher 
Study title 
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Data Protection Act 1998 Compliance & Confidentiality Acceptance 
I refer to the terms of your letter set out above and hereby unconditionally accept its terms and agree to 
comply with all Data Protection Act 1998 requirements in respect of any processing of personal data 
performed by me in the provision of the Services and to treat in confidence any confidential information 
which may become known to us during the provision of the Services.   
Yours faithfully 
…………………………………………. .................................................... 
Printed Name of person undertaking 
transcription or moderation 
  Date 
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Appendix 13 
Human Security in a Post-conflict Livelihoods Change: Case of Buni Yadi 
Data Processing and Analysis Method 
1. Quantitative method data
Collection location: The empirical data for this research method was collected from the
residential area of Buni Yadi, Gujba LGA, Yobe State. 
Collection date: 14th – 20th August 2017
Type: These are numerical information for the thematic components of the livelihoods framework. 
The data are the quantitative measures for pre and post-conflict economic, social, infrastructure 
and human capital variables for individuals and households in Buni Yadi.  
Processing tool: Microsoft Excel was used to process the data for this method. 
Analysis method: The numerical entry for each of the collected livelihoods variables were 
recorded into the Excel spreadsheet according to the themes of the framework. This information 
was used to generate the descriptive pattern of the pre and post-conflict livelihoods conditions for 
individuals and households in the case study.  
Presentation: The processed data were transformed and presented in the form of tables and 
charts e.g. bar and pie.  
2. Physical surveys data
Collection location: The empirical data for this research method was collected from the
residential area of Buni Yadi, Gujba LGA, Yobe State. 
Collection date: 14th – 20th August 2017
Type: These are spatial and pictorial evidence regarding the location and physical conditions of 
infrastructures in Buni Yadi after the conflict. These infrastructures include houses, roads, 
schools, hospitals, business premises, police stations, public buildings etc. 
Collection method: These include physical observation and note-taking on the base map and 
photography. 
Processing tool: ArcGIS software was used to process and identify the locations, types and 
conditions of the infrastructures in the case study. The photographic images were copied from the 
camera onto the computer for presentation. 
Analysis method: The recorded locations, physical conditions and the types of destroyed 
infrastructures were uploaded onto the ArcGIS interface. Based on the residential satellite image 
of Buni Yadi, this information was analysed thereby used to generate the spatial distribution and 
conditions of the infrastructure in the case study area. The output provided the ground for further 
interpretation of the pattern that emerged.  
Presentation: The processed physical surveys information were presented in the form of spatial 
plan and photographic images.  
3. Qualitative method data
Collection location: The empirical data for this research method was collected from the
residential area of Buni Yadi, Gujba LGA, Yobe State. 
Collection date: 3rd – 7th April 2018 
Type: This is oral evidence regarding pre and post-conflict livelihoods in Buni Yadi. 
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Collection method: The oral information was collected through individuals and focus groups 
discussions. The discussions were recorded using note-taking and audio recording following the 
written consent by participants.   
Processing tool: The collected data were manually processed. Having conducted the 
discussions in the Hausa Language recorded audio was first transcribed into a word document. 
This was then translated into the English Language.  
Analysis method: The processed data were grouped into the themes based on the livelihoods 
framework. Each category was then aligned to fit the purpose of this research thereby study the 
pattern that emerged.   
Presentation: The analysed data were presented as words quotes based on the individual 
themes and pattern that emerged. 
